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IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DELAWARE
CORPORATE LAW
ROBERT T. MILLER
ABSTRACT
Although it is dangerous to attempt to say anything new
about Smith v. Van Gorkom, the most controversial decision in
the history of Delaware corporate law, this Article tries to do so
by arguing that the extensive development of Delaware law since
the time of the case allows us a perspective on Van Gorkom not
available when the case was decided in 1985 or, indeed, for a long
time thereafter. In particular, Van Gorkom had as important a
role in the evolution of Delaware law as the three other outstanding cases decided by the Delaware Supreme Court in the miracle
year of 1985: Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, Revlon v. MacAndrews
& Forbes, and Moran v. Household International.
This Article argues, first and foremost, that Van Gorkom was
an attempt by the Delaware Supreme Court to respond to widespread
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concern about the vast increase in merger-and-acquisition activity
in the early 1980s. In particular, the case was the court’s first
attempt to devise a regime of directorial fiduciary duties to regulate negotiated transactions. Van Gorkom should have been Revlon,
and what the Delaware Supreme Court got wrong in Van Gorkom
in January of 1985—the creation of a new duty of care based on
dicta from the 1984 case of Aronson v. Lewis—it got right in
Revlon in November of 1985 by creating what we now call Revlon
duties. Nevertheless, Van Gorkom was not simply a botched first
attempt at articulating duties for directors selling their company.
The reasoning in Van Gorkom was in many ways inadequate,
but its essential holding—that the directors breached their duties—
would certainly have been the same under the reasoning in Revlon.
In other words, the basic holding in Van Gorkom—that the
Trans Union directors breached their fiduciary duties in selling
the company—is correct, albeit for not quite the reasons the Van
Gorkom court gave for this holding. What was truly disastrous
about Van Gorkom was not the holding that the Trans Union
directors breached their duties, but rather the remedy the court
imposed on the breaching directors—enormous monetary damages.
Since Revlon was a pre-closing action, when the court
found in that case that the directors breached their duties in
agreeing to sell the company, the court could order relief by
means of a preliminary injunction. By contrast, Van Gorkom was
a post-closing action decided long after the merger was completed,
and so that option was not available. Rather, when the Van
Gorkom court found that the directors breached their duties, the
axiom of the common law that every right has a remedy required
imposing enormous liability on the directors. We now know that
such a system was untenable, for it made the expected costs of
serving as a director greatly exceed the expected benefits. Neither
the justices of the Delaware Supreme Court nor anyone else could
have known it in 1985, but in fact there was no right answer the
court could have reached in Van Gorkom. If the court got the
holding on the merits right (the directors breached their duties),
it had to get the holding on remedies wrong (enormous monetary
damages). Smith v. Van Gorkom was the Kobayashi Maru of
Delaware corporate law—a problem in which all the possible
solutions prove disastrous.
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Moreover, just as in the fictional Kobayashi Maru in Star
Trek, a solution to the problem did exist, but it required action
from outside the system, action that would violate the fundamental terms of the problem as previously understood. In Van Gorkom,
that action was the Delaware General Assembly’s enactment of
Section 102(b)(7), allowing corporations to eliminate personal liability in damages for directors breaching fiduciary duties not involving disloyalty. This extraordinary statute effectively abridges the
common law rule that every right has a remedy, and it was necessary if the system of Delaware corporate law was to continue. By
eliminating the possibility of monetary damages post-closing, the
enactment of Section 102(b)(7) created strong incentives for
stockholders alleging their directors had breached their fiduciary
duties in approving a merger to bring suit before the merger
closed, thus creating a pre-clearance system of fiduciary-duty compliance similar to the pre-clearance system for antitrust compliance
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. The Delaware system of preclearance, in which stockholder challenges to mergers virtually
always take place at the preliminary injunction stage, has proved
tremendously successful. Such a system would have been impossible, however, without Van Gorkom. For, without Van Gorkom,
there would have been no Section 102(b)(7), and without Section
102(b)(7), there would have been no Revlon-Unocal system of
preclearance. Van Gorkom was in many ways a mistake, but it was
a mistake that had to be made to produce the current system of
Delaware law. In its own way, it was as important a step forward in
Delaware law as Revlon, Unocal or Household International.
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INTRODUCTION

Only with trepidation should anyone approach the topic of
Smith v. Van Gorkom.1 Clearly, the most controversial decision in
the history of Delaware corporate law,2 the case has been the subject of a vast scholarly and professional commentary.3 Although
See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
See generally infra note 3 and accompanying text.
3 The literature on Van Gorkom is tremendous. Immediately after the decision, there was a flood of commentary from both practitioners and scholars.
Among the practitioners, the most important articles include: Dierdre A.
Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate Realities and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J. CORP. L. 311
(1986); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187 (1986); Steven F. Mones, Mining
the Safe Harbor? The Business Judgment Rule After Trans Union, 10 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 545 (1985); Morton Moskin, Trans Union: A Nailed Board, 10 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 405 (1985); William Prickett, An Explanation of Trans Union to
“Henny Penny” and Her Friends, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451 (1985) (Prickett was
counsel to the plaintiffs in the case); William T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (1985); Stephen
A. Radin, The Director’s Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1988); and Barry F. Schwartz & James G.
Wiles, Trans Union: Neither “New” Nor “Bad” Law, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 429
(1985). Among the scholars, the most important articles include Daniel R.
Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS.
LAW. 1437 (1985), Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practice Tips on Life in
the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1 (1985), and Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127
(1988). In 1986, William M. Owen, who was an attorney in the general counsel’s office at Trans Union at the time of the merger, published a book-length
account of the acquisition of Trans Union, WILLIAM M. OWEN, AUTOPSY OF A
MERGER (1st ed. 1986) [hereinafter OWEN], which he supplemented in William
M. Owen, A CEO Named Van Gorkom, 24 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 35 (2000)
[hereinafter Owen, CEO] and A Shareholder Named Smith, 24 DIRECTORS &
BOARDS 39 (2000). In the same year, there appeared Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477 (2000) and a fifteenth
anniversary roundtable discussion involving prominent practitioners and
academics sponsored by Directors & Boards, Roundtable: The Legacy of
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 24 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 28 (2000). In 2001, the
Northwestern University Law Review held a symposium on the topic of Van
Gorkom. Symposium, Van Gorkom and the Corporate Board: Problem, Solution or Placebo?, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 449 (2002). That event produced several
more articles, including William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review
1
2
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there is a broad consensus that the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision in Van Gorkom was a serious mistake that the Delaware
General Assembly had to move quickly to correct,4 practically
every conceivable opinion about the case, whether favorable or
unfavorable, has been defended by someone or other, and thus
the possibility of saying anything new about the case after more
than thirty years naturally seems remote.5 With due caution,
however, this Article suggests that the extensive development of
Delaware corporate law that has occurred since the Delaware
Supreme Court decided the case now allows us a perspective on
Van Gorkom that earlier observers of Delaware corporate law
could not possess. T.S. Eliot famously argued that the full meaning of a great work of literature becomes known only as later great
works respond to it, and so its meaning—or at least its meaning
for us—will develop and increase over time.6 Something similar
Problem, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 449 (2002); R. Frank Balotti & A. Gilchrist
Sparks, III, Deal-Protection Measures and the Merger Recommendation, 96
NW. U.L. REV. 467 (2002); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s
Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 521
(2002); Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the Business Judgment
Rule: An Empirical Investigation of Target Firms’ Use of Fairness Opinions,
96 NW. U.L. REV. 567 (2002); Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van
Gorkom’s Legacy: The Limits of Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of Proprietary Incentives, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 579 (2002); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, A Kinder, Gentler Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Less Celebrated Legacies, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 595 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v.
Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 607 (2002); Fred
S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van
Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 631 (2002); Edward Rock
& Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and
Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 651 (2002). More recently,
articles that have appeared include: Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Story of
Smith v. Van Gorkom in CORPORATE LAW STORIES (J. Mark Ramseyer, ed.,
2009); Stephen P. Lamb & Joseph Christensen, Duty Follows Function: Two
Approaches to Curing the Mismatch Between the Fiduciary Duties and Potential Personal Liability of Corporate Officers, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 45 (2012); Bernard S. Sharfman, The Enduring Legacy of Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 287 (2008).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 330–51.
5 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (listing the wealth of scholarship produced in the years since Van Gorkom).
6 T.S. ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in THE SACRED WOOD
47, 50–51 (1921).
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is true about great cases at law, including Van Gorkom.7 Looking back now and discerning the place of Van Gorkom in the
development of Delaware corporate law yields not only insights
into the case itself that were unobtainable at the time of the
decision, but also insights into the system of Delaware corporate
law that developed in part as a result of the decision.8
In particular, Van Gorkom was one of four decisions the
Delaware Supreme Court issued in what must be regarded as
the miracle year of 1985.9 Van Gorkom was decided in January
of that year.10 In June came the court’s decision in Unocal v.
Mesa Petroleum,11 and in November, the court decided both Revlon
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings12 and Moran v. Household International.13 Unocal held that a board responding to a takeover
attempt has the burden of proving that it reasonably perceived
that there existed a threat to corporate policy or effectiveness
and that its response to the perceived threat was reasonable in
the circumstances.14 Unocal thus became the basis of the Delaware law governing hostile takeovers. Revlon held that when a
board decides to sell the company, it has the burden of proving
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (listing scholarship on Van Gorkom).
Id.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 10–13; Charles M. Elson & Robert B.
Thompson, Van Gorkom’s Legacy: The Limits of Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of Proprietary Incentives, 96 NW. U.L. Rev. 579, 579
(2002) (stating that Van Gorkom “is at the center of the most remarkable
period of judicial activity in corporate law in the twentieth century” and
noting its proximity in time to Aronson v. Lewis, Weinberger v. UOP, Unocal
v. Mesa Petroleum, and Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes).
10 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 858 (Del. 1985). The case was
submitted on June 11, 1984, and decided on January 29, 1985. On March 14,
1985, the Delaware Supreme Court denied a motion for reargument.
11 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985).
The case was submitted on May 16, 1985, and the Supreme Court rendered
an oral decision the next day, May 17, 1985. The written decision followed on
June 10, 1985.
12 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
173 (Del. 1986). The case was submitted on October 31, 1985, and the Supreme Court rendered an oral decision the next day, November 1, 1985. The
written opinion did not appear until March 13, 1986.
13 See Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1346 (Del.
1985). The case was submitted on May 21, 1985, decided on November 19, 1985,
and amended on November 20, 1985.
14 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
7
8
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that it took reasonable steps to get the best price reasonably
available for the stockholders.15 Revlon thus became the basis of
the Delaware law governing negotiated transactions. Moran held
that the poison pill was legal in Delaware, which gave the board
of directors the legal means to block hostile tender offers and so
fundamentally altered the balance of power between targets and
raiders in hostile transactions.16 With boards able to protect
against takeovers with the poison pill,17 and with Unocal regulating hostile deals18 and Revlon regulating friendly ones,19 there
may seem to be no place for an important role for Van Gorkom
in Delaware corporate law. Indeed, although the case has been
cited in subsequent business judgment cases not involving business combinations,20 there is no Van Gorkom doctrine or Van
Gorkom line of cases related to mergers and acquisitions.21 That
circumstance, I suggest, is highly misleading.
This Article argues that Van Gorkom played a critical role
in the development of the Delaware law of mergers and acquisitions. First and foremost, Van Gorkom was an attempt by the
Delaware Supreme Court to begin working out a regime to regulate negotiated transactions.22 Van Gorkom should have been
Revlon,23 and what the Delaware Supreme Court got wrong in
See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357.
17 Id.
18 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
19 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
20 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006).
21 See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
22 See id.
23 See generally Revlon, 506 A.2d 173. Soon after Van Gorkom was decided,
Manning astutely predicted that the case foreshadowed the development of
stricter judicial scrutiny of what he termed “ownership decisions,” i.e., board
decisions that affect the stockholders’ property in their shares. Bayless Manning,
Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41
BUS. LAW. 1, 6 (1985). “It is no accident that the court chose a cashout merger
case for the lecture it delivered” in Van Gorkom. Id. “The best way to read the
whole … opinion is to say that, whenever a board decision has a direct impact
on stock ownership, the board had better be extra careful.” Id. Macey and
Miller argued in 1988 that Van Gorkom should be understood not as a business judgment case but as “a takeover case” whose “function is to regulate a
target’s response to certain types of takeover bids, namely ‘rush’ offers with
short time fuses.” Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 128 (1988). Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court
15
16
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would later say, “[b]oards that have failed to exercise due care are frequently
boards that have been rushed.” Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 67 (Del. 1989). As noted in the text, like Macey and Miller, I
too see Van Gorkom as a takeover case, but one that (like Revlon) concerns
the duties of target directors in negotiated acquisitions generally, not one
limited to the rare case of “rush” offers and, moreover, a takeover case that
mistakenly tried to cram an entire takeover jurisprudence into the business
judgment rule’s duty of care. Furthermore, the risk of “rush” offers, which
may have seemed significant in 1988, never really materialized. Influenced
by Van Gorkom, plaintiffs to this day routinely allege that the directors were
in a rush to sell the company. See, e.g., In re Petsmart, Inc., No. 10782-VCS,
2017 WL 2303599 (Del. Ch. 2017); In re Om Group Inc. S’holders Litig., No.
11216-VCS, 2016 WL 5929951 (Del. Ch. 2016); Larkin v. Shah, No. 10918VCS, 2016 WL 4485447 (Del. Ch. 2016). As far I can determine, no Delaware
case since Van Gorkom has held that a board breached its duties (including
its Revlon duties) in approving a merger because it was rushed. Indeed, it is
hard even to think of cases in which the board was rushed even without
breaching its duties. For the best examples, see Citron v. Fairchild Camera &
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989) and Lyondell Petrochemical Co. v.
Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009), as well as the extraordinary circumstances
during the financial crisis in In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.) (applying Delaware law). In none of these cases, however, did the
court find that the directors breached their duties. See also Roundtable: The
Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 24 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 28, 38 (2000) [hereinafter Roundtable] (discussing whether it is possible to complete a deal in fortyeight hours post–Van Gorkom). However that may be, Macey and Miller think
the key point of Van Gorkom is that, if an acquirer should present a target
with a premium offer with a very short deadline, the board can reject the
offer citing Van Gorkom to justify taking more time to consider the offer and,
for instance, obtain a fairness opinion. Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller,
Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 128 (1988). This ability to delay
is important because it “eliminates the possibility that the board … will be
held liable to stockholders if it delays making a decision and the bidder …
drops the offer.” Id. at 136. In my view, there are several problems with this
reasoning. One is that the text of the majority opinion in Van Gorkom contradicts it. The court clearly thought that, while the deadline Pritzker set was
short, the board could have complied with its obligations within that timeframe. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877–78 (stating that “the Board did not
consider recessing the meeting [on September 20] to a later hour that day …
to give it time to elicit more information about the sufficiency of the offer,
either from inside Management … or from Trans Union’s own investment
banker.”). Furthermore, although the Trans Union directors had been advised by counsel that they could be liable for not accepting Pritzker’s offer,
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868, such a possibility was entirely fanciful. Such a
proposition had no basis in Delaware law at the time, and its only possible
later basis would be the very duty of care imposed by Van Gorkom itself. See
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that
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a board’s refusal to accept a premium offer was a prima facie breach of fiduciary duty and stating that “[e]stablishing such a principle would rob corporate boards of all discretion, forcing them to choose between accepting any
tender offer or merger proposal above market, or facing the likelihood of
personal liability if they reject it. To put directors to such a Hobson’s choice
would be the antithesis of the principles upon which a proper exercise of
business judgment is demanded of them.”). Subsequently, in Time-Warner,
the Delaware Supreme Court would hold that a board’s decision to turn down
a takeover proposal and remain independent, whether the offer is a “rush”
offer or not, would be reviewed under the business judgment rule, including
with respect to the duty of care. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1990); see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax
Minerals Co., 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999)
(holding that “even the decision not to negotiate … must be an informed one.
A target can refuse to negotiate under Time Warner, but it should be informed when making such refusal.”). Macey and Miller are right that directors faced with a premium offer with a short deadline face a difficult business
decision as to whether to take the attractive sure thing and risk losing the
possibility of an even better deal, but such directors can surely make this
decision without fear of personal liability except for possibly breaching their
duty of care. See Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 128 (1988). Contrary to Macey and Miller, Van
Gorkom did not ameliorate the difficulty such directors face by eliminating
the possibility of personal liability; it rather exacerbated that difficulty by
creating the possibility of liability where none had existed before. Compare
id. at 132–33, with Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858. Citing Macey and Miller,
Chancellor Allen once stated that, at least for purposes of deciding a motion
to dismiss derivative claims not involving allegations of disloyalty or improper
motivation, he:
count[ed] Smith v. Van Gorkom … not as a ‘negligence’ or due
care case involving no loyalty issues, but as an early and, as
of its date, not yet fully rationalized ‘Revlon’ or ‘change of control’ case … reflecting a concern with the Trans Union board’s
independence and loyalty to the company’s [stock]holders in a
critical ‘sale of the company’ context.
Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 n.4 (1996). This goes
beyond Macey and Miller in what this Article argues is the right direction by
seeing Van Gorkom as groping attempt towards Revlon. Nevertheless, I think
Allen’s somewhat cryptic remarks conflate concerns of improper motivation
(i.e., Unocal’s specter of self-interest that haunts decisions by directors that
might be perpetuating themselves in office) with concerns about due care in
selling the company (i.e., Revlon situations, where directors are usually voting themselves out of a job). Other scholars have also occasionally referred
favorably to Macey and Miller’s suggestion. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I
Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 488 (stating that “some have
cogently argued that Van Gorkom is best understood as a crude precursor to
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Van Gorkom in January of 1985 it would get right in Revlon in
November of that year.24 Nevertheless, Van Gorkom was not
simply a misstep, taken and then corrected. Indeed, if the court
in Van Gorkom had formulated and applied the doctrine it soon
would in Revlon, the outcome in Van Gorkom would have been
the same: that is, the Trans Union directors did breach their
fiduciary duties as those duties would soon come to be understood in Revlon.25 Put anachronistically, the Trans Union directors breached their Revlon duties when they approved the sale of
the company.26 Assuming Revlon is rightly decided, what was
wrong in Van Gorkom was thus not the essential holding that
the Trans Union directors breached their fiduciary duties.27
How then was Van Gorkom so wrong? Part of the answer
lies in the Van Gorkom court’s reasoning.28 Rather than announce an important new doctrine as it would soon do in Revlon,
the court in Van Gorkom attempted to reach what we can now
see as a correct result based on business judgment doctrines
involving the procedural duty of care that had entered the law in
dicta in Aronson v. Lewis29 in March of 1984—that is, just nine
months before Van Gorkom was decided and more than four
years after the Trans Union board had approved the merger
challenged in that case.30 This duty of care reasoning, however,
Revlon”); Elson & Thompson, supra note 9, at 582 n.17 (referring to Macey
and Miller, and to unpublished remarks of former Chief Justice Veasey and
former Chancellor Allen at the Northwestern University symposium on Van
Gorkom, to the effect that Van Gorkom was “the beginning of the Delaware
court’s attempt to work out the relative roles of directors and [stock]holders
in hostile takeovers that occupied so much of the court’s time for the remainder of 1985 and subsequent years”); RONALD GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATION ACQUISITIONS 1055 (2d. ed. 1995) (stating
that Van Gorkom “may be the Delaware Supreme Court’s first attempt at
counseling directors about the right way to sell the corporation.”).
24 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173.
25 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. See generally Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173.
26 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. See generally Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173.
27 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. See generally Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173.
28 Cf. William T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral
Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 470 (1985) (arguing that the majority
opinion “appears to many to be unprincipled, that is, without generality and
neutrality transcending the immediate result,” and “is burdened by overkill
and by needless, and often erroneous, legal and factual excesses.”).
29 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
30 Id.
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was manifestly inadequate to support the dramatic outcome in
Van Gorkom.31 For, as virtually the entire corporate bar understood at the time, the court was clearly imposing new fiduciary
duties on directors, but the court nevertheless steadfastly refused to admit that it was doing so.32 As a result, it never articulated a theoretical justification for the new duties it was creating,
never explained in adequate detail what they were, and never
made clear under what circumstances those duties would apply.33 This greatly contributed to the shock, chaos, and panic the
decision produced.34
A few months later in Revlon, of course, the Delaware Supreme Court would articulate a justification for a new set of
directorial duties based on the idea that, when the board decides
to sell the company, the end towards which the board should
direct its efforts changes from maximizing the value of the company
in the long term to obtaining the best price for the stockholders
See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. Allen, Jacobs, and Strine argue that
in Van Gorkom “while purporting to apply the gross negligence standard of
review, in reality (but not explicitly) [the Delaware Supreme Court] applied
an ordinary negligence standard.” William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care With
Delaware Public Policy, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 449, 458 (2002). Then–Vice Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Strine, has written that Van Gorkom “is hardly a
model for the principled application of the concept of gross negligence and
arguably involved facts that, when considered in their totality, did not even
amount to simple negligence.” Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition
LLC, 891 A.2d, 1032, 1063 n.82 (Del. Ch. 2006). Macey and Miller think that
“although the court defined the applicable standard of care as gross negligence, it seemed to apply a more stringent standard on the facts of the case,”
and “the facts did not support a finding of negligence, much less gross negligence.” Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 129. This latter conclusion is not
widely shared; it seems most observers agree that the Trans Union board was
negligent or grossly negligent. See Roundtable, supra note 23, at 28 (detailing
discussion among eleven eminent professionals and academics, of whom four
thought the board grossly negligent, six more thought the board at least negligent, and one thought the board not negligent). In any event, Mones is surely
right that Van Gorkom differed from prior cases “in its application of the gross
negligence standard to directors’ actions that, hitherto, undoubtedly would have
remained sheltered within the safe harbor” of the business judgment rule.
Steven F. Mones, Mining the Safe Harbor? The Business Judgment Rule After
Trans Union, 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 545, 567 (1985).
32 See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
33 See generally id.
34 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
31
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in an immediate sale transaction.35 Thus explained and limited,
these Revlon duties, while certainly new, were intelligible to the
corporate bar and seemed to directors like ones they could comply with in the limited circumstances in which they applied.36
This was true even though the new Revlon duties were in fact
more stringent than the duties imposed by Van Gorkom.37 For
example, the duty of care articulated in Van Gorkom required only
that the board be fully informed before it decides, but Revlon
requires not only this kind of procedural due care but also substantively reasonable decisions.38 The fact that Revlon demands
more of directors than did Van Gorkom shows that the error of
Van Gorkom, which we already saw did not lie in finding that
the Trans Union directors had breached their fiduciary duties, also
did not lie in imposing on those directors duties that were too
demanding.39 Rather, a good part of the problem with Van Gorkom
lay not in the content of the duties the court announced but in
the court’s failure to explain what that content was and when
the new duties would apply.40
In particular, by attempting to shoehorn a result that would
be correct under Revlon (the board had breached its fiduciary
duties) into a doctrine inadequate to the task (the procedural
duty of care articulated in Aronson v. Lewis),41 the Delaware Supreme Court found itself at key points required to say that certain actions by the Trans Union board were procedural mistakes
involving decisions made on the basis of inadequate information
when the real objection to those decisions—an objection not stated
in the opinion,42 but apparent in the subsequent light of Revlon—
was that these actions were manifestly not reasonably calculated
to get the best price for the stockholders reasonably available.43
35 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1985).
36 Id.
37 Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, with Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
38 Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, with Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
39 Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, with Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
40 See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
41 Compare Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, with Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984).
42 See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858. Indeed, it seems very likely
that the justices in the majority in Van Gorkom could not themselves, at the
time of the decision, have articulated the real objection.
43 See generally id.
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One result of this mismatch between the stated reasons for the
holding and the outcome of the case was an unpersuasive and
chaotic opinion. Another was great uncertainty for corporate directors.44 Van Gorkom made it clear that the Trans Union directors did something very wrong, but in just what was wrong, was
far less clear.45 Using the analytic tools of Revlon and subsequent
Revlon cases, we today can easily identify the breaches committed
by the Trans Union directors.46 But at the time, with just the
text of the Van Gorkom opinion to guide them, directors and
their counsel could not possibly have done so, and the reason
was that the text of the opinion simply does not contain a coherent account of what the directors did wrong and in what the
wrongness of their actions consisted.47
But Van Gorkom was not simply a botched first attempt
by the Delaware Supreme Court to regulate friendly transactions.
In one critically important way, it was an advance of the first
importance in Delaware corporate law, for it was a necessary mistake—a mistake without which Delaware very likely would not
have the well-functioning system of corporate law it has today.48
The reason for this becomes apparent when we compare the different procedural contexts in which Van Gorkom and Revlon
arose.49 Revlon arose in the context of the plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction,50 so that when the plaintiffs won, the
result was an injunction that led to a better sales process for the
company.51 By contrast, Van Gorkom was a post-closing appeal52
seeking to hold the directors liable for monetary damages.53 The
44 See

infra text accompanying notes 45–47.
See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
46 For example, compare the actions of the Trans Union directors in 1985
with those of the Lyondell directors, who faced a very similar factual scenario,
in 2007. See Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 237–39 (Del. 2009);
Robert T. Miller, Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan: Good Faith Comes to RevlonLand, 11 ENGAGE 14 (2010). Id.
47 See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858.
48 See generally id.
49 See infra text accompanying notes 50–52.
50 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179
(Del. 1985).
51 See id. at 185.
52 See Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1981 WL 15145 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 1981).
The plaintiff in Van Gorkom had brought the suit pre-closing, but the Court of
Chancery denied a preliminary injunction and let the merger continue.
53 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858.
45
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difference is critically important, for the gravest defect of Van
Gorkom lay not in its reasoning based on procedural due care—
though this was definitely inadequate54—nor yet its holding that
the Trans Union directors had breached their fiduciary duties—
which was in fact correct55—but in the remedy it imposed on the
defendants: enormous monetary damages.56 With the benefit of
hindsight, we know that such a system is untenable: rational
businesspeople will not serve as public company directors if an
honest mistake in approving a merger can subject them to damages aggregating many times their net worth.57 The benefits of
being a director, financial and otherwise, simply do not come
close to compensating a person for bearing such a tremendous
risk.58 Certainly in the merger context, where the sums involved
are generally enormous relative to the worth of any individual
and vastly exceed the limits of directors’ and officers’ insurance,
personal liability for directors cannot be part of a rational system of fiduciary duties.59
But now the tremendous positive contribution of Van
Gorkom to the development of Delaware corporate law should be
clear. Any decision in the case that reached the correct result—
that is, any decision that held that the Trans Union directors
See supra text accompanying notes 30–34.
See infra text accompanying note 635.
56 See infra text accompanying notes 636–38.
57 This point is common ground among practitioners and scholars alike.
See, e.g., Roundtable, supra note 23, at 28 (2000) (stating that the case contributed to “a reexamination by many executives of the personal risks of board
service”); Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(“Given the scale of operations of modern public corporations ... only a very
small probability of director liability based on ‘negligence,’ ‘waste,’ etc. could
induce a board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects.”); Bernard S.
Sharfman, The Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
287, 289–90 (2008) (stating that “[t]he enduring legacy of Van Gorkom is the
understanding that corporate directors should not be held financially liable
for corporate board decisions that lack due care”); Jonathan R. Macey, Smith
v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 607, 608 (2002)
(referring to “the debilitating threat of financial ruin from the personal liability to which the directors were exposed.”). Of course, there is always a contrary
opinion. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Drury, III, What’s the Cost of a Free Pass? A Call
for the Re-Assessment of Statutes that Allow for the Elimination of Personal
Liability for Directors, 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 99, 104 (2007).
58 See infra text accompanying notes 650–52.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 650–53.
54
55
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had breached their fiduciary duties—would have produced the same
disastrous results that Van Gorkom produced: collapsing directors’
and officers’ liability insurance (D&O) markets,60 panicked directors, serious calls for corporations to reincorporate outside of Delaware, and finally action by the Delaware General Assembly to allow
corporations to eliminate personal liability for directors for
breaches of the duty of care.61 Such results would have followed
even if the reasoning adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court had
been the perfectly sound reasoning it would deploy later the same
year in Revlon, or even the more elaborate version of that reasoning
that appears in Paramount v. QVC62 or other of Revlon’s progeny.63 The inadequate reasoning in Van Gorkom no doubt made
things much worse, but no matter how sound the reasoning had
been, the case would still have been a disaster that, if left uncorrected, would collapse the edifice of Delaware corporate law.64
For, if the law is to have special fiduciary duties for directors
See Nancy R. Mansfield, The Shocking Impact of Corporate Scandal on
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 211, 228 n.87 (2012);
Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 50–51 (stating that
D&O insurance premiums increased more than tenfold between 1984 and 1986);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Story of Smith v. Van Gorkom, in CORPORATE
LAW STORIES 198 (J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., 2009) (“perception that the decision
had significantly increased director liability exposure drove dramatic changes in
the director and officer … liability insurance market.”); E. Norman Veasey et al.,
Delaware Supports Directors With a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability,
Indemnification and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 400–01 (1987) (discussing
how some D&O carriers withdrew from the market or raised premiums and
deductibles as a result of Van Gorkom); Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31,
at 458 n.36 (stating that “after Van Gorkom, the D & O insurance industry
sharply increased their premiums and in some cases, threatened to stop writing
D & O insurance policies. This crisis required a legislative solution,” which
took the form of Section 102(b)(7)); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 651, 659 (2002) (stating “[i]n the wake of Smith v.
Van Gorkom, a directors and officers … liability insurance crisis was triggered.
Policies were not renewed, premiums skyrocketed, and firms worried about
being able to recruit high quality directors.”).
61 See infra text accompanying notes 343–50.
62 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51
(Del. 1994) [hereinafter QVC].
63 See, e.g., Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1145–46 (Del. 1990);
Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Co., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264, 1279–80 (Del. 1988).
64 See infra text accompanying notes 670–72.
60
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selling the company, then the coherency of the common law required that if directors breach those duties, the stockholders must
have an adequate remedy.65 In the pre-closing context, as in Revlon,
that remedy was an appropriate injunction, a tool with which the
equity courts of Delaware were intimately familiar.66 But in the
post-closing context, as in Van Gorkom, the only possible remedy
was monetary damages, and that remedy, it turns out, cannot be
part of a workable system of corporate law.67 The Delaware Supreme Court in Van Gorkom could not have issued any opinion
that solved this problem: if the opinion reached the conclusion
that the Trans Union directors breached their duties—the result
that would clearly follow under Revlon—then the court had to hold
the directors liable in damages, and that result would bring down
the entire system of directorial fiduciary duties.68 Smith v. Van
Gorkom was the Kobayashi Maru69 of Delaware corporate law.70
See infra text accompanying notes 664–67.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
185 (Del. 1986).
67 See infra text accompanying notes 664–69.
68 See infra text accompanying notes 669–71.
69 In Star Trek, the Kobayashi Maru is a training simulation for cadets at Star
Fleet Academy. The cadet is commanding a star ship that encounters a civilian
ship—the Kobayashi Maru—in distress, but aiding the ship requires entering the
Neutral Zone, which would violate a treaty with the warlike Klingons. Because
of how the simulation is constructed, if the cadet chooses not to aid the ship, its
innocent passengers and crew perish; if the cadet aids the ship, Klingon warships
appear and ultimately destroy or capture the cadet’s ship, perhaps triggering a
galactic war. The test is deliberately constructed to present the cadet with a
situation in which every possible choice is disastrous. In Star Trek II: The Wrath
of Kahn, we learn that James T. Kirk was the only cadet in Star Fleet history to
defeat the Kobayashi Maru, but he did so by covertly reprogramming the simulation—i.e., by creating a new option outside the accepted terms of the problem.
The academy commended him for original thinking. Commenting on the episode
later, Kirk declares that he does not believe in no-win situations. This is not
merely a bit of bravado. Kirk’s point is that a computer simulation artificially
limits a person’s options, but in the real world the set of options is not determined
in advance but limited only by human imagination and ingenuity. In the real
world, a situation is a no-win situation only because no one has yet devised a
winning solution; there can be no certainty ex ante that a winning solution does
not exist. Star Trek: The Original Series (CBS television broadcast 1966–69); see
Janet D. Stemwedel, The Philosophy of Star Trek: The Kobayashi Maru, No-Win
Scenarios, and Ethical Leadership, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2015, 10:18 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/janetstemwedel/2015/08/23/the-philosophy-of-star-trek
-the-kobayashi-maru-no-win-scenarios-and-ethical-leadership/#3d77f05c5f48.
70 See infra text accompanying notes 669–71.
65
66
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Neither the justices of the Delaware Supreme Court nor anyone
else could have known it at the time, but there was no correct answer to the issue posed by the case, no opinion that the Delaware
Supreme Court could have issued that would have both decided
the case correctly and not fatally undermined Delaware corporate law.71
More precisely, just as in the fictional training exercise at
Star Trek’s Star Fleet Academy, Kobayashi Maru, in Van Gorkom
there was no right answer within the system in which the participants were operating in Van Gorkom, the common law system.72 Just as in the Kobayashi Maru, where all moves within
the computer simulation lead to disaster but reprogramming the
simulation opens the possibility of a viable solution, so too in
Van Gorkom did a viable solution exist, but not within the common law system of Delaware fiduciary law.73 A workable solution required legislative action: the creation of a very unusual
legal structure, a duty—the director’s duty of care—that would
be enforceable by injunction when the directors threatened to
violate it, but not by monetary damages when they had in fact
violated it.74 If Delaware law was to impose significant duties on
directors who were selling their company—that is, if Delaware
were to have anything like the Revlon duties it has today—then
the question had to be faced: what happens when directors breach
these duties and the deal closes?75 The answer to that question
had to be that, at least in general, the directors were not liable in
damages.76 Knowing all we do now, perhaps we can imagine a
court of Solons and Solomons in 1985, farsighted enough to
grasp of all this and hold in Van Gorkom that directors had special new duties in selling their company and that the Trans Union
directors had breached those duties, but that the stockholders
Id.
Id. at 656–70.
73 See Stemwedel, supra note 69; infra text accompanying notes 656–70.
74 See infra text accompanying notes 627–31; infra Section II.B.
75 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
185 (Del. 1986); Derek J. Famulari, The Revlon Doctrine—The Fiduciary Duties
of Directors when Targets of Corporate Takeovers and Mergers, A.B.A. (Jan. 29,
2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/young_law
yers/publications/101/fiduciary_duties_of_directors_coporate_takeover.authcheck
dam.pdf [http://perma.cc/MJT5-PZQ6].
76 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
71
72
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post-closing would have no remedy for these breaches.77 In 1985,
however, no one could realistically have foreseen that Van
Gorkom required such an extraordinary outcome.78
Van Gorkom’s reasoning was poor and its outcome was
disastrous,79 but Van Gorkom was a disaster that had to occur if
the current system of Delaware law, especially the system of Revlon
duties, was to develop.80 In Delaware’s miracle year of 1985, Van
Gorkom was not simply a mistake soon to be corrected in Revlon.81
It was a necessary mistake, a mistake that had to be made, either
in Van Gorkom or some other case, if Revlon was to be possible.82
The creation of Revlon duties was a major advance in Delaware
law, but the practical existence of those duties critically depends
on their non-enforceability in the post-closing context, and that
essential aspect of Delaware corporate law comes not from Revlon
but from Van Gorkom.83 We naturally think of the elimination of
director liability as flowing from Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), for that section, to be sure,
is the legal basis for the elimination of that liability.84 It is no
stretch, however, to think of the elimination of that liability as
Van Gorkom immunity.85 That kind of immunity was essential
to the creation of the Delaware system of merger regulation, for
it results in all the critical regulatory decisions—that is, litigations about alleged fiduciary breaches—being made pre-closing.86
It compels the establishment, as it were, of a system in which
the Delaware courts pre-clear mergers for fiduciary compliance
before they close in much the same way (and for very similar
reasons) as the antitrust authorities pre-clear mergers for antitrust compliance under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.87
See infra text accompanying notes 671–75.
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985); infra text accompanying notes 636–40.
79 See supra text accompanying notes 30–34.
80 See infra text accompanying notes 671–79.
81 See id.
82 Id.
83 See infra text accompanying notes 627–31.
84 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2015).
85 See infra text accompanying notes 686–88.
86 See infra text accompanying notes 631–35.
87 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(2006). See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
77
78
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The balance of this Article consists of three parts. Part I
reviews the context in which Van Gorkom arose and then reconsiders Van Gorkom as a Revlon case, comparing the reasoning in
the case to what the Delaware Supreme Court could have said
had it adopted the principles it would espouse ten months later
in Revlon.88 This comparison highlights just how unpersuasive
and chaotic the Van Gorkom opinion was by showing what, with
the benefit of thirty years of hindsight, it could have been.89
Along the way, the Article clarifies a few matters at issue between the majority and the dissent, distinguishing disagreements about how the duty of care applied to the facts of the case
from disagreements about whether directors would have new
and different fiduciary duties in the context of approving a business combination.90 Part II elaborates on the argument that Van
Gorkom was the Kobayashi Maru of Delaware corporate law,
and that the Delaware Supreme Court had available to it no
right answer—that is, if the court reached the correct (by Revlon
standards) result that the Trans Union directors had breached
their fiduciary duties, the court’s holding, no matter how wellreasoned, would be fatal to Delaware corporate law.91 Part II
also reconsiders the genius of the legislative solution—the creation of a duty enforceable only by injunction when a breach is
threatened and not by monetary damages when a breach has
been completed—and explains the similarities of this system to
the Hart-Scott-Rodino system for pre-clearing mergers for antitrust purposes.92 The Conclusion offers some observations about
how extraordinary a development in the law Smith v. Van Gorkom
really was.93

LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (2d ed.
2000); STEPHEN M. AXINN ET AL., ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT (2017); PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PRACTICE
MANUAL (Anthony W. Swisher & Neil W. Imus eds., 4th ed. 2007).
88 See infra Part I.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See infra Part II.
92 See id.
93 See infra Conclusion.
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I. SMITH V. GORKOM AS A REVLON CASE

This Part (a) reviews the facts in Van Gorkom, and then
(b) reconsiders how the case would have turned out if the court
had applied Revlon and its progeny to the facts in the case. In so
doing, some of the disagreements between the majority and the
dissent may be clarified, including by showing how some disagreements were really about whether directors would have new and
special duties in selling the company and other disagreements
were more about how pre-Revlon doctrine should have been understood and applied.
A. The Facts in Van Gorkom
The facts in this case, at least as found by the Delaware
Supreme Court,94 are familiar to corporate law scholars, but
given the disorganization of the majority’s opinion—it recites its
finding of facts in Part I but then goes on to find some of the
most important facts only later in Parts II and III as it applies
the law to the facts—recounting the facts in chronological order
is probably worthwhile. Moreover, Owen’s account in Autopsy of
a Merger, though generally consistent with that of the Delaware
Supreme Court, often includes additional facts that are highly
illuminating.95 The account below generally follows that of the
The Delaware Supreme Court did indeed find the facts. See Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871 (Del. 1985). In reviewing the findings of fact
by the Court of Chancery, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that these findings were “contrary to the record and not the product of a logical and deductive reasoning process.” Id. (referring to the language of Levitt v. Bouvier, 287
A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972), which it had just quoted). The court went on to apply
the holding in Levitt to the effect that “when the findings below are clearly
wrong and the doing of justice requires their overturn,” the Delaware Supreme Court is “free to make contradictory findings of fact.” Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 871. This occasioned some severe criticism. See, e.g., Quillen, supra note
28, at 472–74. To say the least, it is possible that the Delaware Supreme Court’s
account of the facts is in some respects mistaken or incomplete; the dissenting
justices in the case surely thought this. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893–94
(McNeilly, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion “reads like an advocate’s closing address to a hostile jury” and is a “comedy of errors”).
95 See generally OWEN, supra note 3. In 1983, the Pritzkers sued Owen to
prevent him from publishing this book even as it was being serialized in
Crain’s Chicago Business. See Pritzkers Seeking to Squelch Book on Trans
94
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Delaware Supreme Court but, as expressly noted, integrates facts
from Owen in several place.
Trans Union was a cash cow company,96 producing a significant and presumably increasing free cash flow,97 primarily from
its business of leasing rolling-stock to businesses that shipped goods
by rail.98 However, the company had a persistent problem in
generating sufficient taxable income to use all of the investment
tax credits (ITCs) to which it was entitled under the tax laws as
then in effect.99 Over the years, Trans Union had in part dealt
with this problem by acquiring smaller companies that had taxable income against which Trans Union could use its ITCs.100 In
1980, however, Congress was considering amending the tax code
to allow corporations to accelerate depreciation of capital assets,
and this would have further exacerbated Trans Union’s inability
to use all of its available ITCs.101 Having unsuccessfully lobbied
Congress to make the ITCs refundable and dissatisfied with the
expedient of acquiring smaller companies with taxable income,102
the company’s chairman and chief executive officer, Jerome W.
Union Merger, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, Dec. 19, 1983, at 2. The Pritzkers’
motives for this extraordinary (and unsurprisingly futile) suit remain obscure.
See Rance Crain, Don Reuben Plays Both Sides, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS,
Dec. 26, 1983, at 10 (stating that in the sections of the book Crain’s published
“the Pritzkers come off very well” and “even in the later sections detailing the
dismantling of the Trans Union Corp. staff, there is little that hasn’t appeared before or that Bob Pritzker hasn’t boasted about elsewhere”).
96 Id. at 3 (stating Trans Union was a “cash cow” business). Owen also
notes that Trans Union was in the Fortune 500 in 1978 and had revenues of
$922 million and net income of $60 million in 1979. Id. at 4–5. It had turned a
profit every year for sixty-nine consecutive years. Id. at 4. For a fascinating
account of the origins of Trans Union in the nineteenth century, see Bainbridge,
supra note 60, at 201–02.
97 See OWEN, supra note 3, at 5, 34.
98 See id. at 4. In 1980, Trans Union owned 51,000 tank cars and 12,000
rail cars of other types. Id. at 3.
99 See id. at 24–25, 28. On ITCs, and the relation between ITCs and accelerated depreciation, see id. at 23–27.
100 See id. at 28–29.
101 See id. at 24, 30. To use all of its available ITCs, Trans Union would
then have needed an additional $150 million per year in taxable income. Id.
at 30. In 1979, Trans Union’s total taxable income was only $100.5 million. Id.
102 See id. at 25–28, 30; see also Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 202–03 (discussing Trans Union’s tax problems and the options the company’s managers
considered to deal with them).
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Van Gorkom,103 along with other senior managers of the company,
began considering a possible sale of the company to a larger corporation that could make full use of Trans Union’s ITCs.104
At a meeting on September 5, 1980, prompted by news
stories about leveraged buyouts (LBOs), Donald Romans, Trans
Union’s chief financial officer, presented to Van Gorkom and
other senior executives of the company a preliminary study of
the feasibility of an LBO of Trans Union.105 The prices in the
study ranged from $50 and $60 per Trans Union share, but at
the time, Trans Union’s shares were trading in the high thirties.106 Although not noted by the Delaware Supreme Court, this
was the first time Van Gorkom had ever heard of LBOs.107 Although he thought a management-led buyout involved too many
conflicts of interests to be desirable, Van Gorkom found a price of
$55 per share attractive, at least from his personal perspective
103 For background on Van Gorkom personally, see William M. Owen, A
CEO Named Van Gorkom, 24 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 35 (2000). See also Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 204–05.
104 See OWEN, supra note 3, at 30–31; see also Helen M. Bowers, Fairness
Opinions and the Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical Investigation of Target
Firms’ Use of Fairness Opinions, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 567, 568–69 (2002) (describing the larger economic context of the Trans Union merger and arguing
that the transaction was typical of the merger wave of the 1980s in which
“acquiring firms sought targets that offered the opportunity to liberate cash
by some method of post-acquisition restructuring or to take advantage of investment tax credits”).
105 See OWEN, supra note 3, at 36.
106 Id.
107 See id. at 37 (stating that “Van Gorkom had not heard of the concept of
a leveraged buyout before the meeting”). This was not because Van Gorkom
was unsophisticated or ignorant; it was because, in the fall of 1980, LBOs
were still something new under the sun and, apparently, not well-understood
outside of certain financial and legal circles. See Richard E. Rustin, Kohlberg
Kravis Hones Its Takeover Technique, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1980 at 35, in
which the Wall Street Journal thought it had to explain to its readers that a
certain transaction proposed by KKR was “called a ‘leveraged buy-out’” because it “involve[s] using borrowed money to purchase a company ... and then
converting it into a privately held concern.” As becomes clear below, a general
failure by Van Gorkom and other insiders at Trans Union to understand how
LBOs work may have been an important reason for the failure of the KKR
bid. More generally, it is critical to keep in mind that the world of M&A deal
making was vastly less sophisticated in 1985 than it is today. See Roundtable,
supra note 23, at 39 (Stephen M. Waters, stating “this was a much less sophisticated environment”).
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as a stockholder, and he became intrigued by the possibility of a
leveraged buyout by a third party.108 At sixty-three years of
age,109 he was approaching Trans Union’s mandatory retirement
age of sixty-five and may have wanted to liquidate the 75,000
Trans Union shares he held.110 Van Gorkom then secretly directed the company’s controller, Carl Peterson, to study the feasibility of an LBO of the company at $55 per share, assuming the
acquirer would make an equity contribution of $200 million and
would sell certain weaker-performing divisions.111 In particular,
Van Gorkom wanted to know whether, given certain assumptions about the interest rates that would be available for debt
financing,112 the acquirer could retire the debt to be incurred in
See OWEN, supra note 3, at 37–39.
Id. at 5.
110 Owen, who seems to treat Van Gorkom and others quite objectively,
noting the bad along with the good, never discusses this theory as a serious
possibility. It apparently originated in a Crain’s Chicago Business story. Id.
at 107–08. As explained below, Owen presents near-overwhelming evidence
that Van Gorkom—though not some of the other senior executives at Trans
Union—sincerely believed that management’s first duty, if the company was
to be sold, was to get the best price for stockholders. See, e.g., id. at 93.
111 According to Owen, the other assumptions were that (a) the acquirer
would borrow $490 million, (b) the divisions to be sold would net the company
some $102 million, (c) the interest rate on the debt would range from 12 percent to
14 percent, and (d) the company would achieve the cash flows projected in the
company’s existing five-year projections. Id. at 45. As far as appears from the
opinion of the court and Owen, this analysis took no account of the tax benefit
the acquirer would capture from Trans Union’s excess ITCs. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985). See generally OWEN, supra note 3.
112 Van Gorkom intended to, and later in fact did, help the acquirer arrange financing from Trans Union’s own banks. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
867. See OWEN, supra note 3, at 127. In contemporary terms, Van Gorkom
was arranging a form of stapled financing for the acquirer. See Christopher
Foulds, My Banker’s Conflicted and I Couldn’t be Happier: The Curious Durability of Staple Financing, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 519, 520 (2009). Although never
noted by the Delaware Supreme Court and as discussed below the interest
rate environment, in which the Trans Union merger was negotiated and consummated was critically important to the participants. See infra note 250 and
accompanying text. For, on September 20, 1980, the day the Pritzker–Trans
Union merger agreement was signed, the prime rate was 12.5 percent, OWEN,
supra note 3, at 128, and the effective federal funds rate that month was
10.87 percent. See Effective Federal Funds Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST.
LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS [https://perma.cc/JZ9S
-VVNY]. Interest rates would increase steadily thereafter, and by January of
108
109
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the transaction within five years.113 Peterson reported that, on
the assumptions Van Gorkom gave him, between $50 million
and $80 million of the required debt would remain outstanding
after five years.114
On Sunday, September 14, Van Gorkom met with Jay
Pritzker, who had built his family’s business, the Marmon Group,
which included the Hyatt Hotel chain, into a vast portfolio of
companies, largely through acquisitions.115 Van Gorkom presented
to Pritzker the transaction structure he had devised, including
the $55 per share price, which implied an aggregate valuation
for Trans Union of about $690 million.116 Van Gorkom presented
Pritzker with a handwritten financial analysis of the transaction
very similar to the one Petersen had prepared. It assumed a
$200 million equity contribution, $490 million of debt financing
at 14 percent interest, and sales of various minor Trans Union
units that would net $102 million.117 Although not noted by the
Supreme Court, it seems that Van Gorkom approached Pritzker
as much to seek his advice about the feasibility of an LBO of Trans
Union as to offer to sell him the company.118 Pritzker, who thought
the meeting would concern the business of the Chicago School
Finance Authority, on which he and Van Gorkom both served,119
was surprised when Van Gorkom began a discussion of a possible acquisition of Trans Union, and he clearly took Van Gorkom
to be soliciting an offer to purchase Trans Union.120 Emphasizing
1981, when KKR was attempting to arrange financing for its bid for Trans
Union, the prime rate had reached 20.5 percent, the highest rate it would
ever reach before or since, OWEN, supra note 3, at 128, and the effective federal funds rate had reached 19.08 percent. Effective Federal Funds Rate, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS [https://
perma.cc/JZ9S-VVNY].
113 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866.
114 Id.
115 See OWEN, supra note 3, at 8; see also Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 205–06
(discussing Pritzker’s background and the history of the Marmon Group).
116 OWEN, supra note 3, at 49.
117 William M. Owen, Trans Union: Behind the Scenes of a Giant, Controversial Merger, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, Dec. 19, 1983, at 25 [hereinafter
Owen, Trans Union]; see also OWEN, supra note 3, at 45.
118 OWEN, supra note 3, at 48.
119 Id.
120 According to Pritzker, Van Gorkom “commenced talking about the sale or
merger of Trans Union” and this “came as something of a shock to me ... because
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that Van Gorkom’s LBO structure assumed significant increases
in Trans Union’s cash flow,121 Pritzker attempted to negotiate the
price down to $50 per share, but Van Gorkom refused, and there
was no further discussion of price.122 In what would become a
matter of great significance, Van Gorkom told Pritzker that, in
any possible transaction, Trans Union would reserve the right to
accept a superior offer if such should emerge, and Pritzker replied
that, if his organization was to thus act as a stalking horse, he
would have to receive an option to purchase a large amount of
Trans Union stock at its undisturbed market price to compensate
him if another buyer should ultimately acquire the company.123 By
the next day, Monday, September 15, Pritzker informed Van
Gorkom that he was interested in pursuing a transaction on the
terms they had discussed.124
On Tuesday, September 16, and Wednesday, September 17,
Pritzker and his representatives met with Van Gorkom and certain Trans Union employees so Pritzker could conduct due diligence
on the company.125 In order to guard against the possibility that
news of the potential transaction would leak, Van Gorkom involved
only a very small number of senior Trans Union executives in the
due diligence process.126 Most of Trans Union’s senior management,
including Romans (the chief financial officer) and key operations
officers, were kept entirely in the dark—a fact that later became
very important.127 Meanwhile, Pritzker’s attorney was drafting a
you don’t usually have the chief executive officer of a company come in this
fashion. At least I hadn’t had that experience.” Id. at 48–49.
121 Owen, Trans Union, supra note 117.
122 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866 (Del. 1985). Pritzker later
stated that Van Gorkom said firmly that Pritzker could not buy the company
for less than $55 per share and so Pritzker “quickly concluded that if you
were going to make a deal, you might as well think in the $55 term, and if
financing could be properly worked out, perhaps you could afford to pay $55 a
share.” Owen, Trans Union, supra note 117.
123 OWEN, supra note 3, at 51–52.
124 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867.
125 By contemporary standards, of course, the speed and resulting cursory
nature of Pritzker’s due diligence is astonishing. It is perhaps worth noting
that the Trans Union executives involved at the time were shocked as well.
See OWEN, supra note 3, at 58–59. Chelberg, Van Gorkom’s heir apparent as
chief executive officer, thoughtɆincorrectlyɆthat Van Gorkom had pressured
Pritzker to move so quickly. Id. at 59.
126 OWEN, supra note 3, at 58–59.
127 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
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merger agreement.128 Although they had no further discussions
about price, Van Gorkom and Pritzker did negotiate further about
the stock option and finally agreed that, when Pritzker’s financing condition was fulfilled or waived, he would be entitled to
acquire from Trans Union one million shares of its common stock at
$38 per share, which was seventy-five cents above the closing
market price of the shares on Friday, September 19.129 Also on
September 19, Pritzker demanded that the merger agreement be
executed no later than the evening of Sunday, September 21, before financial markets opened in the United Kingdom on the following Monday.130 Accordingly, that same day, September 19, Van
Gorkom called a meeting of his senior executives for 11:00 AM,
and a special meeting of the Trans Union directors for noon the
following day, Saturday, September 20.131 Van Gorkom did not
reveal the purpose of the meeting to either group.132
On Saturday, September 20, both meetings were held. At
the earlier meeting with the Trans Union executives, Van Gorkom
apprised his senior officers of the offer from Pritzker.133 The reaction of the executives was almost entirely negative, with Romans
in particular noting that, based on a further analysis he had
conducted, an LBO could be completed at prices ranging from $55
to $65 per share, which put the Pritzker offer at the bottom of the
range.134 Romans stated that he thought a better price for the
company could, and should, be obtained.135
The Trans Union directors met at noon.136 The board consisted of five inside directors, including Van Gorkom, and five
outside directors,137 all of whom were eminently well-qualified:
Id. at 867.
Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Showing remarkable prescience, Romans guessed that Van Gorkom
would announce that he had sold the company to Pritzker and he stated to
another Trans Union executive before the meeting that it “better not be for
less than $60 per share.” OWEN, supra note 3, at 62.
133 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 886.
136 Id. at 867.
137 If we assume that Van Gorkom was interested in the Pritzker transaction, then since five of the ten directors were employees under Van Gorkom’s
control, a majority of the ten-member board was conflicted and the board
128
129
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four were chief executive officers of corporations larger than
Trans Union, and the fifth was the former dean of the University
of Chicago Business School.138 All of the directors were thoroughly familiar with Trans Union and its business and financial
condition, including its ongoing problem of realizing the full value
of its ITCs.139 Van Gorkom made a twenty-minute oral presentation about the Pritzker offer, and it seems that James Brennan,
the company’s attorney, made a presentation about the terms of
the proposed merger agreement,140 but the directors received no
written materials about the transaction.141 Although not noted
by the Supreme Court, at least one director seems to have expressed surprise that Van Gorkom would undertake to sell the
company essentially by himself without the input of management
or the board of directors.142 Van Gorkom did not disclose to the
board that he selected the $55 per share price based on Peterson’s
determination of the feasibility of an LBO, nor did he explain the
history of price negotiations between himself and Pritzker.143
would have lost the protection of the business judgment rule in approving the
merger simply for this reason. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del.
Ch. 2002). Furthermore, although not noted by the Delaware Supreme Court,
Van Gorkom was on the board of a corporation of which one of the outside
Trans Union directors was chief executive officer. OWEN, supra note 3, at 19.
Under contemporary Delaware law, this might raise an issue as to whether that
director also was truly independent. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 35–36
(Del. Ch. 2002). Consciences were clearly not as delicate in 1985, however, and
this issue seems never to have been raised.
138 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894. Macey has argued that Van Gorkom
should be understood as creating a one-size-fits-all rule about directorial care
that, while not truly needed for directors like those who sat on the Trans
Union board, would greatly improve the decision-making of directors who are
unqualified, lazy, poorly informed, avaricious or dishonest. Macey, supra note
57, at 619–21. Thus, while “the outcome in Smith v. Van Gorkom, appears questionable against the backdrop of the tremendous qualifications of [the Trans
Union] board,” the opinion “would not appear to be so odd if the court’s admonishments about high deliberative standards, careful disclosure to [stock]holders, and the use of qualified independent experts had been made to a board
that was of demonstrably low quality.” Id. at 628.
139 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876.
140 The dissent mentions a presentation by Trans Union’s attorney, but the
majority opinion does not. See id. at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 874 (majority opinion).
142 OWEN, supra note 3, at 70.
143 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868.
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Romans, who attended the meeting in his capacity as chief financial officer, but who was not a director, told the board: that
he had conducted some leveraged-buyout studies at $50, $55,
$60, and $65 per share; that these studies were not valuation
studies of the company; and that while he thought $55 per share
was a fair price, it was at the low end of the range.144 According
to Van Gorkom’s later account, the directors knew “that $55
might not be the highest price obtainable,”145 and there was “considerable discussion about seeking an outside ‘fairness opinion,’”
but “no such opinion worthy of the name could be obtained” before
the expiration of the offer.146 At the conclusion of the meeting, the
Trans Union directors voted to approve the merger agreement.147
Later, the board would assert that it did so on two conditions: first, that Trans Union would have the right to accept any
better offer that might emerge (but not to solicit such offers),
and, second, in order to facilitate such offers, Trans Union would
be free to share confidential information with any potential bidder (Pritzker had originally sought to limit Trans Union to
providing other potential bidders only publicly available information).148 In contemporary terms, the board was willing to agree to
a no-shop, provided it was qualified by a standard fiduciary-out.149
Supposedly, the no-shop period was to extend for ninety days from
Id. at 869.
Jerome W. Van Gorkom, The ‘Big Bang’ for Director Liability: The Chairman’s Report, 12 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 17, 18 (1987).
146 Id. at 18.
147 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869.
148 The Supreme Court majority seemed very skeptical about this. See Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 878. However, Owen accepts the directors’ contention
that these conditions were in fact discussed and imposed by the board at the
September 20 meeting. See OWEN, supra note 3, at 73–74. Quillen points out
that, in reversing the Court of Chancery’s finding of fact on this issue, the Supreme
Court disregarded the testimony of all the witnesses on this point. Quillen,
supra note 28, at 473.
149 See generally William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The
What and the Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 653 (1999);
Lou R. Kling, Eileen Nugent Simon & Michael Goldman, Summary of Acquisition Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 782 (1997); J. Travis Laster, Exposing a
False Dichotomy: The Implications of the No-Talk Cases for the Time/Revlon
Double Standard, 3 DEL. L. REV. 179 (2000); Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas
M. Raju, A Process-Based Model for Analyzing Deal-Protection Measures, 55
BUS. LAW. 1609 (2000).
144
145
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the date of the merger agreement (thus from about September 20 to
about December 20), with the Trans Union stockholder meeting
to consider the merger to follow on January 10 of the next year.150
The language of the merger agreement as executed by the
parties, however, did not clearly reflect such arrangements.151
After providing that Trans Union would call a stockholder meeting to consider the merger and that the Trans Union board would
recommend that the stockholders adopt the merger agreement
and use its best efforts to obtain the requisite vote, the agreement provided that the acquirer “acknowledges that the Trans
Union directors may have a competing fiduciary obligation to
the stockholders under certain circumstances.”152 The Delaware
Supreme Court would make much of the vagueness of this language.153 But it had to mean something, and at the least it would
See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 878.
Id.
152 Id. at 879; OWEN, supra note 3, at 76.
153 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 879. In this regard, see supra note 107,
regarding the primitiveness of deal technology in 1985. Furthermore, it would
likely be a mistake to conclude that Pritzker, the savvy dealmaker, had in this
instance drafted the contract to benefit himself and harm Trans Union. It
seems, rather, that the entire contract was slipshod even by the standards of
1980. Two examples make this clear. First, just before the eventual stockholder vote in February of 1981, Trans Union paid its usual quarterly dividend, which effectively cost Pritzker about $5 million. OWEN, supra note 3, at
185. Second, Trans Union made large retention and severance payments to
many employees, which also cost Pritzker a significant amount of money. Id.
at 204. Pritzker objected to both these actions and complained to Van
Gorkom, but as neither action was prohibited by the merger agreement,
Pritzker had to acquiesce. Id. Nowadays, it would inconceivable that a public
company merger agreement not address such issues in the interim covenants
section of the agreement. LOU R. KLING, EILEEN NUGENT SIMON & BRANDON
A. VAN DYKE, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND
DIVISIONS 795–98 (2017). Even in 1980, however, covenants prohibiting the
target company from paying dividends or increasing employee compensation
in material ways were well known. See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A
MERGER 293–94 (1975). That a sophisticated dealmaker like Pritzker entered
into a merger agreement not containing such standard and customary covenants protecting his interests suggests that, when the Trans Union directors
insisted that the artless language in the September 20 agreement gave them
a fiduciary out, they may have been correct. As to why the contract may have
been so poorly drafted, the answer likely lies with Pritzker’s whole philosophy
of deal making. Owen, Trans Union, supra note 117, at 24, quotes Pritzker as
saying that his father “convinced us that it is not the contract that makes a
150
151
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seem to allow the Trans Union board to withdraw its favorable recommendation of the merger, to decline to use its best efforts to
obtain the requisite vote, and probably even to recommend
against the merger if the board determined that its fiduciary
duties so required.154 Although the dissent disagreed,155 the majority found—and from a contemporary perspective this seems
plainly correct—that this language did not give the Trans Union
board the right to terminate the merger agreement in order to
accept a superior proposal.156
deal sound but how you behave afterward,” and “[w]e’ve bought a lot of things
on just a handshake or a paragraph or two. We’re the least legal-minded
people you’ll ever meet.”
154 Such is Quillen’s view as well. Quillen, supra note 28, at 473 (stating
“this language in the agreement clearly related to the board recommendation”
and noting that the extrinsic evidence, including the testimony of Pritzker, supported the view that the language meant that the Trans Union board could
withdraw its recommendation of the Pritzker transaction and recommend a
superior offer if one materialized). Note, however, that the analysis here and
in the text reflects the contemporary understanding that a board may convene a stockholders meeting and bring before the stockholders proposals
against which the board recommends. Such a possibility is expressly contemplated by, for instance, Section 146 of the DGCL. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 146
(West 2003). In 1985, the law may have been different. For, in Van Gorkom, the
court says that the board was mistaken to think that it could conduct a
stockholders meeting and either recommend against a merger considered at
the meeting or take no position in connection therewith; the board’s only
option, if it should later determine that the merger is no longer in the best
interests of the stockholders, is to “rescind its agreement.” Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 888. But if this is right, then the language in the merger agreement,
which the majority said did not give the board a right to terminate the agreement
to accept a better offer, probably did do just that, for then the board’s withdrawing its recommendation in favor of the merger is tantamount to terminating
the agreement. Id. This remains one of the minor mysteries of the case.
155 While admitting that the language “is not artfully drawn,” Justice
McNeilly in his dissent maintained that “the evidence is clear that the intention underlying that language was to make specific the right that the directors assumed they had, that is, to accept any offer that they thought was
better, and not to recommend the Pritzker offer in the face of a better one.”
Id. at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
156 The majority wrote, “[c]learly, this language on its face cannot be construed as incorporating either of the two ‘conditions’ described above: either
the right to accept a better offer or the right to distribute proprietary information to third parties.” Id. at 879. Nevertheless, Pritzker would later testify
that his understanding of the language was the same as that advanced by the
Trans Union directors. OWEN, supra note 3, at 76.
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The distinction was likely not as important, however, as
the majority maintained. If a superior proposal for the company
emerged, and the agreement allowed the board to recommend
that the Trans Union stockholders vote against the Pritzker
proposal in order to accept the superior one (or even if the
agreement did not allow this), then the outcome of any stockholder meeting to consider the Pritzker proposal would likely
have been a defeat for the proposal.157 At that point, the merger
agreement with Pritzker would presumably have to be terminated in some way or other, and Trans Union would be free to
accept the superior proposal.158 Pritzker would, of course, still in
effect collect a termination fee resulting from the stock option
Trans Union had granted him.159 As to the right to share
non-public information with a potential acquirer, surely Trans
Union already had this right, and it would lose it only if the agreement prohibited such disclosure.160 The fact that the agreement
did not expressly authorize Trans Union to share non-public
information about the company with potential bidders clearly
cannot be construed as a contractual prohibition on such actions.161
In any event, in what was likely the most notorious signing in American corporate history,162 Van Gorkom and Pritzker
executed the merger agreement during the evening of Saturday,
September 20, at a formal social event Van Gorkom was hosting
for the opening of the Chicago Lyric Opera.163 The Supreme
Court’s account of this event almost conjures a picture of Van
Gorkom and Pritzker, both dressed in white tie at a lavish party,
OWEN, supra note 3, at 73.
See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 858 (majority opinion).
160 OWEN, supra note 3, at 76.
161 See generally Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form over Substance? The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 849, 859 (2011).
162 Surely, it was the only signing ever to produce a whole article dedicated
to describing it. See William M. Owen, Opening Night at the Opera, 24 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 106 (2000). Quillen suggests that it was unfair of the
Supreme Court to draw a negative inference from this event, which he describes
as a “superficial fact[.]” Quillen, supra note 28, at 479. He is right about this.
Whatever else went wrong in the deal process at Trans Union, the details of
the physical execution of the merger agreement were not relevant.
163 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869.
157
158
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with Van Gorkom asking Pritzker to turn around so Van Gorkom
can sign the agreement leaning on Pritzker’s back.164 The reality
was not quite that dramatic. According to Owen, Van Gorkom
was hosting a party in the penthouse of the Trans Union building and, at a certain point, although “[g]arbed in his formal
black suit with tails and a white bow tie,” Van Gorkom left the
party and took the elevator down to a lower floor “carrying a
tray laden with drinks.”165 There, “a group of lawyers—the beneficiaries of this thoughtfulness—was working diligently putting
the finishing touches on the agreements,” and Van Gorkom executed the agreements on behalf of Trans Union.166
On Monday, September 22, the parties publicly announced
the merger.167 The result was a rebellion among the company’s
senior executives, but contrary to the impression that may be
created by the Supreme Court’s account of the facts, the reason
seems to have had little to do with the price Pritzker was offering.168 At this point, Owen’s account in Autopsy of a Merger is especially illuminating. To be sure, one group of executives led by
Romans was interested in making a competing bid for the company in a management buy-out, and although these executives
thought they could pay more than $55 per share and knew they
would have to do so in order to outbid Pritzker, they obviously
had strong incentives to keep the price as low as possible.169
While they would argue that a higher price could and should be
obtained,170 they did not envision that price as being higher than
the price they themselves were prepared to pay—probably about
$60 per share.171
See generally id. Bainbridge goes so far as to suggest that “the concise
take home lesson of the case may be that one ought not to conclude deals of
this magnitude at the opera” because “doing so suggests an unseemly cavalier
attitude.” Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 226. In the retelling, this episode has
undergone great transmogrification. According to one article, for example, the
signing occurred in the opera house at intermission. Gregory R. Andre, Tender
Offers for Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12
DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 895 (1987).
165 OWEN, supra note 3, at 2.
166 Id.
167 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 869.
168 OWEN, supra note 3, at 84–85.
169 Id. at 84.
170 Id.
171 See id.
164
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A larger group of executives was dissatisfied with the
transaction for quite different reasons.172 They worried about
the effect the transaction would have on them personally.173 As
compared to those at the Pritzker’s Marmon Group, the salaries,
benefits, and perquisites offered by Trans Union were extraordinarily generous.174 Indeed, the overwhelming impression left by
Owen’s account of the merger’s effect on Trans Union’s employees—Owen himself was an attorney in Trans Union’s general
counsel office, and his book describes interviews with over forty
of his former colleagues—is that Trans Union was an extreme
case of a public company providing lavish benefits to executives
and other insiders.175 As one of the employees interviewed by
Owen puts it, Trans Union was “fat, dumb and happy” and deserved for that reason to be acquired.176 Other Trans Union employees describe the company as being “sleepy,”177 “relaxed,”178
“complacent,”179 and “cushy,”180 and many said they expected to
have at Trans Union “a job for life.”181 Emblematic of this culture
was the corporate headquarters. In addition to the Trans Union
Building in downtown Chicago, the company had built another
headquarters in the Chicago suburb of Lincolnshire; the structure
was set on a gigantic wooded parcel and resembled a country manor
house (many of the 180 employees who worked there jokingly
referred to it as “Camelot”).182 By contrast, the Pritzker’s Marmon
Group had a no-frills, cost-cutting culture, and Robert Pritzker
was famous (or notorious) for insisting employees put out the
lights in their offices when they went out to lunch.183 Marmon
was also famous for its extremely lean staffing, and Trans Union
staffing levels were, by Marmon standards, exorbitant.184 Many
Id. at 81.
Id.
174 Id. at 80.
175 See generally id.; infra text accompanying notes 176–85.
176 OWEN, supra note 3, at 236.
177 Id. at 248.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 249.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 250.
182 Id. at 208.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 210.
172
173
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Trans Union executives worried—entirely correctly, as it turned
out—that if Pritzker acquired Trans Union, many of the existing
Trans Union executives would be terminated and those remaining would do much more work for much less pay.185
In this context, perhaps it should not have surprised Van
Gorkom that many of his executives expressed their anger about
the transaction precisely because of its potential effects on them
personally.186 At one critical meeting held to placate the angry
executives, one of Van Gorkom’s lieutenants flabbergasted him
by stating that, in the lieutenant’s view, the first duty of management was to the employees of the corporation.187 To his credit,
Van Gorkom consistently maintained throughout the process
that the paramount concern was obtaining the best price for the
stockholders.188 Indeed, after the merger closed but long before
185 Id. at 213. After the Pritzker transaction was publicly announced, Van
Gorkom called a meeting of the corporate staff at the Lincolnshire headquarters and emphatically assured them that “99.9 percent” of them would continue to be employed by the company under the new owners. Id. at 78. Owen
suggests that Van Gorkom, suffering from an astonishing naiveté, actually
believed this. Id. Within a year of the closing of the merger, the Pritzkers had
sold the Lincolnshire building and fired virtually all of the 180 Trans Union
employees who worked there. Id. at 208–10.
186 Id. at 84–85.
187 Id. at 92. According to Owen, “[t]he officer said something that Van
Gorkom later testified ‘really stunned’ him. He said that he thought the company had obligations to its employees, its customers, and its [stock]holders—and
that the employees clearly came before the [stock]holders.” Id. Van Gorkom
said that he “didn’t want to get into a big argument with him” but told him,
“[w]ell, we don’t agree with that.” Id.
188 Id. at 91, 100. Of course, this would be precisely the duty of the directors under Revlon. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986). In Owen’s account, Van Gorkom consistently and
vociferously stated that it was the duty of the directors and the officers to act
selflessly to obtain the best price for the stockholders, and Van Gorkom insisted that, in his judgment, he had always so acted. OWEN, supra note 3, at
91, 100, 227. Pritzker later stated that Van Gorkom’s focus on the interests of
stockholders was extraordinary, saying, “I haven’t run into many CEOs who
view their constituency completely to be their [stock]holders. [Van Gorkom’s]
only interest seemed to be to get the absolute best price he could get for his
[stock]holders.” Owen, Trans Union, supra note 117, at 29. If this is correct—and
it very likely is—this means that Van Gorkom fulfilled the subjective part of
his Revlon duty; whether he fulfilled the objective part—i.e., whether he in
fact took reasonable steps to get the best price reasonably available—is of
course a separate question.
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the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, Van Gorkom stated
to Owen in correspondence, “[o]ne of the most painful revelations
growing out of the entire transaction ... was that there was such
a total lack of understanding of the real responsibilities of top
executives in a corporation like Trans Union. To me ... it was always
obvious that our loyalties had to be the stockholders.”189 He goes on,
“I was quite amazed to have one of our senior executives tell me
that he felt the company’s first loyalty should be to the employees and then to the customers and finally to the stockholders.”190
Finally, a third group of executives was angry about the
transaction not because they thought the price was too low nor
even because they were worried about the effect of the transaction on them personally, but because they felt insulted that Van
Gorkom had sold the company without consulting them.191 As
Romans would later explain say, the senior managers at Trans
Union “w[ere] outraged by the way in which the Pritzker offer
had been transmitted to them.”192 Indeed, one insider told Crain’s
Chicago Business that “Mr. Van Gorkom previously was viewed
with respect,” but after his announcing the Pritzker transaction
“the attitude toward him is a cross between Faust and Darth
Vader.”193 Perhaps difficult to understand in the contemporary
world of mergers and acquisitions, these executives felt “disenfranchised” (a word Owen says was used over and over again) by
how Van Gorkom had proceeded.194 Most important among this
group was Jack Kruizenga, the executive who headed Trans
Union’s largest and most profitable division, its rail car leasing
business.195 Van Gorkom had described Kruizenga as the executive “more key than any of the others.”196 At the urging of Romans,
OWEN, supra note 3, at 227.
Id.
191 Id. at 84.
192 Id. at 92–93.
193 Id. at 106.
194 Id. at 82, 84, 94. Bainbridge speculates that Van Gorkom’s failure to
involve his senior managers in the sales process and the resulting often vehement complaints from those managers negatively affected Trans Union’s case
before the Delaware Supreme Court. Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 212–13.
195 OWEN, supra note 3, at 13, 86.
196 Id. at 86. Van Gorkom thought Kruizenga would be very difficult to replace; this was in contradiction to Romans, who Van Gorkom thought could
be easily replaced. Id. at 90.
189
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Kruizenga signed a letter resigning from Trans Union, and together Romans and Kruizenga obtained similar letters from about
fifteen other senior Trans Union executives.197 Kruizenga then
informed Van Gorkom he was holding the letters and threatened to
deliver them.198 At a lunch on October 3, 1980, Kruizenga expressly
told Van Gorkom that he had no objection at all to the $55 price.199
Rather, he was “madder than hell” at Van Gorkom because he and
the other senior executives had been disenfranchised. 200 Emphasizing his long and loyal service to Trans Union, Kruizenga told
Van Gorkom, “Now you have sold the company … and you didn’t
permit any of us who helped you build the company participate
in that decision. I think it’s totally unreasonable for you to take
the position that you know everything about everything.”201
Kruizenga threatened to deliver the resignation letters, including
his own, “unless [Van Gorkom] g[o]t [the merger agreement with
Pritzker] reopened to give [Trans Union] an opportunity to look
for another offer.”202 Given that Kruizenga was clear that he was
not objecting to the $55 per share price, it seems that, to the extent that Kruizenga was thinking clearly about the matter, what
he wanted in reopening the contract with Pritzker was an opportunity to participate in the process, regardless of whether that
process produced a higher price for the stockholders—a course of
action that may well have involved a breach of the fiduciary
duty of good faith.203 In the same conversation, Van Gorkom
argued that their first duty was to the stockholders and that the
stockholders should have an opportunity to vote on the $55 per
William M. Owen, Trans Union’s Controversial Merger: Executives Go
for a Leveraged Buyout, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, Dec. 26, 1983, at 17 [hereinafter Owen, Leveraged Buyout].
198 Id.
199 OWEN, supra note 3, at 90.
200 Id. at 94.
201 Id. at 95.
202 Id.
203 The Chancellor says, the protection of the business judgment rule is not
available “to a fiduciary who could be shown to have caused a transaction to
be effectuated (even one in which he had no financial interest) for a reason
unrelated to a pursuit of the corporation’s best interests.” In re RJR Nabisco
S’holder Litig., No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. 1989). He continues, “[g]reed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from the path of
propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy, revenge … or shame or pride,” id., of
which the last may have been relevant to situation discussed in the text.
197
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share offer,204 but this seems to have made little impression on
Kruizenga.205 Van Gorkom left the meeting thinking that there
was little he could do to satisfy Kruizenga and the other executives aligned with him.206
Assuming that it would placate the group of executives
who thought the price was too low, if not the other groups, Van
Gorkom approached Pritzker about amending the agreement.207
Van Gorkom and Pritzker discussed changes to the merger
agreement, but they apparently did not agree on any precise language.208 Although not noted by the Delaware Supreme Court,
Van Gorkom then called a meeting of the executives objecting to
the deal and presented to them certain changes to the merger
agreement that Pritzker had advised Van Gorkom he would
accept: the agreement would be amended to permit Trans Union
to actively solicit offers for the company (in contemporary terminology, Pritzker agreed to a “go shop”)209 until January 31, 1981,
and the Trans Union stockholder meeting to consider the Pritzker transaction would be pushed back to February 10, 1981.210
This would give the company almost four months to conduct an
active market test of the $55 per share price in the merger
agreement with Pritzker. Van Gorkom thought that such changes
may well satisfy the executives who were concerned about the price
in the Pritzker transaction but would do nothing to appease the
executives who opposed the transaction for other reasons.211 To
his amazement, however, Kruizenga and all the other executives
whose objections to the merger were not based on the price enthusiastically approved the changes, indicated that they were
now satisfied with the terms of the deal, would withdraw their
threats to resign, and would even promise to remain with Trans
OWEN, supra note 3, at 95.
Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 96.
208 Id. at 96–97.
209 In contemporary terminology, a “go shop.” Go Shop Period, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/go-shop-period.asp [https://perma.cc
/6KVE-W4QU].
210 OWEN, supra note 3, at 96, 150.
211 Id. at 97.
204
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Union for six months after a transaction (regardless of whether
it was with Pritzker or another acquirer) closed.212
On October 8, Van Gorkom reconvened the Trans Union
board and described the proposed changes to the merger agreement.213 The Trans Union board approved the proposed changes
and engaged Salomon Brothers, its usual financial advisor, to
solicit offers for the company during the go shop period.214 On
October 9, the parties announced that the merger agreement had
been amended, that Pritzker’s financing condition had been fulfilled, and that Pritzker had exercised the stock option to acquire
one million Trans Union shares at $38 per share. 215 Only on
October 10 did Pritzker’s attorney deliver to Van Gorkom a draft
amendment to the merger agreement.216 Van Gorkom executed
the amendment and returned it to Pritzker without reviewing it to
determine if it actually reflected the terms that he had described
to the board and that the company had announced to the public.217
The text of the amendment the parties executed did authorize Trans Union to solicit offers for the company through
January 31, 1981, but it also contained other provisions the significance of which, the Supreme Court found, Van Gorkom personally seems not to have understood and that the board appears
never to have considered.218 In particular, whereas, under the
reading of the original September 20 merger agreement most
favorable to Trans Union, the company could terminate the agreement only if, prior to January 10, it received a superior offer for
the company,219 under the October 10 amendment to the agreement Trans Union could terminate the agreement only if, prior
to February 10,220 it either (a) had consummated a merger (or similar transaction), or (b) had entered into a definitive agreement
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
214 Id. at 103–04. The board specifically did not engage Salomon Brothers
to provide a fairness opinion related to the Pritzker or any other offer, or to
otherwise opine on the value of Trans Union. Id. at 103.
215 Id. at 104.
216 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 870 (Del. 1985).
217 Id. at 883.
218 Id. at 870.
219 Id. at 895.
220 The Delaware Supreme Court gives the deadline as February 10, 1981.
Id. at 896. According to Owen, the date was January 31, 1981. OWEN, supra
note 3, at 102.
212
213

2017]

SMITH V. VAN GORKOM

105

related to such a transaction that was superior to the Pritzker
offer and subject only to stockholder approval (i.e., contained no
financing condition).221 Thus, while the shopping period was extended by a month from January 10 to February 10, what Trans
Union would have to accomplish in that period in order to avail
itself of the right to terminate the agreement was greatly increased.
Contemporary fiduciary outs are virtually always based
on the target company’s receiving a superior offer, not on its entering into a superior definitive agreement.222 The reasons for
this are many, but a key one is that, while Van Gorkom’s experience with Pritzker may suggest otherwise, it typically takes
acquirers a considerable period of time to conclude due diligence
on the target, for the parties to negotiate the text of a definitive
agreement, and for the bidder to secure financing223 (recall that
the October 10 amendments required that the definitive agreement
not include a financing condition).224 But four months—the period
221 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 895–96. Owen states that the competing agreement could also include, as a closing condition, the absence of an injunction
prohibiting the consummation of the merger. OWEN, supra note 3, at 103. It is
worth noting that, not only could the new bidder not have a financing condition, it also could not have a condition related to antitrust or regulatory approvals—a condition that was potentially quite important because Trans
Union had significant Canadian operations and, at the time, under Canada’s
Foreign Investment Review Act, the Canadian government could block mergers affecting even the indirect ownership of Canadian assets unless it found
that the transaction involved “a ‘significant benefit to Canada.’” See id. at
174. As things developed, KKR dealt with this issue by including Canadian
citizens in its proposed transaction. Id. at 175. General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC), on the other hand, would have had significant difficulty getting approval, and so any transaction with Trans Union that did not include
the obtaining of such approval as a condition to closing would have involved
substantial risk for GECC. Id. at 174–76. The Pritzker agreement included a
condition that, at the time of closing, the Canadian authorities had not disapproved the transactionɆnot a condition that the Canadian authorities had
approved itɆand so the Pritzkers were bearing some risk that the Canadian
authorities would later act to undo the merger. Id. at 175.
222 Fiduciary Out, Practical Law Glossary Item 5-382-3460 (West 2017).
223 Richard D. Harroch & David A. Lipkin, 20 Key Due Diligence Activities
In A Merger And Acquisition Transaction, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2014, 1:09 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2014/12/19/20-key-due-diligence-activ
ities-in-a-merger-and-acquisition-transaction/#6b83b2dc4bfc [https://perma
.cc/6URT-APN5] (describing the multiple due diligence activities that must
take place prior to closing of a mergers and acquisitions transaction).
224 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 882.
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from October 10 to February 10—is hardly an unreasonably short
period of time for a determined acquirer and eager target to negotiate a definitive agreement, and thus, the Delaware Supreme
Court’s conclusion that the marketing period was “effectively reduced” by requiring Trans Union to obtain a definitive agreement
rather than merely an offer in order to terminate the merger
agreement may be exaggerated.225 It remains true, however,
that the aggregate effects of the October 10 amendments to the
merger agreement were not simply to extend the shopping period.
By requiring a definitive agreement and not merely an offer, the net
effect of the amendments on the feasibility of Trans Union’s exercising its option to terminate the agreement and take a superior offer is unclear. As discussed below, however, the significance
of this is questionable. If a bidder launched a credible tender
offer for the shares of Trans Union at a price materially above
$55 per share, it is very unlikely the Trans Union stockholders
would have voted to approve the Pritzker transaction, regardless
of whether the Trans Union board could exercise a fiduciary out
to terminate the agreement.226
During the go shop period, Salomon Brothers approached
approximately 150 potential bidders. 227 The most serious interest came from General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC),228
and its effort was headed by a young Jack Welch.229 Throughout,
GECC proceeded at what Van Gorkom would later call “glacial”
speed.230 The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion fails to mention that Borg Warner, Bendix, and Genstar all conducted due
diligence on Trans Union during the go shop period, but none
ultimately made an offer for the company.231 Owen states that
Id. at 883.
For further discussion of how important all this actually was, however,
see infra Section I.C.4.
227 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 896; see OWEN, supra note 3, at 119 (suggesting that Salomon Brothers’ selling efforts were in some ways defective, noting
that it took them three weeks to produce a brochure to be distributed to potential buyers and that, even when completed, the brochure contained inconsistent information).
228 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 896. See generally OWEN, supra note 3, at
150, 165.
229 OWEN, supra note 3, at 168.
230 Id. at 167.
231 Id. at 188 (mentioning Borg Warner and Bendix); id. at 190 (mentioning Genstar).
225
226
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some Trans Union insiders thought that Pritzker’s option to acquire one million Trans Union shares deterred other offers, but
assuming a topping offer at $60 per share, that option’s value
was only $22 million or about 3 percent of the value of the equity
value of the transaction.232 Of course, under contemporary conditions, a 3 percent termination fee in a $750 million transaction
would be consistent with market practice and would almost certainly be found to be legal under Unocal.233 Moreover, according
to Owen, none of the potential acquirers who conducted due diligence on Trans Union ever mentioned Pritzker’s option as an
impediment to its making an offer.234
Meanwhile, Romans, the company’s chief financial officer,
who had been critical of the transaction with Pritzker from the
beginning, had organized some of the other executives dissatisfied with the merger and approached Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts &
Co. (KKR) about a management buyout of Trans Union.235 In the
Delaware Supreme Court’s account of the facts, on December 2,
KKR presented a letter to Van Gorkom in which KKR and the
Reichmann family of Canada (the owners of Olympia & York),
along with certain Trans Union executives (excluding Van
Gorkom and his heir apparent Chelberg),236 offered to acquire
Id. at 120.
See, e.g., In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig. 14 A.3d 573, 614 (Del Ch.
2010) (3.9 percent and referring to a 3 percent termination fee as “standard”);
In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 87 (Del. Ch. 2010) (3 percent termination fee did not violate Unocal); In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58
(Del. Ch. 2007) (4.3 percent); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d
975 (Del. Ch. 2005) (3.75 percent); In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 852
A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004) (3.3 percent termination fee); In re Pennaco Energy,
Inc., S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 2001) (stating that a 3 percent termination fee was “modest and reasonable”); McMillan v. Intercargo
Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505–06 n.61 (Del. Ch. 2000) (3.5 percent termination fee
was within the reasonable range).
234 OWEN, supra note 3, at 121.
235 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985).
236 OWEN, supra note 3, at 142 (stating that the list of management participants in the KKR transaction “did not contain the names of either Van
Gorkom or Chelberg. Neither Van Gorkom nor Chelberg had been asked to
participate. There would be no role for them in the new company.”). Owen
suggests that, besides Van Gorkom’s repeated insistence that he would not
participate in an LBO because of the conflict of interest involved, there was
another reason that he had to be excluded: so many of the other executives
232
233
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Trans Union in an LBO at $60 per share (that is, $5 per share
more than the Pritzker offer) but otherwise on the same terms
offered by Pritzker.237 KKR’s offer contained a financing condition, but Henry Kravis represented to Van Gorkom that he was
confident that financing commitments could be obtained in two
to three weeks—and thus long before the February 10 deadline.238
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, Van Gorkom’s reaction
to the offer was highly negative.239 He asserted that the financing
condition made the offer excessively contingent even when Romans
argued that the condition was essentially the same as that in
Pritzker’s original offer.240 Van Gorkom also stated that publicly
announcing the KKR offer would chill other offers, even though he
had previously taken the position that announcing the agreement
with Pritzker would generate other offers for the company.241
Owen’s account of this meeting and the KKR offer is
broadly consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court’s account,
but it differs in certain important respects. First, if anything,
the Delaware Supreme Court downplayed Van Gorkom’s negative reaction to the offer. In fact, Van Gorkom told Kravis to his
face that, because of the financing condition it contained, he would
not dignify Kravis’s letter with the term offer.242 But, unnoted in
the Delaware Supreme Court’s account, Van Gorkom may have
had significant justification for this attitude.243 Unlike Pritzker’s
offer, KKR’s offer was contingent not only on obtaining debt
financing but also on obtaining equity financing as well.244 The
equity required in KKR’s transaction aggregated $178 million, of
which Kravis had commitments for only $153 million ($120 million from the Reichmanns, $25 million from KKR itself, and $8
million from the management participants) or 80 percent; the
remaining $25 million Kravis was confident he could raise from
were so angry with him about the Pritzker transaction that they would not
have participated in the KKR LBO if Van Gorkom was included. Id. at 143.
237 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 884; OWEN, supra note 3, at 137.
238 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 884; see also OWEN, supra note 3, at 137–38.
239 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 884.
240 Id. at 885.
241 Id.
242 OWEN, supra note 3, at 138.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 137–38.
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KKR’s limited partners.245 As to the debt financing, the KKR
transaction required $650 million in debt, of which Kravis had
commitments in hand for only $200 million ($100 million each
from Citibank and Continental Illinois, which had agreed to
organize a consortium of lenders to supply the remaining $450
million).246 Furthermore, as Van Gorkom later explained, he believed that the financing condition in the KKR offer involved
more contingency than the facially similar condition in Pritzker’s
offer “because the Pritzker family and their various organizations
constituted an existing entity with visible assets, visible wealth,
visible equity, visiting borrowing power.”247 Owen casts doubt on
this argument, noting that, at the time, KKR had completed
larger acquisitions than the Pritzkers had, but nevertheless Van
Gorkom may well have been right: in order to obtain his 14 percent financing for the merger, Pritzker had pledged all of the
assets and stock of Trans Union and also the common stock of
the Marmon Group, which of course was very valuable.248 Presumably, KKR and its partners would be pledging only the assets
and stock of Trans Union, which would naturally make obtaining financing more difficult. Even more significant was another
fact never mentioned by the Delaware Supreme Court: on September 20, when the Pritzker agreement was signed, the prime
rate had stood at 12.50 percent, but by December 2, the day
Kravis presented KKR’s offer to Van Gorkom, the prime rate
had increased to 18.5 percent.249 (Similarly, the effective federal
funds rate in September of 1980 had been 10.87 percent, and by
December it had increased to 18.90 percent).250 Other things
Id. at 137.
Id.
247 Owen, Leveraged Buyout, supra note 197, at 19.
248 OWEN, supra note 3, at 121.
249 OWEN, supra note 3, at 128.
250 See Effective Federal Funds Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS [https://perma.cc/JZ9S-VVNY].
The dramatic increase in interest rates resulted from the extraordinary tightening
of monetary policy under Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker to reduce
the very high inflation rates of the final years of the Carter Administration.
See Paul Volker, Remarks at the Alfred M. Landon Lecture Series on Public
Issues at Kansas State University in Manhattan, KS: Dealing with Inflation:
Obstacles and Opportunities (Apr. 15, 1981), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
/scribd/?item_id=8236&filepath=/files/docs/historical/volcker/Volcker_198104
245
246
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being equal, KKR’s financing was likely to be between 600 and
800 basis points more expensive than Pritzker’s. But other things
were not equal because, assuming, as seems likely, that KKR
would not have been providing its lenders with collateral beyond
the assets and common stock of Trans Union, KKR would very
likely have had to pay a higher spread over the risk-free rate
than Pritzker had. Van Gorkom understood this quite clearly, stating later that KKR’s “ability at a time where interest rates were
20 percent to raise $650,000,000 was to be questioned.”251 Moreover, because Trans Union made use of large amounts of shortterm debt in the ordinary course of its business, its interest expense
was rising substantially as interest rates increased,252 which
would have reduced the company’s ability to service the debt incurred to fund the LBO. When Romans argued to Van Gorkom
that KKR’s offer was no more contingent on financing than
Pritzker’s had been, this was not literally true with respect to
equity financing and it was highly misleading with respect to
debt financing.253
Moreover, Owen’s account reveals that KKR’s offer was
half-baked in other important respects. In particular, as difficult
as this may be to believe in a contemporary context, KKR and
Romans had done very little to determine which of Trans Union’s
executives would participate in the buy-out group.254 Other than
Van Gorkom and Chelberg being out and Romans and another
executive (Bosner) being in, KKR and Romans seemed not to
have confirmed with any other executives whether they were
definitely in or definitely out.255 At his meeting with Kravis, Van
15.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5HT-LNGB]; Paul Volker, Remarks to the National
Press Club in Washington, DC: No Time for Backsliding (Sept. 25, 1981),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?item_id=8243&filepath=/files/docs/historical
/volcker/Volcker_19810925.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZLN-QUA6]. See generally
ALLAN H. MELTZER, 2 A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2014).
251 OWEN, supra note 3, at 139. Although it was probably unknown to Van
Gorkom, in their loan commitments to KKR, Citibank and Continental Illinois
had agreed to lend at a floating rate above prime, with interest above 15 percent payable at maturity. See id. at 137.
252 Between 1979 and 1980, Trans Union’s interest expense increased 46
percent from $90 million to $131 million. Id. at 200.
253 Id. at 138–39.
254 Id. at 142.
255 Id.
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Gorkom demanded to know which of his executives were involved in the deal, and the best that Kravis and Romans could
do was retire to a conference room to produce a list of executives
who would be invited to participate in the deal.256 Van Gorkom’s
reaction that the proposal from KKR was less than fully definite
was not entirely unreasonable.
As to what happened next, the Delaware Supreme Court
and Owen’s accounts diverge significantly. According to the court,
soon after receiving the offer, Van Gorkom had a private conversation with Kruizenga, the head of Trans Union’s critical railcar
business, who the court says was a member of the buy-out group,
and immediately after this conversation, Kruizenga withdrew from
the KKR group.257 Although Van Gorkom denied he had influenced Kruizenga’s decision, his decision not to participate in the
group led KKR to withdraw its offer before the Trans Union
board could consider it.258 According to Owen, armed with KKR’s
list of executives who would be invited to participate in the
transaction, Van Gorkom began speaking with them one-on-one to
ascertain whether they were actually going to participate in the
buy-out.259 Some told Van Gorkom that they would participate,
but at least one expressed outrage that Romans would include
him in such a venture.260 When Van Gorkom got to Kruizenga,
Kruizenga immediately and unequivocally told Van Gorkom that
he was not participating in any buy-out.261 This was not surprising because, as Kruizenga and Romans testified,262 just the day
Id.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 885 (Del. 1985).
258 See id. at 885; see also OWEN, supra note 3, at 146. Owen asserts:
Very few people in the [Trans Union] corporate office ... were
willing to believe Van Gorkom’s account of his encounter with
Kruizenga after the KKR offer had been presented. Many
seemed to think that Van Gorkom as somehow talked Kruizenga out of participating, even though Kruizenga himself said
that Van Gorkom never attempted to influence his thinking
on the leverage buyout one way or the other.
Id. (discussing how Kruizenga had told Romans the day before that he would
not participate in the transaction).
259 OWEN, supra note 3, at 145.
260 Id. at 143.
261 Id. at 145–46.
262 Id. at 146 (stating “both Kruizenga and Romans, in recalling the matter later, gave consistent accounts: Kruizenga had already backed out the day
before. ‘Count me out’ he had said”).
256
257

112 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:065
before, Kruizenga had told Romans he would not participate.263
Primarily because of the tremendous increase in interest rates,
Kruizenga had concluded that an LBO of Trans Union was unlikely to make money.264 Just how, under these circumstances,
Romans could have felt confident that Kruizenga would participate in the LBO is a mystery, but he apparently did so feel.265 In
any event, after his conversation with Van Gorkom, Kruizenga
told Romans and Kravis that he was not participating and
would encourage his subordinates not to participate either.266
The Delaware Supreme Court and Owen agree that once
Kravis learned that Kruizenga (and likely his lieutenants at the
railcar business, who throughout acted under his guidance) was
not participating, KKR withdrew the offer.267 The majority opinion makes Kruizenga’s dropping out the primary, or even sole,
cause of KKR’s withdrawing the offer.268 The dissenting justices
in Van Gorkom suggest that KKR had also encountered problems with the Reichmanns, who were providing equity financing,269
but this seems to be a mistake.270 Owen agrees that Kruizenga’s
Id. at 134. At a meeting with his lieutenants the same day, Kruizenga
expressed his reservations about the deal, including his worry about rising
interest rates. Gerald F. Lahey, one of Kruizenga’s subordinates, did not share
his concerns, however, and Kruizenga approved Lahey joining Romans in
further negotiations with KKR and the Reichmanns—a fact that could have
led Romans to believe Kruizenga still had an open mind about participating
in the LBO, regardless of what he had said to Romans about not participating. Id. at 134–35.
264 Id. at 134.
265 See id. at 147 (“In the frantic pace of activity of the preceding few days,
Romans apparently misread the situation, believing that Kruizenga could be
brought around notwithstanding his comments of the previous day. In fact,
Romans had asked one of Kruizenga’s colleagues to review with Kruizenga
the events of the preceding day [which involved mostly negotiations with the
Reichmanns] and make sure Kruizenga was ‘on board.’”).
266 Id.
267 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 885 (Del. 1985); OWEN, supra note
3, at 149.
268 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 896.
269 See id. at 896 (McNeilly, J., dissenting) (asserting that KKR withdrew
the offer for two reasons—Kruizenga’s change of heart and “complications
arising out of negotiations with the Reichmann family,” who were also participating in the KKR group).
270 According to Owen, all issues with the Reichmann family had been settled,
and KKR’s withdrawal of the offer had nothing to do with the Reichmanns.
263
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decision not to participate was a very important factor in KKR’s
decision to withdraw the offer,271 but Owen notes another factor
as well: KKR had no interest in an unfriendly transaction, and
Van Gorkom’s reaction to the offer made it abundantly clear
that Van Gorkom opposed the transaction with KKR.272
This raises the question of precisely why Van Gorkom was
so opposed to the KKR deal. It is true that his objections about
the contingent nature of the KKR offer were more serious than
Romans or the Delaware Supreme Court allowed, and it was
also true that, if Pritzker acquired Trans Union, Van Gorkom
was expected to stay briefly till he retired, after which his heir
apparent Chelberg would take over as chief executive officer,
whereas if KKR acquired the company, his relationship with the
company would cease.273 The real reason, however, seems to lie
elsewhere. To understand it, it is important to remember that
LBOs were still a new form of transaction in 1980, that Van
Gorkom had never even heard of such transactions before September of that year,274 and that probably none of the Trans Union
directors had any meaningful experience with such transactions.275 From the beginning, perceiving the clear conflict of interest
a manager participating in an LBO faces, Van Gorkom declined to
participate; his attitude, loudly expressed, was that conflicts of
interest should be avoided, not managed.276 As Romans recognized
OWEN, supra note 3, at 134, 147ï49. In January of 1981, when Romans and
Kravis attempted to reconstruct the KKR offer, they determined that they did
not have sufficient time to arrange financing before the Trans Union stockholder meeting. One of the Reichmanns was involved in those discussions and
took a similar view. Id. at 148. It seems that Justice McNeilly is conflating the
causes of the withdrawal of the December 2 offer from KKR and the causes of
the failure to resurrect that offer in January.
271 Id. at 147–48.
272 Id. at 148 (noting that “KKR has a decided antipathy for ‘unfriendly
deals’—a view shared with the Reichmanns,” that KKR had “no desire to get
the KKR name in the papers unless there was a good likelihood of the deal
closing” and that “[i]t must have been clear to Kravis that Van Gorkom and
Chelberg were not exactly thrilled to receive KKR’s proposal.”).
273 Not surprisingly, Van Gorkom denied that such considerations affected
his estimation of the KKR offer. Id. at 143.
274 Id. at 37.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 37, 126.
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at the time, this was very convenient for the buy-out group, because it left Van Gorkom free to negotiate on behalf of Trans
Union and the stockholders against KKR and the managers participating in the buy-out.277 In short, Van Gorkom would be on
the sell-side, and Romans and Kravis would be on the buy-side.278
Van Gorkom, backed by the Trans Union directors, did
not see things so clearly. At the October 8 board meeting, which
was held to approve the amendments to the Pritzker merger
agreement, the Trans Union board instructed Van Gorkom that
all negotiations about a potential LBO were to be coordinated
through him.279 Amazingly, they meant by this not simply that
Van Gorkom should lead the negotiations against any buy-out
group, but that he should also participate in and supervise any
effort to formulate an LBO with management participation.280
That is, although Van Gorkom was not a participant of the buyout group, Van Gorkom and the board thought he should be included in the meetings between the managers participating in
the buy-out and KKR and their lenders and generally be kept
apprised of all matters related to the formulation of the offer.281
Van Gorkom candidly admitted that, on at least two occasions,
when Romans wanted to meet with KKR, he “invited [him]self”
to the meetings even though he “was not asked.”282 Although
this did not in fact occur, Van Gorkom likewise wanted Trans
Union’s financial advisor to participate in the buy-out group’s
meetings.283 On occasion, Romans gently protested that there
Id. at 126.
See id. (contending that because KKR had recently acquired another
company under analogous circumstances, this precedent was on Romans’s
mind as he worked with KKR on a bid for Trans Union).
279 OWEN, supra note 3, at 103 (noting that at the meeting on October 8,
1980, “[t]he directors made it clear that they wanted all solicitations to be coordinated through Van Gorkom. And they wanted all negotiations—including any
for a leveraged buy-out—to be carried on by Van Gorkom.”).
280 See id. at 103.
281 See id. at 124.
282 Id. at 125; see also Owen, Leveraged Buyout, supra note 197, at 18 (noting that Van Gorkom invited himself to a meeting in New York between Romans
and KKR and then to a meeting with Romans, Kravis, and representatives of
Continental Illinois Bank, which was considering providing financing for the
management buyout).
283 See id. at 124.
277
278
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had to be some meetings between the managers participating in
the LBO and KKR in which Van Gorkom did not participate, but
this seems to have made no impression on Van Gorkom.284 Understandably, Romans and KKR began meeting without Van
Gorkom,285 and so when Kravis presented his offer letter to Van
Gorkom on December 2, Van Gorkom was genuinely surprised to
get it.286 Difficult as it may be to understand today, he seems to
have had a feeling, perhaps unarticulated, that his senior managers had been sneaking around behind his back and done
something vaguely underhanded.287 This explains his primary
concern on receiving the offer: he wanted to know which of his
managers were involved in the scheme,288 an issue that surely
should have been of anything but minor importance. It also explains a comment Van Gorkom made to Kravis when Kravis
withdrew the KKR offer. Although he assured Kravis that he
thought Kravis had behaved in a professional manner, “he was
concerned that he now had a real split among his managers and
felt he had not been kept up-to-date.”289
Again, this was not just some idiosyncratic view on the
part of Van Gorkom; it was Trans Union’s policy as formulated
by its board of directors. Indeed, when Van Gorkom reported to
the directors that KKR had made and then quickly withdrew an
offer, one director questioned him about whether the executives
involved in the potential buy-out “had kept [Van Gorkom] apprised
of the matter,” and Van Gorkom responded in the negative.290 At
this point, some outside directors “then reiterated that steps be
taken to ensure that no future negotiations relating to any leveraged buy-out with management participation be conducted
without Van Gorkom’s approval and participation.”291 The unavoidable conclusion is that Van Gorkom reacted so negatively to
KKR’s offer because it had been prepared without his participation and thus in violation of his and the board of directors’ orders.292
See id. at 151.
See id. at 147.
286 See id. at 150.
287 See id. at 151.
288 See id.
289 Id. at 149.
290 Id. at 149–50.
291 Id. at 150.
292 See id. at 152.
284
285

116 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:065
Van Gorkom expressly confirmed this view the next day
in a conversation with Romans. For Van Gorkom, “it was a serious concern that, in his judgment, the handling of the whole
situation [with KKR] had been improper” because “the instructions that had been issued on the coordination of inquiries from
various suitors had not been followed.”293 Van Gorkom expressed
his displeasure to Romans, “indicating that he [Van Gorkom]
had not been properly involved” in the process.294 When Romans
protested that because Van Gorkom was not participating in the
LBO, KKR and the other participants could not include him in
all of their discussions, Van Gorkom merely reiterated that any
managers participating in the process would have a severe conflict of interest—a point that was true but obviously not responsive to Roman’s objection.295
In any event, when Kravis withdrew the KKR offer, this
did not in fact end KKR’s pursuit of Trans Union.296 Not noted
by the Delaware Supreme Court, Van Gorkom and Romans
agreed that they would all cool off for a while and consider
whether the KKR offer could be resurrected in the new year,
with Van Gorkom involved in the process in the manner he considered proper.297 Meanwhile, on December 19, the plaintiff
stockholders sued the Trans Union board alleging it had
breached its fiduciary duties in approving the merger.298 When
Id. at 151.
Id.
295 Id.
296 See id. at 152.
297 Id.
298 See id. at 162. Ironically, Smith, the lead plaintiff, did not object as
much to the price in the Pritzker transaction as to the form of consideration it
involved—cash instead of stock. See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 200. Smith
had acquired his Trans Union stock in one of the company’s many minor
acquisitions, and Smith had a low tax basis in the stock. Id. Whereas a stockfor-stock transaction would almost certainly have been tax free to Smith, the
cash deal from Pritzker triggered for Smith a significant tax liability. Id. See
generally, William M. Owen, A Shareholder Named Smith, 26 DIRECTORS &
BOARDS 39 (2000) (stating that about one-third of the outstanding Trans
Union shares were issued in acquisitions of other companies, with the result
that the original holders of those shares generally had low tax bases in such
shares). As Bainbridge correctly notes, however, the business judgment rule
would certainly have protected the board’s decision as to the form of consideration it chose to accept. Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 200–01.
293
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the new year came, GECC was still conducting due diligence,
and eventually indicated it may be willing to offer $60 per share
cash to acquire Trans Union.299 Welch, then on the verge of being appointed chief executive officer at General Electric, told
Van Gorkom that GECC was worried that if it made an offer to
Trans Union, a bidding contest with Pritzker would result, and
GECC had no interest in participating in a such contest.300 Welch
thus convinced Van Gorkom to approach Pritzker with the extraordinary request that Pritzker agree to rescind the merger
agreement with Trans Union before GECC would make a bid. 301
Pritzker responded that if he agreed to this and either GECC made
no offer or made an offer but never consummated a transaction,
then Pritzker would have incurred significant expenses, would
not be able to acquire the company, and would have nothing but
his option to acquire one million shares of Trans Union common
stock at $38 per share.302 If GECC did not acquire Trans Union,
the price of the Trans Union shares would likely fall back to the
pre-transaction market price, thus making the option worthless
and leaving Pritzker with nothing.303 It is easy to sympathize
with Pritzker when he says that this “was asking an awful
lot.”304 Not surprisingly, Pritzker declined this most unusual
request.305 GECC then terminated discussion with Trans Union.306
See OWEN, supra note 3, at 166.
Id. at 169.
301 See id. at 172.
302 See id. at 173.
303 See id.
304 Id.
305 This episode is utterly bizarre. For one thing, as Van Gorkom explained
to Welch, Pritzker would almost certainly not have overtopped a $60 per
share offer from GECC, preferring instead to make $22 million on the stock
option. GECC was thus being almost absurdly cautious. Furthermore, if GECC
wanted assurance that Pritzker would not overtop a $60 per share offer, it
need only have entered an agreement with Pritzker in which Pritzker promised not to top a $60 per share offer if GECC made one. Pritzker could well
have accepted this. If GECC did not make an offer, or made an offer and it
failed to close for any reason, he would still acquire the Trans Union in accordance with the terms of the merger agreement. If GECC made an offer
and it succeeded, Pritzker would profit under the option. There was no need
to rescind the Pritzker–Trans Union agreement to ensure that Pritzker not
make an offer topping any offer from GECC.
306 OWEN, supra note 3, at 178.
299
300

118 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:065
On January 16, 1981, when an offer from GECC had begun to appear unlikely, Van Gorkom authorized Romans to attempt to resurrect the KKR offer. Romans quickly got in touch
with Kravis, and the two men attempted to put together another
offer for Trans Union.307 A flurry of meetings, this time including Van Gorkom, followed. On January 21, Trans Union mailed
its proxy statement to the Trans Union stockholders in anticipation of the scheduled February 10 stockholders meeting.308 On
January 26, with the prime rate then at over 20 percent309 and
the effective federal funds rate at 19.08 percent,310 Kravis and
the Reichmann family concluded that they did not have enough
time to arrange the financing for the transaction, and Kravis so
informed both Van Gorkom and Romans.311 Had they had a few
more weeks to arrange financing, however, both Kravis and the
Reichmanns believed they could have made an offer to acquire
Trans Union at $60 per share.312 Apparently, Kruizenga’s decision not to participate in the KKR transaction turned out to be
irrelevant, for, true to his word, he was not participating in the
effort to reconstruct the offer.313
Later on January 26, the Trans Union board met, reconsidered the entire sequences of events related to the Pritzker
transaction, and resolved to send the stockholders a supplement
to the proxy statement, in part in response to disclosure claims
that had been raised by the plaintiffs in the litigation challenging the merger.314 On February 3, Chancellor Marvel of the
Court of Chancery declined to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the merger.315 On February 10, the Trans Union stockholders
See id. at 177.
See id. at 177–78.
309 See id. at 180, 182.
310 See Effective Federal Funds Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS [https://perma.cc/JZ9S-VVNY].
311 See OWEN, supra note 3, at 182.
312 See id. at 172, 182.
313 See id. at 182–83.
314 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985); OWEN, supra
note 3, at 184.
315 Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1981 WL 15145, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3,
1981). This was actually the most fateful decision in the case. If Chancellor
Marvel had enjoined the merger, all of the issues would have been resolved
pre-closing, and the key issue of personal liability in damages on the part of
the directors would never have arisen.
307
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met, and with the board still recommending that they approve the
merger, they voted to do so, with 69.9 percent of the shares entitled to vote voting in favor, 7.25 percent against, and 22.85 percent not voting.316 No Trans Union stockholder sought appraisal
of his shares.317
After the merger, the plaintiffs amended their complaint
to request rescission of the merger and, in the alternative, monetary damages.318 After the trial in the Court of Chancery, on
July 5, 1982, Chancellor Marvel delivered his opinion on the
merits and found for the defendants on all counts.319 The plaintiffs appealed, but aside from the litigants and their counsel,
almost no one gave the case another thought.320
B. The Delaware Supreme Court’s Opinion and the Reaction
Thereto
This section (1) briefly summarizes the Delaware Supreme
Court’s disposition of the case, and then (2) discusses the reaction to the court’s opinion.321
1. The Delaware Supreme Court’s Opinion
The proceedings in the Delaware Supreme Court were
surprisingly protracted. The court first heard oral arguments on
February 24, 1983, and the court then ordered reargument on
May 16, 1983, and again on June 11, 1984.322 More than six months
later, on January 29, 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court issued
its opinion in the case then denominated Smith v. Van Gorkom.323
The Court was bitterly divided, three to two,324 an unusual
circumstance for the Delaware Supreme Court in a corporate
See OWEN, supra note 3, at 192–93.
Id. at 194.
318 See id.
319 Pritzker, 1981 WL 15145, at *5.
320 See OWEN, supra note 3, at 195.
321 See infra Section I.B.1.
322 OWEN, supra note 3, at 257.
323 Jay Pritzker and the other non-director defendants had been dismissed
from the case, thus resulting in the action being retitled. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863–64 (Del. 1985).
324 OWEN, supra note 3, at 255.
316
317
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case,325 and not surprisingly, for the majority’s holding was truly
extraordinary. As every corporate lawyer knows, the majority
reversed the Court of Chancery on virtually every issue in the
case.326 The court held that the Trans Union directors breached
their fiduciary duty of care, first “by their failure to inform
themselves of all information reasonably available to them and
relevant to their decision to recommend the Pritzker merger”
and second “by their failure to disclose all material information
such as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in
deciding whether to approve the Pritzker offer.”327 The court remanded the case to the Court of Chancery to compute damages,
instructing it “to determine the fair value of the shares ... based
on the intrinsic value of Trans Union on September 20, 1980” in
accordance with Weinberger v. UOP and to enter judgment for
the plaintiffs to the extent that the fair value of Trans Union
exceeded the $55 per share deal price.328 Since KKR was apparently willing to pay $750 million for the company and the price
in the Pritzker deal aggregated $690 million, the damages owed
by the ten individuals who had served on the Trans Union board
could easily have exceeded $60 million.329
Id.
See id. at 256 (stating “[a]s if to tell the directors not to bother to ask
for a further hearing on the case, the Court overturned almost every major factual determination made by Chancellor Marvel of the Delaware Chancery Court”).
327 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
328 Id.
329 OWEN, supra note 3, at 261. On July 30, 1985, the caseɆand a related
stockholder suit in federal court in IllinoisɆsettled for $23.5 million. According to Owen, of this amount, Trans Union’s D&O insurance carrier paid $10
million, the individual defendants paid $1.5 million, and the Pritzkers, even
though they were no longer defendants in the case, contributed the balance.
OWEN, supra note 3, at 319. According to Bainbridge, however, the Pritzkers
paid everything over the amount covered by insurance subject only to a requirement that the defendant directors make small contributions to charity.
Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 225. Bainbridge speculates that the Pritzkers
were willing to pay even when they were not legally required to do so because, as
serial acquirers, they had an interest in proving to directors at potential
targets that they would be held harmless if they sold their companies to the
Pritzkers. Owen, however, has suggested to me in private conversation a simpler
and more plausible explanation: the parties may have believed that Trans
Union, by then a subsidiary of Marmon, was required to indemnify the former Trans Union directors.
325
326
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2. The Furious Reaction
The reaction was explosive.330 The Wall Street Journal
story, which stated that corporate directors considering takeovers
“might be under increased pressure” because of the decision, was
extremely restrained in comparison to most other reactions in
the legal and financial press.331 More typical was Business Week,
which said that the decision “shocked the corporate world” and
was “a landmark ruling that puts board members in peril.”332 The
case “sent shock waves through the corporate bar,”333 and “reverberated mightily through the boardrooms of Corporate America.”334
Chicago practitioner Leo Herzel said that the court’s decision
“seems to reflect nothing but the court’s need to force haphazardly chosen defendants to repent for the State of Delaware’s
pro-business ways.”335 Barron’s said the court had “hurled a
thunderbolt into the nation’s boardrooms.”336 Bayless Manning
reported that “the corporate bar generally views the decisions as
atrocious,” and he concluded that the court “had exploded a
bomb.”337 Daniel Fischel wrote that Van Gorkom was “one of the
worst decisions in the history of corporate law.”338 Former Justice and former Chancellor Quillen demurely hoped that the case
would have “little lasting legal significance” because its holdings
See Barry F. Schwartz & James G. Wiles, Trans Union: Neither ‘New’
Law nor ‘Bad’ Law, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 429 (1985) [hereinafter Schwartz & Wiles]
(saying that “the condemnations appear to be virtually unanimous,” though
Schwartz and Wiles themselves defended the decision).
331 Richard Koenig, Court Rules Trans Union’s Directors Used Poor Judgment in Sale of Firm, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1985, at 7.
332 OWEN, supra note 3, at 257.
333 Dierdre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate Realities and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J.
CORP. L. 311, 312 (1986).
334 Roundtable, supra note 23, at 28 (2000).
335 Leo Herzel, Scott J. Davis & Dale Colling, “Smith” Brings Whip Down on
Directors’ Backs, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 1985, at 14 [hereinafter Herzel et al.].
336 Richard M. Leisner, Boardroom Jitters: A Landmark Court Decision
Upsets Corporate Directors, BARRON’S NAT’L BUS. & FIN. WKLY, Apr. 22, 1985,
at 34; see Herzel et al., supra note 335.
337 Manning, supra note 23, at 1.
338 Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985).
330
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would be confined to its unusual facts,339 but because of what he
argued was the unprincipled nature of much the court’s reasoning, “fear resulted that the court was on an undisciplined frolic
of its own.”340 Ira Milstein later summed up the reaction by saying that almost everyone who wrote about the decision thought
“the Delaware courts are going nuts.”341 Van Gorkom himself
published a response to the decision in which he said the Delaware Supreme Court “showed a serious lack of understanding of
even the basic functioning of the business and financial worlds.”342
Martin Lipton captured the essence of the corporate bar’s objection to Van Gorkom when he lamented in a memorandum to
clients that “[i]t made no difference that there were no allegations of fraud, bad faith or self-dealing” by the Trans Union directors.343 Directors of Delaware corporations were now exposed
to potential liability for enormous sums far exceeding their personal net worth merely for breaches of a duty of care.344
Within months of the Supreme Court’s decision in Van
Gorkom, the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance market
Quillen, supra note 28, at 466.
Id. at 476. The sense of shock created by the decision has endured. In
1988, Macey and Miller said the case “appears to depart dramatically from
prior law” and “apparently displays a mysterious anti-management bias.” Macey
& Miller, supra note 23, at 129. “The outcome of the case was exactly the
opposite to what virtually every observer of Delaware law would have predicted.” Id. at 131. In 2002, McChesney said of the case, “[c]onsidered a legal
disaster in 1985, it is judged no less disastrous today.” Fred S. McChesney, A
Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van Gorkom Still Rankles,
Probably, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 631, 631 (2002). “If sheer wrongheadedness of
result were disqualifying, Van Gorkom would not be worth reading.” Id. In
2009, Stephen M. Bainbridge said the case was “arguably one of the most
surprising decisions ever issued by the Delaware Supreme Court” and “continues” to “generat[e] great controversy.” Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 197–98.
341 Roundtable, supra note 23, at 32.
342 Van Gorkom, supra note 145, at 17.
343 Koenig, supra note 331, at 7; see also Martin Lipton & Andrew R.
Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors’ Responsibilities—An Update,
40 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1410 (1985).
344 See id; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 132 (stating that the
case had “imposed unforeseeable and devastating economic penalties on a
corporate board”); Macey, supra note 57, at 608 (referring to “the debilitating
threat of financial ruin from personal liability”).
339
340

2017]

SMITH V. VAN GORKOM

123

was collapsing. Insurers were sharply increasing premiums and
deductibles, refusing to renew policies, and in some cases exiting
the market entirely.345 Although some have questioned how significant a cause Van Gorkom was of the crisis in the D&O market,346
the sharp decline in the availability of such coverage coupled with
the prospect of potentially catastrophic personal liability under
Van Gorkom led corporate directors to demand increased protection from personal liability.347
As a result, the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware
Bar Association considered several proposals to amend the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Based on analogies to the
law of trusts, some Delaware practitioners argued that an appropriate provision in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation could
limit or eliminate personal liability for the directors for breaches
of their duty of care. Other practitioners questioned whether such a
policy would run afoul of the DGCL and thus be unenforceable.348 Ultimately, on July 1, 1986, the Delaware General Assembly
345 See Mansfield, supra note 60, at 228 n.87; Bradley & Schipani, supra
note 60, at 50–51 (stating that D&O insurance premiums increased more than
tenfold between 1984 and 1986); Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 202–03 (referring to the “perception that the decision had significantly increased director
liability exposure drove dramatic changes in the director and officer … liability insurance market”); Veasey et al., supra note 60, at 400–01 (discussing
how some D&O carriers withdrew from the market or raised premiums and
deductibles as a result of Van Gorkom); Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31,
at 458 n.36 (stating that “after Van Gorkom, the D & O insurance industry
sharply increased their premiums and in some cases, threatened to stop
writing D & O insurance policies. This crisis required a legislative solution,”
which took the form of Section 102(b)(7)); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter,
Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 651, 659 (2002) (stating, “[i]n the wake of Smith v.
Van Gorkom, a directors and officers … liability insurance crisis was triggered.
Policies were not renewed, premiums skyrocketed, and firms worried about
being able to recruit high quality directors”).
346 See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DEL. LAW OF CORPS
& BUS. ORGS. 4-99–100 (3d ed. 1998); Charles J. Hartman & Pamela Gayle
Rogers, The Influence of Smith v. Van Gorkom on Director’s and Officer’s Liability, 58 J. RISK & INS. 525 (1991) (arguing that many predictions of dire
consequences flowing from Van Gorkom were exaggerated).
347 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 346, at 99–100.
348 Id.
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enacted what is now Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL,349 which
provides that a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation
may include a provision eliminating the personal liability of directors for monetary damages for breaches of their fiduciary
duties, other than for breaches of loyalty, for acts or omissions
not in good faith or involving intentional misconduct or knowing
violation of law, for willful or negligent conduct in paying dividends or repurchasing stock out of other than lawfully available
funds, or for any transaction from which the director derives an
improper personal benefit.350 That is, Section 102(b)(7) allows corporations to eliminate the directors’ personal liability in monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care.351
Soon after its enactment, virtually every public company
in the United States incorporated in Delaware proposed that its
stockholders amend the corporation’s charter to add a provision
of the kind authorized by Section 102(b)(7), and these proposals
passed virtually unanimously.352 Nowadays, virtually every public company incorporated in Delaware has such a provision in its
charter.353

349 65 Del. Laws 289 (1986) http://delcode.delaware.gov/sessionlaws/ga133
/chp289.shtml [https://perma.cc/47Z7-JQYS].
350 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2015). Other states quickly enacted similar provisions. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Directors’
Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 301 (1988).
351 See R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of
Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 11 (1987);
Thomas C. Lee, Note, Limiting Corporate Directors’ Liability: Delaware Section
102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors’ Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
239, 241 (1987).
352 Hamermesh, supra note 23, at 490; see also Roundtable, supra note 23, at
35 (John C. Wilcox stating that “there was a flurry of management proposals
seeking [stock]holder approval for indemnification of directors” and although
“there was some question about whether institutional investors would approve these,” in the event “they approved them wholesale” because personal
liability “would drive people out of the boardroom”).
353 See Hamermesh, supra note 23, at 490 (reporting that of 100 Fortune
500 companies sampled, each of 98 stock corporations in the sample incorporated
in a jurisdiction allowing exculpatory charter provisions had such provisions,
including all Delaware corporations in the sample); see also Bainbridge, supra
note 60, at 198 (describing Section 102(b)(7) provisions as “now nearly universal”).

2017]

SMITH V. VAN GORKOM

125

Under current law, if a stockholder plaintiff seeking only
monetary damages and not some form of equitable relief pleads
only a duty of care claim against a director of a corporation with
a Section 102(b)(7) provision in its certificate of incorporation,
the director can immediately dismiss the suit on the basis of the
provision.354 Indeed,
a plaintiff seeking only monetary damages must plead nonexculpated claims against a director who is protected by an
exculpatory charter provision to survive a motion to dismiss,
regardless of the underlying standard of review for the board’s
conduct—whether it be Revlon, Unocal, the entire fairness
standard, or the business judgment rule.355

Hence, when the directors are protected by an exculpatory
charter provision and the plaintiffs do not plead non-exculpated
claims against them, the “directors are entitled to have those claims
against them dismissed.”356 Section 102(b)(7) did not, technically
speaking, overrule Van Gorkom, but, for many purposes, it may
as well have.357
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Del. 2001). This was not
always so clear. In Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 9700, 1994 WL48993 (Del.
Ch. 1994), the Delaware Supreme Court held that exculpation under Section
102(b)(7) was an affirmative defense, which apparently required the defendant directors to prove that they had not been guilty of an unexculpated
breach before they could obtain dismissal of the suit—a result that would
have greatly diminished the value to directors of a Section 102(b)(7) provision. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 463 (arguing that a Section
102(b)(7) provision should be construed as providing a form of immunity and
not as an affirmative defense). Malpiede quickly corrected this misstep in
Emerald Partners. Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1079; see also In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 115 A.3d 1173, 1179–80 (Del. 2015) (holding that, even when the standard of review is entire fairness, independent
directors protected by a Section 102(b)(7) provision are entitled to be dismissed from the suit unless the plaintiff pleads against them personally
unexculpated breaches of fiduciary duty).
355 In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173,
1175–76 (Del. 2015).
356 Id. at 1176.
357 This is one of the main points made in Hamermesh, supra note 23. By
contrast, Prickett, counsel to the plaintiffs in the case, had predicted that
“the Trans Union opinion will for years be a judicial beacon, or a legal lighthouse, constantly reminding Delaware directors” of their duties. William Prickett,
An Explanation of Trans Union to ‘Henny Penny’ and her Friends, 10 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 451, 463 (1985).
354
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C. The Trans Union Board Goes to Revlon-Land Before RevlonLand Exists
Consider how a case with the facts of Smith v. Van
Gorkom would turn out under current law. By comparing what
the Delaware Supreme Court actually said in Van Gorkom to
what a Delaware court would say today, we can see what the
court in Van Gorkom got right, what it got wrong, and how its
various mistakes mattered—or did not matter—for the development of Delaware corporate law. As will become quickly apparent, under current law, Van Gorkom would be a Revlon case,
and any Delaware court considering the case at the preliminary
injunction phase would almost certainly conclude that the Trans
Union directors had breached their Revlon duties. Given that at
least two other bidders (GECC and KKR) were still pursuing
Trans Union at the time, and given especially that the board
and the chief executive officer were refusing to negotiate with
one of them (KKR), the court would almost certainly issue a
preliminary injunction to allow a free and fair sales process for
the company involving all the interested bidders. At the very
least, the court would have required Trans Union to negotiate
with KKR and the management group on reasonable terms. Reconsidering Van Gorkom as a Revlon case also allows us to use
the legal distinctions and doctrines that the Delaware courts have
developed in the thirty years since Van Gorkom to analyze the
facts in the case in ways that justices of the Delaware Supreme
Court could not have done in 1985. This clarifies a great many
issues, including the true nature of some of the quarrels between
the majority and the dissent and real reasons that so many practitioners and scholars have found the reasoning in Van Gorkom
so unpersuasive.
1. The Trans Union Board’s Revlon Duties Were Triggered
Van Gorkom was a Revlon case before there was a Revlon.
Under Revlon as interpreted by Paramount v. QVC, when the
board of directors of a Delaware corporation initiates a sales
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process involving a change of control of the corporation,358 its
duty changes from the preservation of the corporate entity to the
maximization of the value of the company at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit.359 No longer “defenders of the corporate
bastion,” the directors become “auctioneers charged with getting
the best price for the stockholders.”360 In the jargon of M&A
lawyers, the board’s Revlon duties are triggered, or, even more
colloquially, the board enters Revlon-Land. This means that the
board is required to take reasonable steps to get the best price
for the stockholders reasonably available.361
The paradigm case of a transaction that triggers the
board’s Revlon duties is a cash-out merger, for in such a transaction control passes from a fluid aggregation of stockholders in the
market to a single person, the acquirer.362 Since in the transaction with Pritzker the Trans Union stockholders would receive
cash for their shares, there is no doubt that, under contemporary law, the Revlon duties of the Trans Union directors would
have been triggered. Indeed, when the Delaware Supreme Court
held the Trans Union directors to a new and higher standard of
fiduciary conduct in selling their company,363 the Trans Union
directors in effect became the first corporate directors in history
ever to reach Revlon-Land.364 To be sure, it was done inadvertently, but by initiating the cash sale of Trans Union to Jay
Pritzker, Jerome W. Van Gorkom and the Trans Union directors
were to boldly go where no director had gone before.
358 Paramount Commc’n Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del.
1993); see also In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164VCP, 2010 WL 2403793, at *10–12 (May 20, 2011) (holding that a sale in
which 50 percent of the merger consideration was cash and 50 percent was stock
in a non-controlled public company triggered the target board’s Revlon duties).
359 Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1985).
360 Id. at 182.
361 QVC, 637 A.2d at 51. See generally J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and Why It Matters, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 5 (2013); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3277 (2013).
362 A board’s Revlon duties are also triggered when the selling stockholders receive for their shares the shares of a corporation with a controlling
stockholder. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
363 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
364 Id.
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2. The Van Gorkom Duty of Care vs. Revlon Duties365
a. The Origin of the Van Gorkom Duty of Care in Aronson
v. Lewis
As Lipton emphasized in his client memorandum, nowhere
in the Van Gorkom opinion did the Delaware Supreme Court
suggest that the Trans Union directors breached their duty of
loyalty or acted otherwise than in good faith.366 In fact, the court
had expressly said that “there were no allegations of fraud, bad
faith, or self-dealing, or proof thereof.”367 That is, the court proceeded on the assumptionɆindeed there was not the slightest
evidence to the contraryɆthat all of the Trans Union directors
were free from conflicts of interest involving the transaction
with Pritkzer368 and honestly believed that the actions they were
taking were in the best interests of the corporation and its
stockholders. Holding the Trans Union directors liable, however,
required that there be a duty that they had violated, and the Delaware Supreme Court found such a duty in the duty of care: a
duty of directors to inform themselves of all the material information reasonably available before making a business decision.369
This duty of care is now thoroughly familiar to directors,
practitioners, and scholars, but it was a new thing—a very new
thing—in 1985. It is true that, outside of Delaware, courts had
often spoken in terms of directors being required to use the degree
of care that persons of common prudence ordinarily exercise in
their own affairs.370 Likewise, Moravetz had said in 1886 that
For a somewhat different account of the origin of the duty of care, see
the very illuminating article by Rock & Wachter, supra note 60 (tracing the
history of the duty of care from its origins in trust law through Aronson and
Van Gorkom); see also Henry Ridgley Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of
the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 974 (1994).
366 See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
367 Id. at 873.
368 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984); Orman v. Cullman,
794 A.2d 5, 26 (Del. Ch. 2002).
369 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
370 E.g., Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 65 (1880) (directors of a bank are “bound
to exercise care and prudence in the execution of their trust, in the same
degree that men of common prudence ordinarily exercise in their own affairs”);
see also Horsey, supra note 365, at 974. See generally Rock & Wachter, supra
365
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directors “are required to be diligent and careful in performing
the duties which they have undertaken,” with the result that “if
they commit an error of judgment though mere recklessness or
want of ordinary prudence and skill, the corporation may hold
them responsible for the consequences.”371 Nevertheless, as Allen,
Jacobs, and Strine have said, before Van Gorkom the Delaware
courts were averse to reviewing director action for any purpose
other than remedying breaches of the duty of loyalty.372 Indeed,
before Van Gorkom, Delaware directors had never been held
liable for a breach of the duty of care not also involving a breach
of the duty of loyalty.373
In Van Gorkom, however, the Supreme Court held that the
“determination of whether a business judgment is an informed
one turns on whether the directors have informed themselves
‘prior to making a business decision, of all material information
note 60, at 651 (tracing the history of the duty of care from its origins in trust
law through Aronson and Van Gorkom).
371 VICTOR MORAVETZ, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 554 (2d ed.
1886); see also HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 157 (1946)
(stating “[directors’] liability is not limited to willful dishonesty and mismanagement; it extends also to negligence, which may consist in mere failure to
act.”). I am indebted to Harwell Wells for the reference to Ballantine.
372 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 450.
373 Rock & Wachter, supra note 340, at 651 (stating “[n]ever before [Van
Gorkom] had Delaware directors been held liable for a breach of the duty of
care absent a breach of the duty of loyalty, at least outside the context of
financial institutions”); see also Fischel, supra note 338, at 1444 (stating that,
before Van Gorkom, “the business judgment rule ha[d] traditionally precluded
judicial review of the merits of business decisions not involving conflicts of
interest, including the decision of how much information to acquire”); Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982), where Judge Winter writes that
“although it is often stated that corporate directors … will be liable for negligence in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem to agree that such a
statement is misleading” because “the fact is that liability is rarely imposed
upon corporate directors … simply for bad judgment.” Probably the best way
to make sense of the pre–Van Gorkom law is to say that, while the standard of
conduct for directors involved a duty of care, the standard of review applied by
courts in applying the business judgment rule did not. See generally Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). If so, one way to
understand what went wrong in Van Gorkom was that the Delaware Supreme
Court took for a standard of review what was merely a standard of conduct.
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reasonably available to them.’”374 Here, the court was quoting
from its own opinion in Aronson v. Lewis, which it had issued on
March 1, 1984—that is, more than three years after the Trans
Union merger had closed in February of 1981, more than eighteen months after the final decision of the Chancery Court on
the merits in 1982 that the Supreme Court was reviewing, more
than a year after the first set of oral arguments in the Supreme
Court in early 1983, and almost a year after the second set of
oral arguments in the Supreme Court in mid-1983.375 Not only
could the Trans Union directors not have known of this duty of
care in 1980 and 1981, but even the lawyers arguing the case in
the Supreme Court in 1983 could not have known of it. Smith v.
Van Gorkom was certainly the first time that a Delaware court
had held directors liable for damages for a supposed breach of
their duty of care.376
In Aronson, the question before the Supreme Court was
when, in a stockholder derivative suit, a stockholder’s demand that
the board of directors redress an alleged wrong to the corporation
would be excused as futile.377 Since the answer to that question
involved the business judgment rule,378 the Court restated its
business judgment doctrine. In so doing, it first stated that, to
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 805; OWEN, supra note 3, at 192–93
(noting that the merger closed on February 10, 1981); Smith v. Pritzker, 1981
WL 15145, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3, 1981) (showing Chancellor Marvel delivered
his opinion on July 5, 1982); OWEN, supra note 3, at 257 (noting the first set
of oral arguments occurred on February 24, 1983 and the second on May 16,
1983). However, Aronson was decided a few months before the third set of oral
arguments the Supreme Court ordered in Van Gorkom. OWEN, supra note 3,
at 257 (noting the date of the third set of oral arguments as June 11, 1984).
376 See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 60, at 672.
377 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813–14 (stating that “the Zapata demandexcused/demand-refused bifurcation, has left a crucial issue unanswered:
when is demand futile and, therefore, excused?”).
378 See id. at 814–15. Aronson held,
in determining demand futility the Court of Chancery in the
proper exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under the
particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created
that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent and
(2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment.
Id. at 814.
374
375
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enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule, directors
must be both disinterested in the transaction379 and independent.380 This part of the court’s opinion was unremarkable. Next,
however, the Court said that “to invoke the rule’s protection directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to
them”—the language it would figure so prominently in Van Gorkom
less than a year later.381 The court cited no authority for this
proposition, and indeed it could not do so, for none existed. The
duty the Trans Union directors would later be found to have violated came to be for all practical purposes in Aronson in 1984,
more than three years after the Pritzker–Trans Union merger
closed in early 1981.
Albeit inadvertently, the court’s discussion of the duty of
care in Aronson makes clear what an innovation that duty
was.382 Immediately after stating that, prior to making a business decision, directors have a duty to inform themselves of all
379 The director may not appear on both sides of the transaction and may
not derive any personal financial benefit from the transaction not devolving
on stockholders generally. Id. at 812.
380 The director may not be dominated or controlled by another party (such
as a controlling stockholder) and the director’s decision must be based on the
corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations. See id. at 815–16.
381 Id. at 812. The next sentence in the court’s opinion reads, “Having become so informed, [the directors] must then act with requisite care in the
discharge of their duties.” Id. This part of the Aronson holding, not mentioned
in Van Gorkom, seems to involve a duty beyond merely being informed, perhaps a duty to deliberate about all the material information reasonably
available in a way that meets some standard of careɆpresumably, gross negligenceɆbefore deciding. The Supreme Court’s criticisms of aspects of the
Trans Union board’s decision-making process, beyond mere failures to have
information, suggest some support for this interpretation. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 869 (Del. 1985). Nevertheless, the majority’s insistence in
Van Gorkom that the breaches by the Trans Union directors all involved
merely a failure to be informed seems to have prevented any significant development of this idea, much less any development of a more Revlon-like
review of the substantive reasonability of the board’s decisions. Of course, the
law is clear today that, except under Revlon or some other enhanced standard
of review, the duty of care involves care only in the process of decisionmaking, not its substance. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d
27, 74 (Del. 2006).
382 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
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material information reasonably available, the court explains
this duty, stating, “[w]hile the Delaware cases use a variety of
terms to describe the applicable standard of care, our analysis
satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”383 To this
proposition, the court attaches a footnote, saying, “[w]hile Delaware cases have not been precise in articulating the standard by
which the exercise of business judgment is governed, a long line
of Delaware cases holds that director liability is predicated on a
standard which is less exacting than simple negligence.”384 This
is misleading in two ways. First, it distracts from the important
and new holding—that there was a duty of care at all, regardless
of what the standard of care may be. That critical point gets
passed over in silence; the shift from the existence of the duty to
its exact content was prestidigitation.
Second, in turning to the whether the standard of care
should be simple negligence or some less exacting standard such
as gross negligence, the court gets things exactly backwards.
What was new and surprising about a duty to be informed before making a business decision was that there was a duty at
allɆthat is, that there was a basis for liability less than dishonesty, fraud, self-dealing or conflicts of interest. In its Aronson
opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court speaks as if the court is, if
anything, constricting the duties of directors by holding them
merely to a gross negligence standard. In fact, the court was greatly
expanding directors’ duties by imposing on them a duty involving a
standard less than the traditional one of dishonesty, fraud, selfdealing, or conflicts of interest.385
The “long line of Delaware cases” holding “that director
liability is predicated on a standard which is less exacting than
simple negligence” to which the court refers confirms this. 386
Id.
Id. at 812 n.6. (listing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723
(Del. 1971); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1969);
Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492 (Del. 1966); Moskowitz v. Bantrell,
190 A.2d 749, 750 (Del. 1963); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349,
352 (Del. Ch. 1972); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 140–41 (Del. Ch. 1960);
Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 260 (Del. Ch. 1929)).
385 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817.
386 Id. at 812 n.6.
383
384
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None of these cases held directors liable for breaching a duty of
care. None of them even refers to a duty of care. In not one of
them does the word “informed” even appear. The Aronson opinion
makes it sound as if these were duty of care cases that held that
the duty of care involves a gross negligence rather than a simple
negligence standard. In fact, most were cases based on allegations
of director (or controlling stockholder) misconduct involving
fraud, dishonesty, self-dealing or other conflicts of interest.387
The rest challenged the substantive merits of a business decision.388 None involved even allegations that the directors had not
been sufficiently informed before making a business decision.
See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971) (challenging transactions between a controlled subsidiary and the controlling
parent); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1969) (action
for declarative judgment by controlling stockholder regarding its duties to
controlled corporation); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492 (Del. 1966)
(challenging transactions taken by directors who were also directors of controlling stockholder alleging that transactions between the corporation and a
third party benefited the controlling stockholder at the expense of the minority);
Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 140–41 (Del. Ch. 1960) (challenging the board’s
decision to use corporate funds to reacquire a block of the corporation’s shares
from a large stockholder and alleging that the directors undertook the transaction to benefit and entrench themselves).
388 See Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749, 750 (Del. 1963) (challenging
on the merits the board’s decision not to pay higher dividends, but not alleging
that the board was uninformed). The court dismissed the complaint because
the plaintiff “failed to show any oppressive or fraudulent abuse of discretion.”
Id. at 751; see also Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 350 (Del.
1972) (challenging the directors’ decision to sell stock owned by the corporation at the market price when they knew that they would soon cause the
corporation to purchase shares of the same class of stock at a higher price).
Of all the cases the Aronson court cites, Penn Mart Realty comes closest to
recognizing a duty of care. Such recognition as exists in the case, however, is
limited to the unexplained observation that, in refusing to dismiss the complaint, the court said, “[f]raud and self-dealing are not the only ways in which
corporate directors may breach their fiduciary duty; they may also breach
that duty by being grossly negligent or by wasting corporate assets.” Penn
Mart Realty, 298 A.2d at 351. There is not the slightest hint, however, that
the gross negligence concerned the board’s being uninformed. Indeed, the key
assertion in the plaintiff’s complaint was not that the board knew too little
but that it knew too much—that is, that it sold the shares knowing it would
soon purchase identical shares at a higher price. Finally, in Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., the plaintiff stockholder challenged the directors’ approval of a
sale of all the corporation’s assets, and although the plaintiff alleged that the
sale was tainted by self-interest in various respects, the court rejected these
387
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Immediately after saying that the duty of care it was creating would be implemented with a gross negligence standard,
the Aronson court cited a then-recent law review article, by E.
Norman Veasey (future Chief Justice Veasey) and William E.
Manning, in which the authors compared the standard of care set
allegations. Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A. 257 (Del. 1929). Nevertheless, the court went on to say that the majority stockholders (and so presumably directors as well) “favoring the sale owe something more to the minority
than to merely refrain from reaping a forbidden personal advantage, either
directly or indirectly, from the sale. They owe the further duty of securing to
it that the assets shall be sold for a fair and adequate price.” Id. at 260. But,
determining whether a price was fair and adequate:
invites a study of the value which the assets may be fairly said
to possess, and having ascertained the value, a determination
of the question of whether or not there is such a disparity between the price to be received and the value found as would
indicate legal fraud upon the rights of the dissenting minority.
Id. Further,
the disparity must be sufficiently great to indicate that it
arises not so much from an honest mistake in judgment concerning the value of the assets, as from either improper motives underlying the judgment of those in whom the right to
judge is vested or a reckless indifference to or a deliberate
disregard of the interests of the whole body of [stock]holders
including of course the minority.
Id. Exactly what this meant in 1929 is hard to say, but nowadays such a
standard is certainly not the Van Gorkom duty to be informed of all the material information reasonably available before making a business decision. It
sounds, rather, like the corporate waste standard, as explained by the Supreme Court in Disney: “To recover on a claim of corporate waste, the plaintiffs must shoulder the burden of proving that the exchange was so one sided
that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration.” In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006). At most, the duty described in Allaun
is a precursor to the Revlon duty to obtain for the stockholders the best price
reasonably available. It is true that the Allaun court examined the process
the controlling stockholder used to shop the company, but it did so not to
determine whether the controlling stockholder used due care. Rather, the
court considered the sales process as evidence that the price obtained was
fair. There is simply nothing like the Van Gorkom procedural duty of care in
Allaun. Conversely, there is nothing like the Allaun inquiry into the substantive fairness of the price in Van Gorkom, where the Delaware Supreme Court
based its decision entirely on the supposed inadequacies of the process, expressly declined to determine whether the price in the Pritzker transaction
was fair, and remanded the case to the Court of Chancery to make that determination. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
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forth in Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act to the
standard required under Delaware law.389 There was in the later
1970s and early 1980s an active debate about whether Section 35
involved a simple negligence or gross negligence standard for
directorial conduct, and Veasey and Manning take up the question of what the standard was under Delaware law.390 They observe that the existing Delaware law provided little guidance,391
and although they come to no definitive conclusion, they seem to
favor the idea that in Delaware the standard of care is a gross
negligence standard.392 In reaching this conclusion, they refer
only to three cases: Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co.,393 Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker,394 and Lutz v. Boas.395 The
first of these is now recognized as being not a business judgment
rule case at all but the seminal case concerning director oversight liability,396 the doctrine that applies not when the board
has made a business decision (even a decision to do nothing) but
E. Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, Codified Standard—Safe
Harbor or Uncharted Reef?, 35 BUS. LAW. 919 (1980).
390 Id. at 926–28.
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
394 Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 352 (Del. Ch. 1972).
395 Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 331, 396 (Del. Ch. 1961).
396 Nevertheless, Justice Horsey, who of course wrote the majority opinion
in Van Gorkom, has insisted that Graham is an important doctrinal basis for
the duty of care. See Horsey, supra note 365, at 974. Although the case does
refer to a director’s duty “to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful
and prudent men would use in similar circumstances,” the case does not
involveɆand given that it sounds in oversight, could not have involvedɆa
duty to be informed of all the material facts reasonably available before making a business decision. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130; see Robert T. Miller, Wrongful
Omissions: Stone v. Ritter and Adapting the Process Model of the Delaware
Business Judgment Rule, 10 PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 783 (2008) [hereinafter
Wrongful Omissions]. Moreover, the court in Graham also held that the directors had not breached their duties, however defined. Graham, 188 A.2d at
131. That those who wish to say that the Aronson–Van Gorkom duty of care
had some basis in Delaware law before Aronson are reduced to pointing to
cases such as Graham shows, in my opinion, how completely wrong they are.
As Thomas Aquinas said, some arguments are so weak that they lend probability to the opposing view. Thomas Aquinas, On the Eternity of the World (De
Aeternitate Mundi), trans, Robert T. Miller, in INTERNET MEDIEVAL SOURCEBOOK
(Fordham Univ. 1991), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas
-eternity.asp [https://perma.cc/2MKT-ASCR].
389
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has rather abdicated its responsibilities or merely failed to act at
all.397 The standard in such cases is not negligence or gross negligence but bad faith, that is, conscious disregard of a known duty
to act.398 Lutz v. Boas, although it is earlier than Allis-Chalmers,
also concerns oversight liability, not the business judgment rule.399
The remaining case, Penn Mart Realty, which the court itself
had already cited in Aronson, did say that directors may breach
their fiduciary duty not only by fraud and self-dealing but also
by “being grossly negligent or by wasting corporate assets,” but
this duty was in no way explained, and the opinion certainly never
As was made clear in Aronson itself, when a board “abdicated its functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act,” the business judgment rule,
which concerns actual business judgments, cannot, by its very terms be applied.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (quoting Graham v. AllisChalmers Manufacturing Co., 188 A.3d 125 (1963) (“Although questions of
directorial liability in such cases have been adjudicated upon concepts of business
judgment, they do not in actuality present issues of business judgment.”)).
398 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006); see also Wrongful
Omissions, supra note 396, at 946. Even at the time of Van Gorkom, scholars
recognized that Allis-Chalmers and the Van Gorkom duty of care concerned
different issues. See Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 330, at 444–45.
399 Veasey and Manning understand Lutz v. Boas as holding that certain
directors were liable because they “paid little attention to management’s
actions which even ‘average attention to duty’ would have revealed as improper or, at best, waste,” leading the court to find “that in abdicating their
responsibilities these directors were grossly negligent.” Veasey & Manning,
supra note 389, at 928. But as this summary suggests and as the text of the
opinion itself confirms, the claim in the case was not that the relevant directors had made a business decision on the basis of inadequate information; it
was that they were not monitoring the business at all, with the result that
management had looted the company. Thus, the court states, “These men are
prime examples of what can happen when a man undertakes substantial
responsibility with public overtones without any appreciation of his obligation thereunder,” and it goes on to quote from and adopt the conclusions of
the Securities and Exchange Commission in a related action:
[the] directors gave scant attention to the management of the
[company]; made no efforts to be informed concerning [the
company’s] polices and whether such policies were being followed; made no decisions concerning purchases and sales of
portfolio securities; and generally permitted the [company] to
be managed by [certain officers] without consultation with or
approval by the board as a whole.
Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 395–96 (Del. Ch. 1961). In contemporary terms,
this is the language of oversight liability, not breaches of the duty of care.
Wrongful Omissions, supra note 396, at 928.
397
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mentioned anything about directors being informed.400 The opinion
contains nothing relating to gross negligence except this one phrase.
There was, in short, no basis in prior law401 for the Delaware
400 Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. 1972); see also
supra note 388 and accompanying text (discussing Penn Mart Realty).
401 Schwartz and Wiles assert that “the possibility of attacking a sale of
control solely on the basis of a lack of due care by the corporation’s directors
has been recognized in the Delaware cases since at least 1929.” Schwartz &
Wiles, supra note 330, at 439 (citing Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A.
257, 260 (Del. Ch. 1929)). This is not true, as simply reading the cases shows.
As to Allaun, see supra note 388 and accompanying text (discussing Allaun).
The other cases Schwartz and Wiles cite are similar. In Mitchell v. HighlandWestern Glass Co., the question was again the substantive one of whether the
consideration received was so grossly inadequate as to suggest fraud. 167 A.
831, 832 (Del. Ch. 1933). True, plaintiffs argued that the defendant directors
were uninformed about the value of the purchasing corporation, which was
paying with its own stock, but the court rejected this contention on the facts
without reaching any legal conclusions as to its merits. Id. at 834; see also
Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924) (substantive review of transaction’s terms, no mention of a duty to be informed). The
seminal case in the line, Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel Tube Co. of America,
expressly says, that, in a sale of the company, “[t]he requirements of the
statute and of the certificate of incorporation all being satisfied, ... it will be
manifest that the only ground upon which he can base his claim for relief is
that of fraud.” 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1924). The closest approach to something like the duty of care in Aronson v. Lewis is in Gimbel v. Signal Cos., where
Chancellor Quillen stated that the plaintiffs had not shown that the “directors acted so far without information that they can be said to have passed an
unintelligent and unadvised judgment.” Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599,
615 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d per curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974), Quillen later
himself criticized the Supreme Court for misreading Gimbel to support the
holding in Van Gorkom. Quillen, supra note 28, at 471 (stating that “even the
[S]upreme [C]ourt should not be free to miscite what the chancellor said or
what he did to justify what it is now saying or doing”). Mones, supra note 31,
at 560 (arguing that the “Trans Union court’s reliance on Gimbel may have been
misguided”). Nevertheless, Quillen does think that “for years the courts have
in fact reviewed directors’ business decisions to some extent from a quality of
judgment point of view.” Quillen, supra note 28, at 492 n.109 (he mentions
only Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., 140 A. 264, 267 (Del. 1927) (“gross
abuse of discretion”), Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492–93 (Del. 1966)
(“reckless indifference”), Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908
(Del. Ch. 1973) (“recklessly”), and Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.
1974), aff’d per curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974)); see also Kaplan v. Centex
Corp., 284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971). In the end, Schwartz and Wiles have to
concede that “there appears to be no reported decision prior to Trans Union
which holds, solely on the basis of the board’s decision-making processes, that
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Supreme Court’s assertion in Aronson that Delaware imposed on
corporate directors a duty to be informed of all the material facts
reasonably available before making a business decision.402
a third party merger is invalid as the product of uninformed business judgment.” Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 330, at 442.
402 This was recognized by many practitioners and scholars at the time. In
some cases, however, there seems to have been significant confusion about what
had changed in Aronson and Van Gorkom. For example, Steven Mones states
that, prior to Van Gorkom, a finding that the directors had acted in good faith
and not breached their duty of loyalty “would have been sufficient to trigger
the defense of the business judgment rule,” but then says that “[t]he Trans
Union decision did not break new ground or introduce radical theories” because “it followed the basic standards for the application of the business
judgment rule established in Aronson v. Lewis.” Mones, supra note 31, at 567.
It cuts quite thinly to say that applying a radical new theory announced in a
case the year before in dicta is not to break new ground or introduce radical
theories. Of course, there were those who took the opposite view. William
Prickett, who represented the plaintiffs in Van Gorkom, insisted that “Delaware
lawyers (and indeed most lawyers from elsewhere) familiar with Delaware
law immediately understood ... in reversing the short unreported opinion of the
chancellor dismissing the case, the court had applied, without change, existing Delaware law to the facts in the record.” Prickett, supra note 357, at 451.
Prickett tries to pass off the furious reaction to the case as resulting from
non-Delaware lawyers being uninformed about Delaware law. Id. at 451–52.
However, this is quite absurd (for instance, William T. Quillen, a former justice
on the Delaware Supreme Court and a former chancellor on the Court of Chancery, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Van Gorkom, had drafted an
article on the business judgment rule based on the assumption that the Supreme Court would affirm the ruling below. Quillen, supra note 28, at 465.
Similarly, Macey and Miller, referring to Prickett’s view, state that “the evidence is overwhelming that the decision shocked and amazed a large segment
of the corporate bar.” Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 132. Prickett also refers to
a “whole line of Delaware cases that have held over the years the directors are
liable for gross negligence.” Prickett, supra note 357, at 458. His footnotes,
however, trace back to only “a short survey of case law dealing with directors’
duty of care” in Aronson v. Lewis and to other cases cited in Van Gorkom, none of
which, as discussed in the text above, do anything to support a duty of care.
Id. at 456 n.21; see also id. at 459 n.32 (he cites but does not discuss Gimbel
v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d per curiam, 316 A.2d 619
(Del. 1974), Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971), and Mitchell v.
Highland-Western Glass Co., 167 A. 831 (Del. Ch. 1933)). Schwartz and Wiles
do a much more impressive, yet still quite unconvincing, job of finding support
for Aronson and Van Gorkom in prior Delaware Case law. See supra note 401
and accompanying text; see also Morton Moskin, Trans Union: A Nailed Board,
10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 406 (1985) (“The Trans Union court did not depart
from the established rules”).
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But something like a duty not to act with gross negligence
was in the air in 1984. Besides the Veasey and Manning article,
earlier in its opinion the Aronson court had cited several law review articles most of which have the common theme that courts
needed to do more to control corporate boards.403 Some of these
expressly advocated for a duty of care404 and some bore alarming
subtitles such as “Is Corporate Behavior Beyond the Control of Our
Legal System?”405 More generally, there was a widespread feeling
in 1985 that someone, somewhere had to do something about the
wave of merger activity that had begun in the early years of the
decade. A Wall Street Journal article from January 2, 1985—less
than four weeks before the Delaware Supreme Court released its
opinion in Van Gorkom—begins by referring to the “national
ruckus over merger mania” and states that “stockholders across the
country, as well as state government legislators and regulators, influential lawyers and the heads of the nation’s largest corporations”
were all expressing frustration about takeovers, and that “[u]nderlying the hysteria is the spreading notion that the merger and
acquisition process in America is out of control.”406 The article goes
on to provide breathless accounts of junk bonds, bust-up mergers,
greenmail, poison pills, and state anti-takeover laws, and it speculates about possible action by Congress to limit merger activity.407
403 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 n.4 (Del. 1984). The articles
are Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1259 (1982); Bruce Dickstein, Corporate Governance and the Shareholders’
Derivative Action: Rules and Remedies for Implementing the Monitoring Model,
3 CARDOZO L. REV. 627 (1982); Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New
Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1981);
George W. Jr. Dent, The Revolution in Corporate Governance, The Monitoring
Board, and The Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REV. 623 (1981); Michael G.
Moore, Corporate Officer & Director Liability: Is Corporate Behavior Beyond
the Control of Our Legal System? 16 CAP. U.L. REV. 69 (1980); Thomas M.
Jones, Corporate Governance: Who Controls the Large Corporation? 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 1261 (1979); and Marshall L. Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in
Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1979).
404 E.g., George W. Jr. Dent, The Revolution in Corporate Governance, The
Monitoring Board, and The Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REV. 623 (1981).
405 Michael G. Moore, Corporate Officer & Director Liability: Is Corporate
Behavior Beyond the Control of Our Legal System? 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 69 (1980).
406 Tim Metz & John D. Williams, Year-End Review of Markets and Finance: Debate Over Mergers Intensifies Amid Record Surge of Transactions,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 1985).
407 Id.
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Some corporate law scholars had singled out the Delaware courts
for not doing enough to control what these scholars regarded as
socially harmful transactions.408 Just what role the scholarly
articles and widespread alarm in 1984 and 1985 about corporate
takeovers played in the Van Gorkom court’s decision-making is
impossible to say, but it is tempting to believe that the court felt
pressure to do something409 to impose more discipline on directors
approving business combination transactions.410 Whatever the
causes, the result was the application of the Aronson duty of care
in Van Gorkom.411
See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
409 Cf. famous exchange between Otter and Bluto: Otter declares, “I think
that this situation absolutely requires a really futile and stupid gesture be
done on somebody’s part!” and Bluto answers, “We’re just the guys to do it.”
ANIMAL HOUSE (Universal Pictures 1978). Writing soon after the case was
decided, Herzel and his co-authors described the majority’s opinion as a
“grand anti-business gesture.” Herzel et al., supra note 335, at 14; see also
Mones, supra note 31, at 550 (“Both the length of the majority opinion and its
tenor suggest strongly that the court was sending the message to corporate
directors generally that the business judgment rule is not an impregnable
defense against attacks by dissatisfied [stock]holders.”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
A Kinder, Gentler Critique of Van Gorkom and its Less Celebrated Legacies,
96 NW. U.L. REV. 595, 596 [hereinafter Gentler Critique] (stating that the
Delaware Supreme Court “surely saw the Van Gorkom case as a rare opportunity to address the proper role of directors in dealing with acquisition
bids”). Quillen thinks that it was “the chief criticism of the majority opinion
arises ... from the tone of the writing” and suggests “it would have been tactful and consistent with principle in a jurisdiction that has traditionally given
wide discretion to directors, for the court not to have engaged in language
hostile beyond its holdings or indeed beyond the law of the state.” Quillen,
supra note 28, at 478. Macey and Miller think that “the court seemed determined to make an example of the Trans Union board.” Macey & Miller, supra
note 23, at 131. They too characterize the tone of the opinion as “harsh and
uncharitable towards the defendants.” Id. at 132–33. But see Schwartz & Wiles,
supra note 330, at 431 (stating “[t]he suggestion that there has been a new
anti-business departure in Delaware corporate law is simply wrong”).
410 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 459 n.39 (stating, “Van
Gorkom … must also be viewed as part of the Delaware courts’ effort to grapple with the huge increase in mergers and acquisition activity in the 1980s
and the new problems that posed for judicial review of director conduct.”);
Mones, supra note 31, at 566 (stating “the Trans Union decision must ... be
evaluated against the prevailing state of extensive merger activity” and, thus,
is “the court’s statement to corporate officers in general that their actions will
be subject to stricter scrutiny than in the past”).
411 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
408
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Perhaps ironically, for all its subsequent importance, the
entire discussion of the duty of care in Aronson was the merest
dicta. The plaintiffs in that case were challenging actions by the
directors approving an employment agreement for an officer who
was also a director and 47 percent stockholder of the corporation.412
All the allegations concerned breaches of the duty of loyalty and
whether the other directors were disinterested and independent;413 there was no hint of an allegation that they had been
uninformed when they approved the challenged employment agreement. The duty of care would not actually figure in any case
before Smith v. Van Gorkom.414
b. The Van Gorkom Duty of Care vs. Revlon Duties—
Theoretical Justifications
Even in Revlon itself, Revlon duties were much better theorized than the Aronson–Van Gorkom duty of care. This comes out
in relation to the conditions under which the duty applies, the
content of the duty, the normative justification for the duty, and
potential damages for a violation of a duty.415
Regarding the conditions under which the duty applies,
the Van Gorkom duty of care by its terms is part of the business
judgment rule and so applies to all business decisions that the
board may make, not just decisions about business combinations.416 Thus, in one of the very few duty of care cases involving
public companies since Van Gorkom, the business decisions that
the plaintiff-stockholder challenged involved not a merger, but
the hiring and firing of a key employee.417 This pervasiveness of
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 810 (Del. 1984).
See id. at 813.
414 Id.
415 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
416 Id. at 872–73; see also Sharfman, supra note 57, at 293 n.40 (stating
that “Van Gorkom applies outside the world of mergers and acquisitions”).
417 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006).
Macey and Miller predicted that “[i]t is extremely unlikely that Trans Union
will ever be applied outside the takeover context.” Macey & Miller, supra note
23, at 140. The implementation of Section 102(b)(7) provisions has largely
forestalled any application of the Van Gorkom duty of care, but cases like
Disney show that Macey and Miller were mistaken here. They were misled
largely because they thought Van Gorkom was “a takeover case.” Applying
412
413
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the duty of care had at least two important effects.418 On the one
hand, because the duty applied to all business decisions, it could
not be tailored to the real problem the Delaware Supreme Court
seems to have wanted to address—the behavior of directors in
dealing with the merger.419 On the other hand, because the duty
applied to all business decisions, the threat of personal liability
that it created—which was already gigantic in connection with
mergers—loomed over the heads of directors for every business
decision they made. For example, if the directors caused the company to borrow $10 billion on an unsecured basis at 10 percent
interest for ten years, but a stockholder later convinced the
Court of Chancery that the directors were not fully informed about
the possibilities of issuing secured debt at 6 percent, the directors
would be liable for the incremental borrowing cost of the transaction they approved—potentially up to $400 million.420 Indeed, since
directors of public companies are constantly making business decisions involving vast sums but only rarely consider merger proposals, the tremendous liability exposure Van Gorkom created was
in fact mostly due to potential liability from run-of-the-mill business
decisions, not mergers.421 This made the Van Gorkom duty of
care much more difficult for directors to deal with than a heightened duty that applied only in known special circumstances when
the directors could make particular efforts to comply with it.
By contrast, from the beginning, Revlon clearly applied only
when the directors were engaged in selling their company.422 They
had no need to worry about Revlon duties in any other context.423
Van Gorkom outside the takeover context “would not serve its purposes,
which are unique to that context.” Id. at 128; see also id. at 140. The truth, as
this Article argues, is not that Van Gorkom was a takeover case, but that it
should have been. Since, by its express terms, the holding in Van Gorkom
about the duty of care obviously applies to all board decisions, naturally we
get cases like Disney applying that duty outside the takeover context.
418 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872–73.
419 Id.
420 Id. at 878
421 Id. at 872.
422 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
184 (Del. 1986). As Bainbridge notes, the sale of the company is a final-period
problem, which in itself suggests that special legal duties may be justified in
such cases. Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 223.
423 See id.
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True, it took a few years and some great takeover cases to clarify
exactly when a board’s Revlon duties would be triggered: for
example, that a decision to engage in a cash merger triggers
Revlon, but a decision to engage in a stock-for-stock merger does
not, except in the extraordinary case of an acquisition with a controlling stockholder.424 But the end result was a system in which
it is very clear that a board’s Revlon duties can be triggered only
by a decision by the board itself to sell the company, with no other
party being able to send the board to Revlon-Land.425 Indeed,
after QVC, there was likely never a case in which a board was
surprised to learn that its Revlon duties were triggered.426 Because Revlon duties apply only in rare and clearly circumscribed
contexts and can be triggered only by the board itself, it has been
relatively easy for directors to know when they would be held to
the higher standard required by Revlon and to act accordingly.427
As to the content of the duty, because the Van Gorkom duty
of care was a general duty incorporated into the business judgment rule, it could of necessity supply directors with little guidance as to what they had to do, whether in selling their company
or in any other business decision. They were merely required to
be informed of all the material facts reasonably available.428 Van
424 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del.
1990); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del.
1994).
425 Id. at 1151 (where the Delaware Supreme Court stated, “we decline to
extend Revlon’s application to corporate transactions simply because they might
be construed [by the market] as putting a corporation either ‘in play’ or ‘up for
sale’”); see also Lyondell Petrochemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (2009),
where the court held:
Revlon duties do not arise simply because a company is ‘in
play.’ The duty to seek the best available price applies only
when a company embarks on a transaction—on its own initiative or in response to an unsolicited offer—that will result in a
change of control.
Id.
426 C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees’, 107
A.3d 1049, 1053 (Del. 2014) is a possible exception, but if so, it is the exception that proves the rule. In the doubtful cases, Revlon has been found not to
apply. See, e.g., Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1142.
427 See QVC, 637 A.2d at 46; Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1142.
428 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). The impossibility
of specifying how much care directors should take in particular kinds of
transactions was known to Moravetz in the nineteenth century. He writes
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Gorkom made it very clear that, in approving a sale of the company, some kind of financial analysis, whether from an investment
banker or in-house financial experts,429 would always or virtually
always be deemed material information reasonably available,
but other than that, Van Gorkom offered little guidance for directors considering a business combination and none for directors
considering other kinds of transactions. Presumably, had Van
Gorkom not been effectively overturned by Section 102(b)(7) and
replaced by Revlon,430 there could have developed a line of Van
Gorkom cases determining whether certain kinds of information
were material and reasonably available to a board considering a
merger.431 There can be no doubt, however, that the text of the
Van Gorkom opinion provided much less guidance to directors
and the bar than the text of the Revlon did.
Furthermore, the Van Gorkom duty of care was ill adapted to
regulating the various decisions a board might make in the process
that “directors … undertake to use as much diligence and care as the proper
performance of the duties of their office requires,” which “is a question of fact,
which must be determined in each case in view of all the circumstances,”
including “the character of the company, the condition of [its] business, [and]
the usual methods of managing such companies.” Moravetz, supra note 371,
at § 552. “It is evident that no abstract reasoning can be of service in reaching
a proper solution.” Id.
429 Id. at 876 (stating “[o]ften insiders familiar with the business of a going
concern are in a better position than are outsiders to gather relevant information;
and under appropriate circumstances, ... directors may be fully protected in
relying in good faith upon the valuation reports of their management”).
430 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173,
185 (Del. 1986).
431 QVC, 637 A.2d at 44 (“a board of directors is not limited to considering
only the amount of cash involved, and is not required to ignore totally its view of
the future value of a strategic alliance,” and “the directors should analyze the
entire situation and evaluate in a disciplined manner the consideration being
offered. Where stock or other non-cash consideration is involved, the board
should try to quantify its value, if feasible, to achieve an objective comparison
of the alternatives.”); e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1282 n. 29 (directors should consider an offer’s “fairness and feasibility;
the proposed or actual financing for the offer, and the consequences of that
financing; questions of illegality; ... the risk of non-consummation; ... the
bidder’s identity, prior background and other business venture experiences;
and the bidder’s business plans for the corporation and their effects on
[stock]holder interests.”); cf. the guidance the Delaware courts have offered
directors trying to fulfill their Revlon duties.
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of selling the company.432 As Chancellor Allen famously said,
“[c]ompliance with a director’s duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the
board decision,” and
whether a judge ... considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational’, provides
no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines
that the process employed was either rational or employed in
a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.433

In other words, as the Delaware Supreme Court would later say,
“Due care in the decision[-]making context is process due care
only.”434 But a duty regulating directorial conduct in handling
takeovers that was limited to issues of process and ignored substance would have allowed all manner of decisions that Revlon
would prohibit: in Revlon itself, for example, Revlon’s decision
not to negotiate with Perelman would have to have been upheld
provided only that the Revlon board considered all the material
facts reasonably available before deciding.435 Indeed, as we will
see below, the Van Gorkom court often struggled, sometimes unsuccessfully, to find a way to shoehorn its criticisms of the Trans
Union board into the duty of care, that is, to characterize those
decisions as failures to act on a fully informed basis.
By contrast, Revlon duties are very well-adapted to the
limited context in which they apply: when the board is selling the
company, the directors have to take reasonable steps to get the
best price for the stockholders reasonably available.436 In essence,
when they approve a merger agreement selling the company, the
In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Derivative Litig. 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996).
433 Id.
434 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
435 Id. at 259.
436 Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (stating
“[t]here is only one Revlon duty—‘to [get] the best price for the [stock]holders
at a sale of the company.’”); Paramount Commc’ns. Inc v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) (stating “[t]he consequences of a sale of control
impose special obligations on the directors of a corporation. In particular,
they have the obligation of acting reasonably to seek the transaction offering
the best value reasonably available to the [stock]holders”).
432
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directors have to reasonably believe that the price provided in
the agreement is the best one reasonably available.437 True, this
involves a general standard of reasonability, not bright-line rules,438
and to that extent it may leave directors unsure as to what they
may or may not do, but directors can and do take comfort in the
fact that the Delaware courts have emphasized that a court reviewing a board’s actions under Revlon “should be deciding
whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect
decision,” and “[i]f a board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court should not second-guess that choice even though
it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may have
cast doubt on the board’s determination.”439
As to the theoretical justification for the duty, on the simplest level, everyone is aware that when a board of directors sells
the company in a change-of-control transaction (that is, whenever
Revlon is triggered), this virtually always provides a final opportunity for the stockholders to obtain a significant premium above
market for their shares.440 As to why large premiums are available in such transactions, there is significant debate,441 but the
fact itself is obvious and undeniable. It thus seems eminently
sensible that directors charged with maximizing stockholder
value should have a duty to capture such a premium when the
opportunity arises. As the Delaware Supreme Court put it in
QVC, “a sale of control impose special obligations on the directors of
Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989) (holding that “the crucial element supporting a finding” that the board complied
with its Revlon duties “is knowledge. It must be clear that the board had
sufficient knowledge of relevant markets to form the basis for its belief that it
acted in the best interests of the [stock]holders.”).
438 In the famous and inevitable phrase, “there is no single blueprint” that
a board is required to follow in managing a sale of the company. Id. at 1286.
439 QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
440 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
184 (Del. 1986).
441 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate
Finance, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1053 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums
Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J.
1235 (1990); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of
“Discounted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891
(1988); J. Michael Harrison & David M. Kreps, Speculative Investor Behavior
in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations, 92 Q.J. ECON. 323 (1978).
437
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a corporation,” because “[o]nce control has shifted, the ... stockholders will have no leverage in the future to demand another
control premium. As a result, the ... stockholders are entitled to
receive, and should receive, a control premium,” and thus the
“directors had an obligation to take the maximum advantage of
the current opportunity to realize for the stockholders the best
value reasonably available.”442
By contrast, the theoretical justification of the duty of
care is shaky.443 As Easterbrook and Fischel have pointed out,
since gathering and analyzing information is costly, how much
and what kinds of information a board should have before making a business decision is itself a business decision just like any
other.444 That is, “there is a limit to how informed managers
should be before making a decision,” for “information is costly,”
and “investors want mangers to spend an additional dollar on
information acquisition only to the point where there is an additional dollar generated from better decisions making.”445 Hence,
“the need to expend resources for additional information will vary
from firm to firm, manager to manager, and decision to decision,”446 which means that the manager’s duty to be informed
cannot be specified in advance (except in the most general terms)
and thus “it is correspondingly difficult to determine when there
has been a breach.”447 Accordingly, “[j]udicial inquiry into the
amount of information managers should acquire before deciding
creates the precise difficulties that the business judgment rule is
designed to avoid.”448 Rather than allowing directors to make a
QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
See Fischel, supra note 338, at 1438 (stating “[w]hat the opinion lacks … is
a coherent theory of the business judgment rule” and “the majority opinion
makes no attempt to integrate its extended discussion of the facts with the
theory of the rule or what purposes the rule is meant to serve”).
444 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 107–08 (1991).
445 Fischel, supra note 338, at 1441. Compare with Bainbridge, who writes
that “information is costly and [stock]holders will only want managers to invest an
additional dollar in gathering information where there is an additional dollar
generated from better decisions making.” Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 217.
446 Fischel, supra note 338, at 1441.
447 Id.
448 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 444, at 107–08 (1991); Leo Herzel
and Leo Katz make essentially the same point, arguing that there is no clear
442
443
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business judgment about which information is worth having before
deciding (e.g., whether an investment banker’s fairness opinion
is really worth $5 million of the stockholders’ money), the duty
of care substitutes the court’s judgment about whether certain
material was “material” and “reasonably available.” All the arguments that support the business judgment rule generally449 also
support eliminating the duty of care.450
c. The Van Gorkom Duty of Care v. Revlon Duties—
Applications
Armed with the duty of care announced but not applied in
Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the Trans Union
directors had breached that duty by not informing themselves of
all the material facts reasonably available to them before making
business decisions, whether approving the original transaction
or approving modifications to it. Below, I reconsider those findings as they would appear to a court applying Revlon and its
progeny to the same facts. I shall argue that, in many instances,
it is easy to agree with the court that the directors were not adequately informed before they made a decision. In other cases,
however, it is difficult (sometimes obviously impossible) to justify
the court’s criticisms of the Trans Union directors’ conduct on
distinction between substantive business decisions and decisions about procedures underlying those decisions, and so, it is incoherent for courts to accord extreme deference to one and virtually no deference to the other. Leo
Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business
Judgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187, 1190 (1986) [hereinafter Herzel & Katz] (stating “[w]hy should the failure to hire an investment banker be viewed as part
of the decision-making procedure behind the merger rather than the product
of a decision about whether to hire an investment banker?”).
449 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982); EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, supra note 444, at 90–108.
450 Allen, Jacobs, and Strine have argued that there is yet another problem
with the duty of care as applied in such cases as Van Gorkom: since the concept is essentially a tort concept, the plaintiffs should have to prove not only
a breach of the duty but also harm and causation. Allen, Jacobs & Strine,
supra note 31, at 449 (in particular, the results of the plaintiffs showing a
breach should not be an entire fairness inquiry); see also McChesney, supra
note 340, at 636 (stating “[t]o violate the duty of care, any breach must also
have caused some damage to the firm and its [stock]holders,” but “the court
did not address that issue in its opinion”).
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this basis. In those cases, however, it is usually quite easy to see
why that conduct would amount to a breach of the board’s
Revlon duties.451 The picture that emerges from this analysis is
that of a duty of care being tortured to support conclusions that
it cannot in many cases justify. Even if Van Gorkom had not
suffered from the much more serious problem of creating untenable levels of financial risk for directors, it would nevertheless
still have to have been retooled in Revlon.
(1) The Original Decision to Approve the Merger with
Pritzker
As we saw above, on September 19, 1980, Van Gorkom
called a special meeting of the Trans Union directors for the
next day, September 20.452 The notice of the meeting did not state
its purpose, and so, the independent directors learned of potential transaction with Pritzker only at the meeting (the inside
directors other than Van Gorkom learned of the potential transaction an hour earlier at a meeting of senior executives Van
Gorkom had called).453 In approving the merger, the directors had,
besides their admittedly extensive background information about
the business and financial condition of Trans Union, only Van
Gorkom’s twenty-minute oral presentation about the transaction,454 a presentation from the company’s attorney about the
merger agreement (assuming the dissent is to be believed),455
and a brief presentation by Romans about the leveraged-buyout
analysis he had conducted and his opinion that the $55 price was
See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 459 n.39 (stating “[i]ndeed,
if decided consistent with the ‘enhanced scrutiny’ analysis mandated by
Revlon, with its emphasis upon immediate value maximization, rather than
as a ‘due care’ case, Van Gorkom would not be viewed as remarkable”); see
also Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 131 (arguing that “viewing the case as
being rightly decided on the basis of a gross negligence standard is not a
particularly satisfying way of reconciling the apparent inconsistency between
the facts and the law”).
452 See supra text accompanying note 131. In economic terms, the cost of
providing the directors these facts was clearly much less than the expected
value to the company (in the form of improved decision-making) from the directors having them.
453 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
454 Id.
455 Id. at 895.
451
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within the range of fair prices for the company, albeit at the bottom of the range.456 The court specifically faults the board for not
informing itself of two things: “Van Gorkom’s role in forcing the
‘sale’ of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase
price,” and “the intrinsic value” of the company as would be determined by a financial analyst (e.g., a discounted cash flow study).457
(i)

The Negotiating History

The facts about the negotiating history between Van
Gorkom and Pritzker regarding the price in the transaction were
surely material facts, and since Van Gorkom needed only to
state them at the meeting, they were of course reasonably available to the Trans Union board.458 If the directors really did not
have these facts (which seems very likely), then the Supreme
Court was surely right that they breached their duty of care.
The dissent, however, seemed to think that Van Gorkom did
disclose these facts to directors and that they were thus aware of
them, for it states that he “reviewed all aspects of the proposed
transaction and repeated the explanation of the Pritzker offer he
had earlier given to senior management.”459 However that may
Id. at 877.
Id. at 874. By quoting extensively from the transcript of the oral arguments in the Supreme Court, Owen shows that Chief Justice Herrmann was
especially concerned about this latter point. He asked counsel for the defendants over and over why the directors did not seek some kind of financial
analysis of the company, whether from the company’s investment banker or
its internal financial staff. He also apparently asked counsel whether counsel
was aware of any other similar transaction in which the selling company did
not obtain a financial analysis of this kind, and counsel apparently could not
produce such an example. OWEN, supra note 3, at 257–58.
458 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 895.
459 Id. Owen’s account seems to be closer to that of the majority. He says
that Van Gorkom’s presentation to the board was similar to the one he had
given to his senior executives an hour earlier, OWEN, supra note 3, at 70, and
about that presentation Owen says that “some recall, Van Gorkom left the
clear impression that the offer was unsolicited,” that he had approached
Pritzker to get the viewpoint of a buyer as to whether anyone might be interested in buying Trans Union for $55 per share, and that subsequently Pritzker concluded that he himself might be interested in such a transaction and
so made an offer. Id. at 63. To the extent that Van Gorkom really did approach Pritzker for advice rather than to solicit an offer, this account might
be true, or at least Van Gorkom may have believed it to be true, but it strains
456
457
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be, I would suggest that the more significant problem lies not so
much in whether the outside directors were aware of the negotiating history but rather in that history itself. That is, the larger
problem lay not in whether the board had all the material facts
about the negotiating history reasonably available to it when it
decided, but in whether, under Revlon, the decisions made by
Van Gorkom (which ought to have been supervised and controlled by the board, but of course were not) in negotiating with
Pritzker were substantively reasonably calculated to obtain for
the Trans Union stockholders the best price reasonably available
for their shares. If they were not, it becomes well-nigh impossible
to see how the Trans Union board could approve a transaction at
the $55 price Van Gorkom obtained from Pritzker.
The negotiating process began when Van Gorkom, perhaps
affected by a desire for a liquidity event to fund his impending
retirement460 or perhaps not,461 concluded that he would happily
credulity to imagine that Van Gorkom, in arranging his initial meeting with
Pritzker, was not hoping Pritzker would himself be interested in acquiring
Trans Union.
460 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866. Quillen notes that, having suggested
Van Gorkom wanted to retire, the court then inconsistently suggested that he
was put out not to have been included in the buyout group, whose members
would have had to remain at the company for several years in order to realize
a gain on their investment. Quillen, supra note 28, at 479.
461 On how his imminent retirement may have affected Van Gorkom’s incentives, see the discussion in supra note 113. Stephen M. Bainbridge observes
that, although one could argue that Van Gorkom’s imminent retirement gave
him an incentive to sell the company not shared by the stockholders generally,
nevertheless “the trouble with this argument is that Van Gorkom’s incentive
clearly is to get the best possible price” because “the more money the buyer
paid for Trans Union, the more money Van Gorkom would have in retirement.” Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 200. On the whole, Bainbridge concludes
that Van Gorkom’s “self-interest was directly in line with the interests of the
[stock]holders.” Id. But see Macey, supra note 57, at 609–11, who argues that the
board should be faulted for not realizing that Van Gorkom was not a typical
stockholder because (a) his impending retirement really did make his attitude towards a quick cash deal different from that of other stockholders, and
(b) many other stockholders had acquired their Trans Union shares in tax-free
share exchanges when Trans Union had acquired other companies or otherwise
had low tax bases in their shares, which meant that they might well prefer a
tax-free stock-for-stock merger rather than an LBO in which the merger consideration would be cash and thus fully taxable. On the tax issue, see William
M. Owen, A Shareholder Named Smith, 24 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 39 (2000)
[hereinafter Shareholder] (stating that about one-third of the outstanding
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accept $55 per share for his own Trans Union shares.462 Van
Gorkom then approached Pritzker and presented him with an
LBO structure, a form of transaction of which Van Gorkom had
first heard only days before, after consulting about a buyout at $55
per share with no one except the company’s controller, Peterson,
whom he directed to run some numbers for him. Van Gorkom
knew virtually nothing about the prices that could be paid in
LBOs, and, by his own account, he was consulting with Pritzker
for exactly this reason. Moreover, he had no reason for thinking
that the price obtainable in an LBO would be higher than the price
obtainable in, for example, a strategic stock-for-stock merger.463
He was also fully aware that a cash transaction such as an LBO
would be taxable to the Trans Union stockholders, whereas a
stock-for-stock transaction generally would not.464
Furthermore, the primary reason for the transaction was
that Trans Union could not capture the full value of its ITCs.
The ITCs could be of considerable value to an appropriate acquirer,465 but just how valuable would depend on the acquirer’s
taxable income, and so, the value of Trans Union’s ITCs would
Trans Union shares were issued in acquisitions of other companies, with the
result that the original holders of those shares generally had low tax bases in
such shares).
462 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865. According to Owen, Van Gorkom steadfastly maintained that he settled on the $55 per share number because he
thought it was an attractive price, not because it was the midpoint of the
range in Romans’s original LBO study. OWEN, supra note 3, at 54.
463 In fact, at least under normal market conditions, most observers believe strategic buyers can and do routinely outbid financial buyers. E.g., In re
Netsmart Technologies, Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 186 n.42 (referring to the convention wisdom that strategic buyers can usually outbid financial buyers because of their ability to capture synergies); see also In re Appraisal of
Dell, Inc., No.9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2015). On the
other hand, Van Gorkom believed that Trans Union’s relatively high debt/equity
ratio, along with the dilution an acquirer’s stockholders would likely suffer in
a stock-for-stock merger, would make Trans Union unattractive to a public
company buyer. See Owen, Trans Union, supra note 117, at 22–23.
464 OWEN, supra note 3, at 42 (discussing Van Gorkom’s views on the relative merits of cash and stock consideration, including the different tax treatments of such transactions); see also Shareholder, supra note 461, at 39 (2000)
(describing reaction to the Pritzker transaction of Trans Union stockholders
with low tax bases in their shares).
465 Owen notes that in late 1980 Trans Union had a $244 million deferred
tax asset on its balance sheet. OWEN, supra note 3, at 4.
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vary from acquirer to acquirer. Presumably, Revlon would require that, in selling the company, the directors take reasonable
steps to capture not just the intrinsic value of the company but
also as much of the value that the ITCs would have to the buyer
as they could obtain for the stockholders. Van Gorkom’s $55 per
share LBO structure effectively attributed no value at all to tax
benefit the acquirer would capture from Trans Union’s ITCs,466
and so it seems neither Van Gorkom nor the board took any reasonable steps to obtain a price that impounded the value of the
ITCs to the acquirer.467 In a perfectly competitive market for the
sale of the company, Trans Union would capture the entire riskadjusted value of the ITCs. Of course, the market for an asset
like a public company is not perfectly competitive, but, at least
at the outset of the sales process, a seller hoping to obtain the
best price reasonably available would at least try to capture
some of this value.
Nor did negotiations between Van Gorkom and Pritzker
give Van Gorkom a reasonable basis for thinking $55 per share
was the highest price reasonably available. If anything, those negotiations strongly suggested the opposite, for it was Van Gorkom
who first mentioned $55 per share as a price for the Trans Union
shares. Now, as Chief Justice (then Vice Chancellor) Strine would
later say, it is no breach of a director’s Revlon duties for the director to be the first to suggest a price for the company to a potential buyer; someone has to be the first to mention a number.468
But if a seller is to be the first to mention a number, he has to
See the discussion in supra note 114.
But see Fischel, supra note 338, who argues that the value of the ITC
was impounded into the deal price. Fischel, supra note 338, at 1449 (stating
“[t]he merger at a premium over market price was a method of selling the
investment tax credit to an entity that could use it.”) In one sense, of course,
Fischel is obviously right: since Pritzker and Marmon would get the benefit of
the ITCs in exchange for the merger consideration of $55 per share, they
were in that sense paying for the ITCs. But that trivial point in no way shows
that $55 per share reflected both the present value of Trans Union’s future
earnings on a standalone basis plus the value of the ITCs to the buyer. By
Fischel’s logic, any price reflecting a premium above market would have reflected the full value of the ITCs, which is absurd.
468 In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 85 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing “[a]t some point in the sales dance, someone has to make a move
toward specificity”).
466
467

154 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:065
realize that he is effectively capping the value of the company:
he will be very unlikely to ever get more than the price he mentions, at least from the buyer to whom he mentions the price. If
the director is to get the best price reasonably available, therefore, the price that he first mentions must be at least as high as
his estimate of the highest price any buyer would be likely to
pay.469 He ought not to mention a price that merely seems attractive. As noted above, at the time he suggested the $55 price
to Pritzker, Van Gorkom had no reasonable basis for thinking
that price was the highest available. Furthermore, when Van
Gorkom suggested the $55 per share price to Pritzker, who was
universally recognized as one of the sharpest deal-makers in the
country (indeed, this was precisely why Van Gorkom wanted to
speak with Pritzker), Pritzker almost immediately accepted it,
making only one mild attempt to negotiate the price downwards.
This strongly suggests that Pritzker regarded the price as
low.470 Hence, if anything, the negotiating history between Van
Gorkom and Pritzker, so far from implying that the $55 per share
price was the highest available, strongly suggested that it was not.
Putting the question in the language of Barkan, when
Van Gorkom brought the $55 per share offer to his board of directors, did he have “sufficient knowledge of relevant markets to
form the basis for [his] belief” that $55 per share was the best
price reasonably available?471 By his own admission, Van
Gorkom did not know how high a price could be obtained in an
LBO, and he thus could not know whether a higher price could
be obtained from a strategic buyer.472 He also did not know what
value Trans Union’s ITCs would have for Pritzker or other potential purchasers, over and above the intrinsic value of Trans
Union.473 Moreover, the history of his negotiations with Pritzker
strongly suggested $55 per share was not the highest price that
469 In Topps, when director Greenberg mentioned a price of $10 per share
to a potential buyer, other directors objected that the price mentioned was too
high and would scare off the potential buyer. Id. at 69.
470 See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 216 (stating that “Pritzker’s quick acceptance of the price suggests that he thought he was getting a bargain,
which enhances our questions about the adequacy of the price”).
471 Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989).
472 See supra text accompanying notes 143ï44.
473 See supra Section I.A.
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could be obtained.474 Hence, when he brought Pritzker’s $55 per
share price to the Trans Union board, Van Gorkom clearly did
not have sufficient knowledge of relevant markets to reasonably
believe that $55 per share was the best price reasonably available for the Trans Union shares.475 The other directors, who knew
nothing of the potential transaction before the meeting,476 could
not know more than Van Gorkom did. Therefore, they too lacked
sufficient knowledge of relevant markets to form a reasonable
belief that the $55 per share price that Pritzker was offering was
the best price reasonably available. Thus, in approving a transaction at that price, the directors breached their Revlon duties.
The question thus becomes what the Trans Union directors should have done when Van Gorkom surprised them with
Pritzker’s offer. To be sure, Pritzker had placed a very short deadline on the offer, but the board was meeting at noon on Saturday,
and Pritzker’s deadline was sometime late on Sunday evening—
more than thirty hours away.477 At the very least, the directors
could have sent Van Gorkom back to Pritzker to attempt to negotiate an increase in the price.478 They did not do so, nor, apparently, did they even consider doing so, even though Pritzker
seems never to have said that $55 per share was his best and
final price.479 The directors also could have sought some kind of
See supra text accompanying notes 125ï47.
See supra text accompanying notes 125ï47.
476 See supra text accompanying notes 129ï32.
477 See supra text accompanying notes 130ï36.
478 See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 609 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(holding that the board had not breached its Revlon duties in part because
“[t]hroughout the process, Dollar Thrifty’s negotiators consistently pressed for
a higher price”); In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig. No. 6164VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *18 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (finding that the board
had not breached its Revlon duties and noting that it “pushed both of the companies that expressed interest in acquiring it to increase the attractiveness of
their offers on multiple occasions” and “negotiated two separate price increases” from the ultimate acquirer); In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926
A.2d 58, 70, 75 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that the board had not breached its
fiduciary duties in part because it “voted to continue negotiating with the
goal of getting [the acquirer] to increase the price” and because its lead negotiator “was charged with negotiating, and ... twice tried without success to
get, a price increase”).
479 See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 238 (Del. 2009) (noting
that directors instructed chief executive officer to attempt to negotiate a price
474
475
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financial analysis or valuation study of the company.480 As this
failure was the second breach of the duty of care by the Trans
Union directors the Delaware Supreme Court found,481 I turn
next to this issue.
(ii) The Failure to Obtain a Valuation Study
The Supreme Court held that the Trans Union board
breached its duty of care because it failed to inform itself of the
intrinsic value of the company, that is, the value of the company
as determined by a discounted cash flow or similar financial analysis.482 In the Delaware Supreme Court’s duty of care analysis, the
question was whether a valuation study was a material fact reasonably available to the directors. It is hard to argue that it was not.
In economic terms, the question was whether the benefits
of having such a study exceeded the costs of obtaining one. Although
the cost of engaging an investment banker to produce a valuation
study and a fairness opinion would be considerable, contrary to
what many commentators have suggested,483 the court never said
increase even after buyer had stated that he had already offered his best and
final price).
480 McChesney writes, “All the procedural steps that the court said the
board should have undertaken would have required more time than Pritzker’s
offer allowed, and so the board would have had to reject Pritzker’s timeconstrained offer at its September 20 meeting.” McChesney, supra note 340,
at 637. As indicated in the text, I do not think the facts support this conclusion; there certainly was time to do at least some of the more important
things the majority opinion says ought to have been done, such as attempting
to negotiate the price upwards and obtaining at least a rough valuation
study; see also infra text accompanying note 501.
481 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
482 Id.
483 Fischel, supra note 338, at 1446, 1453 (referring to “[t]he court’s rebuke
of the directors for failing to hire outside experts to acquire valuation information” and stating that investment bankers providing fairness opinion “are
the biggest winners” in the case). The idea that Van Gorkom was a boon to
the investment banking industry is widespread, see, e.g., Park McGinty, The
Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of
Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 193 n.42 (referring to Van
Gorkom as the “Investment Bankers’ Full Employment Act”); William J. Carney,
Fairness Opinions, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 523, 527 (calling the case “the Investment Bankers’ Civil Relief Act of 1985”), but apparently quite mistaken. See
Bowers, supra note 104, at 568 (describing empirical study showing that “although target firms’ use of fairness opinions did increase immediately following
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that the valuation study had to be performed by the company’s
investment bankers. On the contrary, it expressly referred to the
possibility that the analysis might be done by Trans Union’s inhouse financial personnel.484 The cost to the corporation of obtaining a valuation study from Romans and his staff would have
been virtually zero. Hence, if such a study had any significant
value to the corporation in terms of improved decision-making
by the directors, it would have been worth having.
As noted above, Van Gorkom later stated that there was
“considerable discussion” among the directors at the September 20
meeting about obtaining a valuation study but that no such study
“worthy of the name” could be obtained before Pritzker’s deadline.485
This seems clearly wrong. The most obvious type of valuations
study to perform, a discounted cash flow analysis, discounts the
company’s projected future cash flows at various discount rates
estimating the company’s weighted-average cost of capital to
produce an estimate of the value of the company on a standalone
basis. On the date of the board meeting to consider the Pritzker
offer, the directors already had available to them five-year cash
flow projections for the company; indeed, Van Gorkom had used
the Van Gorkom decision, the average frequency of use from 1986 to 1990
(58.2 percent) is not materially different from the 1980 to 1985 period (57.2
percent)” and “there is no significant increase in the portion of revenues
earned by financial advisors from fairness opinions in the post–Van Gorkom
era.”); see also Roundtable, supra note 23, at 37 (2000) (remarks of Henry
Lesser to the effect that it is much more likely for an investment banker to be
involved in the deal process from the beginning, including in negotiating price,
than to merely be brought in at the end of the process to provide a fairness
opinion concerning a price already negotiated).
484 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876–77; see also OWEN, supra note 3, at
258 (quoting Chief Justice Herrmann at an oral argument referring to the
possibility of having “inside people” perform a financial analysis); Mones,
supra note 31, at 566–68 (criticizing the court’s holding regarding the board’s
failure to obtain a valuation study); Bowers, supra note 104, at 571 (stating “[t]he
clarity of the court’s statements [that fairness opinions are not legally required] is at odds with the widespread belief that a fairness opinion is required for protection under the business judgment rule” but allowing that the
fact Van Gorkom can naturally be read as holding that, if the Trans Union board
had obtained an outside fairness opinion, it would not have been found liable,
may have created an informal requirement); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care,
Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 677 (1995).
485 Van Gorkom, supra note 145, at 18; see also Fischel, supra note 338, at
1446–47 (arguing that the benefits of a valuation study from an investment
banker would have been “minimal if not nonexistent”).
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these very projections in preparing the LBO analysis he presented
to Pritzker.486 The directors also certainly knew Trans Union’s own
borrowing costs, and Van Gorkom at least knew what interest
rates Pritzker was paying to borrow funds to purchase the company.487 They would thus have had some reliable information about
the discount rates to use in a valuation study. Given that this
information was ready at hand, Trans Union’s in-house financial
professionals (or the company’s investment banker) could certainly have prepared a discounted cash flow analysis in a matter
of hours.488 Such an analysis would discount the company’s projected cash flows at various discount rates to obtain a valuation
range for the company on a standalone basis. A more careful
study, which would indeed require more time, would improve the
model primarily by refining the cash flow projections.489 In such
OWEN, supra note 3, at 45.
Recall that Van Gorkom helped Pritzker arrange financing from Trans
Union’s own banks. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867; OWEN, supra note 3, at
127.
488 See Moskin, a leading New York practitioner, who asserts that an investment bank could have produced a reasonably thorough opinion even
within Pritzker’s deadline. Moskin, supra note 402, at 416–18. Moskin and others
have detected an inconsistency between Van Gorkom, in which the Delaware
courts criticized a board for not obtaining a fairness opinion when that opinion would have been prepared in great haste, and cases such as Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), and Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335
(Del. Ch. 1984), in which they criticized boards for relying on opinions prepared under such conditions. Moskin, supra note 402, at 416–18. But there is
surely no inconsistency here: in Van Gorkom, haste was required because a
third party made an attractive offer with a very short deadline, and the board’s
choices were a hasty opinion or no opinion, whereas in Weinberger and Shell,
a controlling stockholder unilaterally determined to freeze out the minority
stockholders in a quick transaction, which allowed its controlled subsidiary’s
board only little time to obtain a fairness opinion. In these latter cases, the
controlling stockholder, the real defendant, itself chose to shorten the time in
which a valuation study could be performed. By contrast, consider the contemporary treatment of freeze-out mergers in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.,
88 A.3d 635 (2014), where, among other conditions, the independent committee at the controlled subsidiary must be allowed to choose and effectively use
its own advisors, including financial advisors, before the transaction will be
reviewed under the business judgment rule.
489 See generally DAMODARAN, infra note 510; TIM KOLLER ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUES OF COMPANIES (5th ed. 2010).
In practice, people use a fairly broad range of discount rates, and so, within
reason, no matter how these may be tweaked, the midpoints of the valuation
ranges obtained will not vary very much.
486
487
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cases, if the projections do not change much, neither do the results
of the study, and so improving a discounted cash flow analysis will
generally produce sharply diminishing returns. In other words,
if one starts with detailed cash flow projects, most of the utility
of a discounted cash flow analysis will usually be captured in the
initial attempt. Therefore, it seems virtually certain that a useful
study could readily have been produced prior to Pritzker’s deadline. It is obtuse, if not absurd, to say that a discounted cash
flow valuation of the company based on the very projections
Trans Union had already prepared and that Pritzker was using
to value the deal was not worth having. Why should the directors
not know at least as much as Pritzker did? There is no good answer to this question. A discounted cash flow study would have
been extremely valuable, and it could easily have been obtained.
Now, if the board had sought a discounted cash flow study
for the company, what would it have shown? Without management’s cash flow projections, it is impossible to say for sure, but
we do know that Trans Union’s free cash flow in 1980 was about
$162 million.490 We also know that management projections
showed that this figure would increase significantly.491 We know
that the prime rate on September 20 was 12.5 percent.492 Assume
conservatively that Trans Union’s cost of debt was 14.5 percent
and its cost of equity was 22.5 percent (i.e., assume at 8 percent
equity risk premium). Trans Union had an unusually high debt/
equity ratio for a public company,493 and assume this ratio was
one-to-one. This implies that Trans Union’s weighted-average
cost of capital (WACC) would be 18.5 percent.494 Again being conservative, assume that Trans Union’s cash flow would increase
only 2 percent per year in perpetuity. On these assumptions,
Trans Union was worth $982 million on September 20, 1980.495
According to Owen, at all relevant times, Trans Union had outstanding
12,512,956 shares. OWEN, supra note 3, at 2.
491 Owen, Trans Union, supra note 117, at 25.
492 OWEN, supra note 3, at 128.
493 Owen, Trans Union, supra note 117, at 22–23.
494 That is, (.5)(14.5 percent) + (.5)(22.5 percent) = 18.5 percent.
495 That is, applying the perpetuity formula, dividing $162 million by (18.5
percent – 2 percent) = $982 million. Naturally, more aggressive assumptions
yield an even higher valuation. For example, if we assume at 12.5 percent
cost of debt and 3 percent growth in cash flow (holding other assumptions
constant), the company was worth $1.2 billion on September 20, 1980.
490
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Indeed, it is difficult to construct an analysis in which the company
was worth only the $690 million Pritzker was offering. To get that
number, for example, we would have to assume flat cash flows
and a discount rate of 23.4 percent. It seems very clear, therefore, that, had the Trans Union board sought a discounted cash
flow analysis on September 20, 1980, it would have shown that
Trans Union was worth not just more but probably much more
than Pritzker was offering.496 In any event, the question of
whether the Trans Union board ought to have sought a valuation study on September 20 when Pritzker’s deadline was still
about thirty hours away is in some ways beside the point. For
example, why was Pritzker’s deadline treated as sacrosanct? The
board could have instructed Van Gorkom to tell Pritzker that
the directors were interested in his offer but wanted a few more
days to consider it—a request that was surely very reasonable in
the circumstances. If Pritzker agreed to extend the deadline, the
Trans Union directors could easily have obtained a valuation
study and considered the transaction more carefully. If Pritzker
steadfastly insisted that he would withdraw the offer on Sunday
evening, the Trans Union directors could have decided then what
to do next, but at least they would have tried to get more time in
which to value the company. Or again, Van Gorkom had known
since Monday, September 15, that Pritzker was likely to offer to
purchase the company. Why did he not immediately set either
some in-house financial professionals or else his investment banker
to work on a valuation study? If secrecy was a concern, this
Contrary to what some commentators have suggested, e.g., Julie Andersen
Hill & Douglas K. Moll, The Duty of Care of Bank Directors and Officers, 68
ALA. L. REV. 965, 984–85 (2016); Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruption
and the Complicity of Congress and the Supreme Court—The Tortuous Path
from Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
131, 147 (2009), even in 1980 it seems that it would have been unusual for a
board of directors to approve a sale of the company without some kind of
valuation study. Bowers, supra note 104, at 568 (reporting that, from 1980 to
1985, 57.2 percent of target firms received an outside fairness opinion, and
from 1986 to 1990, 58.2 percent of such firms did). Indeed, at one of the oral
arguments in Van Gorkom, Chief Justice Herrmann asked counsel for the
defendants if he was aware of any case of a public company board of directors
approving a sale of the company without seeing some kind of financial analysis or valuation study, and the defendants’ counsel could not cite such an
instance. OWEN, supra note 3, at 257–58.
496
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could have been done without telling the people involved anything about Pritzker or his interest in the company. Had Van
Gorkom done this, five days later on September 20, the board could
have had a reasonably thorough valuation study before it.
But while the argument that the Trans Union directors
should have obtained a valuation study is strong when made in
terms of the board’s duty of care,497 it becomes much stronger when
we review the board’s actions under Revlon.498 As noted above, in
Barkan, the Supreme Court held that the “crucial element” in finding that a board complied with its Revlon duties is “knowledge:”
“[i]t must be clear that the board had sufficient knowledge of
relevant markets to form the basis for its belief that it acted in
Cf. Sharfman, supra note 57, at 301, who concludes that “it is hard to
disagree with the Van Gorkom court in concluding that the directors of Trans
Union were not informed and that they shirked their duties when they approved and recommended the Pritzker buyout.” Allen, Jacobs, and Strine
think the Trans Union board’s “failures of process may well have constituted
ordinary negligence … but it is difficult to argue that those failures constituted
true gross negligence.” Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 458. The
authors, however, are equating the gross negligence that defines the duty of
care with the extremely lenient rationality test of the substantive portion of
the business judgment rule, see id. at 457, which the Delaware Supreme
Court has identified with the test for corporate waste. In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 28 (Del. 2006). They thus say that that “gross
negligence,” as they are using the term, “requires a ‘devil-may-care’ attitude
or indifference to duty amounting to recklessness.” Allen, Jacobs & Strine,
supra note 31, at 458. This seems to me to be a mistake. Gross negligence is
commonly understood to mean a degree of negligence greater than ordinary
negligence but not yet as great as Allen, Jacobs, and Strine have in mind. If
negligence is defined as B < LP in the Hand formula, United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 160 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1947), then gross negligence is B << LP, or,
in qualitative terms, a very great risk of a very great loss that can be prevented by a very small expense. In the context of the duty of care, which requires directors to assemble all the material facts reasonably available, gross
negligence would thus require a failure to obtain or consider a highly material
fact that was very easily and cheaply available. In any case, Allen, Jacobs,
and Strine concede that, if the Trans Union directors’ actions are reviewed
under the enhanced scrutiny standard of Revlon, “Van Gorkom would not be
viewed as remarkable.” Id. at 459 n.39.
498 Bainbridge observes that “the gist of the opinion [in Van Gorkom] is
that a target board must have some credible basis for determining that a proposed merger is in the best interest of the [stock]holders.” Bainbridge, supra
note 60, at 216. In my view, this is more what the court should have said
than what it actually did say.
497
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the best interests of the [stock]holders,” that is, that it obtained
for them the best price reasonably available.499 As the court famously said in that case, “there is no single blueprint that a
board must follow to fulfill its duties” under Revlon.500 This is
usually taken to mean that there is no particular procedure (e.g.,
a public auction) that a board must follow in order to obtain sufficient knowledge to comply with its Revlon duties.501 It would
be more precise, however, to understand this famous holding as
meaning that the board must do something to obtain the relevant knowledge, albeit any of various things. As Barkan and
other cases have made clear, a board has many options, including a public auction, a private auction, a pre-signing canvassing
of the market, a post-signing canvassing of the market (either passively under a no-shop, or actively under a go-shop), valuation
studies from investment bankers or other valuation experts, or
perhaps other means. At least pre-signing,502 the Trans Union
board did none of these things and did not even attempt to negotiate upwards the first price offered by the acquirer.
If we ask, as we must under Revlon, what basis the Trans
Union directors had for thinking that $55 per share was the best
price reasonably available, there would seem to be three possible
answers: (1) the directors’ intuitive judgment about the value of
the company was based on their admittedly good grasp of its
business and their understanding of economic and financial conditions generally;503 (2) the large premium to market offered in
the Pritzker transaction (the $55 per share price was about 48
percent above the $37.25 closing price of the Trans Union shares
the day before the transaction was announced);504 and (3) the
Barkan v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989).
Id. at 1286.
501 In re Talley Indus., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 15961, 1998 WL
191939, at *10 (Del. Ch. 1998) (quoting Barkan 567 A.2d at 1286); Sutton Holding Corp. v. Desoto, Inc., No. 11221, 11222, 1990 WL 13476, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 5, 1990).
502 See infra text accompanying notes 581–82 (discussing Trans Union’s
post-signing market check, the Supreme Court’s treatment of it, and how that
market check would be evaluated under Revlon).
503 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877 (Del. 1985); OWEN, supra note
3, at 50.
504 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 878; OWEN, supra note 3, at 51.
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results of the leveraged buyout study that Romans described to
the board.505 As to the first, as the directors urged and as the
dissent argued,506 the Trans Union directors were an extraordinarily well-qualified group of businesspeople and were thoroughly
familiar with the business and affairs of Trans Union. We may
assume that this is entirely correct.507 But if a board composed
of very talented businesspeople (one may hope all directors of
public companies meet this standard) very familiar with the
business and affairs of their corporation (something every director should be) could fulfill their Revlon duties of having sufficient knowledge of relevant markets to conclude that a given
price is the best one reasonably available for the corporation
merely by being thus talented and thus informed, then the
board’s Revlon duties would be fulfilled whenever such a board
approved a transaction. In other words, there would be nothing
special directors had to do to fulfill their Revlon duties, and if that
were right, Revlon would come to nothing.508 When the dissent
insisted that the Trans Union directors “knew Trans Union like
the back of their hands and were more than well qualified to
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877; OWEN, supra note 3, at 54.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894.
507 When we reflect, however, that Van Gorkom had never heard of LBOs
until a few days before formulating the transaction and proposing it to Pritzker,
we may well wonder just how well he and some of the Trans Union executives
grasped many of the relevant factors, e.g., the deterring effect of the stock
option on other bidders or the importance of the risk allocations created by
financing conditions. Owen never expressly alludes to it, but there may well
have been a generational disconnect at play in Van Gorkom. Van Gorkom
was 63 years old in the fall of 1980. OWEN, supra note 3, at 5. His outside
directors were 61, 68, 63, 65, and 68. Id. at 16–17. Henry Kravis was only 36.
Id. at 10.
508 Compare this to Bainbridge, who asks why the board could not “reasonably have determined that the deal Van Gorkom had struck simply was too good
to pass up,” and concludes that “[t]he short answer seems to be that good
resumes will not outweigh a distorted process.” Bainbridge, supra note 60, at
219; see also Fischel, supra note 338, at 1446–47 (arguing that because of (a) the
outstanding qualifications of the directors, (b) the fact that Van Gorkom as
chief executive officer probably knew more about the company than anyone else,
and (c) the fact that directors’ incentives were aligned with those of the stockholders, the board’s decision did not violate the duty of care). Of course, as
noted in the text, if general qualifications, intimate knowledge, and proper
incentives are enough, breaching Revlon is virtually impossible.
505
506
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make on the spot informed business judgments concerning the
affairs of Trans Union including a 100 percent sale of the corporation,”509 the dissent was not really disagreeing with the majority about the duty of care. It was really opposing the creation of
anything like Revlon duties—duties that would prohibit the directors from relying merely on their intuitive judgments about
the value of the company and require then to engage in some
special efforts to ascertain that value before selling the company.510
The second possible basis for the Trans Union directors
thinking that the $55 per share price was the best price reasonably available was the fact that the price represented an approximately 48 percent premium over the undisturbed market price
of the Trans Union shares. The Supreme Court devotes significant
effort to showing that the size of the premium was not probative
because, on the board’s own evidence, the trading prices of Trans
Union’s shares were depressed due to the ongoing ITC problem,
and thus these prices did not “adequately reflect[ ] the true value of the Company.”511 There is both a good deal wrong and a
good deal right with the court’s argument here.512 On the one hand,
the market price of a company’s shares is virtually always far
below the result a discounted cash-flow analysis would suggest,513
which is one reason that acquisitions are generally effected at a
substantial premium to market.514 Delaware courts have recognized
this fact, and in valuing companies in appraisal proceedings, the
usual procedure of those courts is to add a premium to values
based on the market prices of comparable companies but not to
values based on discounted cash flow analyses.515 The Van Gorkom
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
On the biases from which people suffer in performing valuations and
strategies to overcome them, ASWATH DAMODARAN, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION,
SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR INVESTMENT AND CORPORATE FINANCE 2–4 (2006).
511 Id. at 875–76; see also OWEN, supra note 3, at 66–68.
512 See Quillen, supra note 28, at 477 (stating “there is no feeling throughout the opinion that the court has grasped the dynamics of the marketplace”).
513 See DAMODARAN, supra note 510, at 245–46.
514 See generally Booth, supra note 441, at 1111; Harrison & Kreps, supra
note 441, at 323–25; Kraakman, supra note 441, at 892; Stout, supra note
441, at 1261–63.
515 See Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992); Le Beau
v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., No. CIV. A. 13414, 1998 WL 44993, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 29, 1998).
509
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court’s supposition that the market price, if unaffected by the
ITC issue, would be a measure of the intrinsic value of the company as determined by a discounted cash flow analysis is thus
likely mistaken. Furthermore, the court’s concern that the market
price was below the intrinsic value is also misplaced. As indicated
above, the market price of a corporation’s shares is almost always
below its intrinsic value as suggested by a discounted cash flow
analysis.516 If Trans Union’s shares were trading below their
intrinsic value, this was not unusual. Finally, the court’s supposition that the board should have considered the premium as a percentage of intrinsic value is also wrong. For, as indicated above,
premiums are properly added to values derived from comparable
company analyses, which measure relative values, not discounted
cash flow analyses, which measure intrinsic value.517
But for all it gets wrong on this issue, the Supreme
Court’s analysis nevertheless suggests a more compelling point.
In Revlon terms, if the Trans Union directors were relying on
the significant premium to market as a factor in showing that they
had obtained the best price reasonably available, they would
have to be able to show something more than that the price was
at a large premium to market. In particular, the directors would
need to discern in the premium a reasonable basis for thinking
that $55 per share was the best price reasonably available.
When relying on premiums, the usual way of doing this is to
See supra text accompanying notes 513–14.
The question of which acquisitions are effected at such large premiums
to market is still subject to debate. See cases cited in supra notes 449, 515. In
my view, acquisition premiums are best explained in financial models that allow
for market participants to have heterogeneous expectations. In such models,
people will disagree about the future value of the company, and so the demand curve for the company’s shares will be downwardly sloping. Some people
will be willing to pay more for the shares than other people will. The shares
will, thus, naturally migrate into the hands of people who value the shares
more highly, and the observed market price will be the equilibrium price
between willing buyers and sellers. In such models, in order to acquire, say,
90 percent, of the shares, an acquirer must pay a price at least equal to the
value assigned to the shares by holders of ninety percent of those shares, which
will always be a price above the observed market price—usually, it seems, substantially above that price. See also Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 213 (criticizing the court’s analysis of the control premium by distinguishing the ordinary
market for the company’s shares and the market for corporate control).
516
517
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study comparable transactions and determine how the premium
in the transaction under consideration compares to premiums
paid by other acquirers in other transactions—a so-called comparable transaction study.518 Of course, the Trans Union board
did not do this. Just as it relied on its intuitive judgment that
$55 per share was an attractive price for the company, so too did
it rely on its intuitive judgment that a 48 percent premium was
an attractive premium.519 The directors’ undoubted business
acumen and familiarity with Trans Union would be of no avail
in showing that they knew what size premiums had recently
been paid in acquisitions of companies comparable to Trans Union.
Just as the Trans Union directors could have had the company’s
in-house financial professionals perform a discounted cash flow
study before Pritzker’s deadline on the following evening, so too
could they have had the company’s investment banker perform an
elementary comparable transaction study before that deadline.
Finally, the Trans Union directors could argue that they
had some knowledge about the intrinsic value of the company
because Romans, the company’s chief financial officer, had spoken briefly at the meeting about leveraged buy-out studies that
he had conducted.520 As the court indicated, Romans told the
board that, in his opinion, the $55 per share price was within
the range of fair prices for the company, albeit at the bottom of
that range.521 The court notes that, after hearing this, no director requested any details about the study, inquired about the
circumstances under which it was undertaken, or asked why
Romans put $55 at the bottom of the range.522 Had they done so,
See DAMODARAN, supra note 510, at 38–43; MCKINSEY & CO., VALUAMEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 331–33 (6th ed.
2015). Delaware courts have considered such studies in appraisal cases. See,
e.g., Le Beau, 1998 WL 44993, at *7–8.
519 But see McChesney, supra note 340, at 638 n.34 (stating that the almost 50 percent premium offered in the Pritzker transaction was “very much
on the high side of takeover premiums generally during this period”) (citing
Gregg A. Jarrell, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence
Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51 (1988), for the proposition that “from
1980 to 1985 the average premium was 30 [percent]”).
520 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
521 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 869 (Del. 1985).
522 Id. at 877.
518
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Romans “presumably would have responded as he testified: that
his calculations were rough and preliminary; and, that the study
was not designed to determine the fair value of the Company, but
rather to assess the feasibility of a leveraged buy-out financed by
the Company’s projected cash flow.”523 The court says all this with
an eye to the duty of care it was imposing on the Trans Union
directors: by not asking these questions, they were failing to
obtain material facts reasonably available to them. It is hard to
argue with this, but once again, in light of Revlon and subsequent
cases, we can see that there is much more wrong here than the
board’s failure to inquire about these matters. That is, even if
the board had been fully informed about the details of the study
Romans had conducted, the board’s relying on that study to determine the best price reasonably available would raise serious
concerns under Revlon.
For one thing, as the Supreme Court intimated,524 and as
the Court of Chancery held in Dell,525 the value obtainable in a
leveraged buy-out—and thus the value returned by a leveraged
buy-out study—measures the price an acquirer using a leveraged
buy-out structure can pay and still make the level of return such
acquirers typically demand.526 Such values are generally below
those returned by discounted cash flow analyses, and thus may
well be thought to be below the intrinsic value of the company.527
Id.
Quillen suggests that the understanding of the Supreme Court in Van
Gorkom was hardly so sophisticated. “At some points” in the court’s opinion,
he writes, “one gets the feeling that a feasible leveraged buy-out does not even
qualify as one measure of price.” Quillen, supra note 28, at 477.
525 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *25
(Del. Ch. July 13, 2015).
526 Id. at *8ï9.
527 This was precisely the result reached in Dell. Id. at *25. The criticisms
of Dell (and there have been many) are quite telling here: those who fault
Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis in Dell do not dispute that an LBO analysis
will usually return a lower range of values for a company than a discounted
cash flow analysis. Their argument is that a thorough market check showed
that there was no buyer willing to pay more than the price the board obtained
in the transaction. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Memorandum, Some Thoughts for
Boards of Directors in 2008, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, at *4 (Dec. 6,
2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090970 [http://
perma.cc/4DWA-HNJL]. To this, the Vice Chancellor can respond that, although
523
524
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For another, the price for the company obtainable in a leveraged
buy-out is relevant only with respect to acquirers who would use
that structure; it is not relevant to other kinds of purchases,
such as strategic buyers, who typically would not use that structure. Hence, if the directors had seen Romans’s leveraged buyout study in full, it, at best, would have informed them about the
highest price reasonably available in a leveraged buy-out, not
the highest price reasonably available simpliciter. In this regard,
it is worth noting that in Netsmart, Chief Justice (then–Vice
Chancellor) Strine held that the Netsmart board likely breached
its Revlon duties because, in selling the company, it marketed
the company only to financial buyers and merely assumed, on
the basis of very little evidence, that there would be no strategic
buyers for the company.528 By analogy, it would seem that a
valuation study that considered only the prices a financial buyer
(or similar acquirer like Pritzker) could pay, but not how much a
strategic buyer could pay, could not provide a reasonable basis
for the directors to form an opinion about the intrinsic value of
the company under Revlon.529
(iii) The Obvious Overarching Revlon Problem
Overshadowing all such questions, however, is one obvious
and fundamental problem with the board’s decision to approve the
original merger agreement with Pritzker on September 20,530
which goes to the very nature of the sales process. Under Delaware
no one was willing to pay more for the company, nevertheless, if the price
obtained in the LBO was below the value of the company on a standalone
basis, the dissenting stockholders were harmed by being required to take the
LBO price. The response to this, presumably, would be that, in the particular
circumstances of Dell, we would have to distinguish the projected future of
the company on a standalone basis as a public company and as a private
company, and because the latter future was not available to the public stockholders, it was irrelevant. Only if the value of the company on a standalone
basis as a public company exceeded the deal price were the dissenting stockholders harmed by being required to take that price.
528 In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 199 (Del. Ch.
2007).
529 See supra note 473 concerning Van Gorkom’s reasons for thinking that
a public company-strategic acquirer would not be interested in purchasing
Trans Union.
530 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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law, “the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for
managing the business and affairs of a corporation,” and “[t]his
unremitting obligation extends equally to board conduct in a
sale of corporate control.”531 Therefore, in selling the company in
a change-of-control transaction, the board of directors has a duty
under Revlon to get the best price reasonably available for the
stockholders,532 and it may not abdicate this duty in favor of any
other party, even the company’s chairman and chief executive
officer.533 In Van Gorkom, the chief executive officer, without
even consulting the board or even his fellow officers (other than
Peterson, whom he asked to run some numbers on possible LBO
scenarios), decided to start the process of selling the company.534
Of the usual means of price discovery in such cases (financial
analysis, market checks, and negotiating over price), Van
Gorkom used none.535 Rather, he determined that the price offered was desirable for the stockholders generally because he
personally found the price attractive.536 He then obtained an
offer from Pritzker, agreed with him on deal-protection devices,
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989).
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
533 Mills Acquisition, Inc., 559 A.2d at 1280 (criticizing the board for being
“torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly independent auction”);
see also Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 218 (arguing the court “concluded that
the Trans Union board had abdicated its role as a deliberative, decisionmaking body”); Macey, supra note 57, at 609 (arguing “a more plausible justification for the court’s decision was the board’s inappropriate reliance on Van
Gorkom’s judgment and negotiating” because the board “delegated too much
power to Van Gorkom in his negotiations with the acquirer” and “did not properly
monitor Van Gorkom’s negotiations with the acquirer”); Stephen A. Radin, ‘Smith
v. Van Gorkom’ on its 15th Anniversary, 24 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 24, 26–27
(2000) (stating, “[a]ssuming the facts in Van Gorkom to be as stated in the
majority’s opinion, the Trans Union directors’ sale of their [stock]holders’
company for $700 million, solely on the basis of a two-hour meeting without
any prior agenda notice and without any particularized study regarding value,
was an egregiously inadequate exercise of the directors’ responsibilities.”).
534 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also Macey, supra
note 57, at 613 (stating that Van Gorkom “ignored the fundamental tenet of
corporate law” that “the business and affairs of the corporation are to be run
by or under the direction of the board of directors” by “unilaterally negotiating the sale of Trans Union without the involvement of the board”).
535 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858.
536 For a discussion of how Van Gorkom’s incentives may have differed from
those of stockholders, see supra notes 113, 473.
531
532
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helped him arrange financing, and negotiated a definitive merger
agreement. Only at that point did Van Gorkom surprise his
board with a fully negotiated transaction.537 Regardless of what
happened at the board meeting of September 20, Trans Union’s
sale process was already terribly, probably fatally, compromised
for the simple reason that the board had not been involved at all
prior that point.538
At the September 20 board meeting, whatever else they
did, the directors did not at that meeting do the one thing Revlon
required of them: they did not take reasonable steps to determine whether $55 per share was the best price reasonably available
for the company. Their discussion did not include any meaningful discussion of the intrinsic value of the company.539 When the
directors decided to accept this offer and approve the merger
agreement, the problem was not so much that they did not have
all the material information about the offer reasonably available.
The problem was that, because of the nature of the process up to
that point, the directors had done literally nothing to obtain the best
price reasonably available and they had virtually no basis for
thinking that the price Pritzker was offering was the best price.540
Van Gorkom later defended the board’s decision on September 20 saying that “the $55 offer, while conceivably not the
See supra text accompanying notes 127ï31; see also Macey, supra note
57, at 614 (arguing that by not involving or even informing the board of his
sales process with Pritzker until the very last minute, when the merger
agreement was already negotiated, Van Gorkom “maneuvered the board into
a position from which it was virtually impossible to exercise its fiduciary duty
of care.”).
538 OWEN, supra note 3, at 70, Owen reports that one board member expressed surprise that Van Gorkom had undertaken to sell the company essentially on his own. Id. One assumes that this individual must have been
one of the outside directors. It is a mystery why, in even 1980, the other directors did not object as well.
539 See Roundtable, supra note 23, at 32 (quoting Ty Sagalow’s statement
that “[w]e are not dealing with an inadequate examination of intrinsic value.
We are dealing with no examination of intrinsic value”) (emphasis in original).
540 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866 (stating that “the record is devoid of
any competent evidence that $55 represented the per share intrinsic value of
the Company”); see also Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 214 (stating that “the
real issue, which is not well-framed in the majority opinion, is what the firm
is worth to Pritzker, and, accordingly, whether the board of directors did a
good job in capturing that value on behalf of the [stock]holders”).
537
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best obtainable, was too good to be allowed to expire without any
opportunity for the stockholders to consider it.”541 Previously, as
noted above, taking the offer and allowing it to expire were not
the only options available to the Trans Union board. The board
could have asked Pritzker for more time. The board and Trans
Union’s managers, perhaps with its financial advisor, could have
worked through the weekend to evaluate the offer more carefully
before the deadline.542 The board could have sent Van Gorkom
back to Pritzker to negotiate the price upwards. Instead, the directors acted if they had to decide immediately, at meeting early
on September 20, either to accept the offer or reject it, and that
was not true. There was not much time for more consideration of
the offer, but there was enough for significantly more consideration than the directors chose to give it. In a world of diminishing
returns, those few hours would have been the most valuable
ones, and the Trans Union directors elected not to use even the
little time they had. On September 20, the directors had done
virtually nothing to maximize company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit, and they had virtually no reason to think
that $55 per share was the best offer reasonably available. They
then chose not to find out even what more they could have
known before deciding to accept Pritzker’s offer.543
Van Gorkom, supra note 145, at 18.
See Roundtable, supra note 23, at 38 (Boris Yavitz stating that “you
could recess the meeting, get two investment bankers in ... and have them
push numbers all night, and then have them address the meeting with the
directors … [a]nd by Sunday midnight or Monday at 6 a.m. you could have a
signed agreement”); Moskin, supra note 402, at 418 (speculating that, if the
board had sought and failed to obtain from Pritzker an extension of the deadline, worked with its financial advisor overnight, reconvened the next day,
and approved the deal after receiving favorable advice from its banker, the
result in the case would have been different).
543 Van Gorkom, supra note 145, at 18 (defending the board’s approval on
September 20 on the basis of the post-signing market check); see also
Roundtable, supra note 23, at 39 (Henry Lesser stating that the directors
“thought that somehow (a) the merger agreement entitled them to go out and
shake the trees and see what fell off; (b) it entitled them to accept something
better if it fell off the tree; and (c) somehow the publicity was going to indicate that. They thought that that would all happen, like on autopilot, and
they could go home safe in the knowledge that they had done right by the
stockholders. They were, unfortunately, mistaken and misguided because
there was no follow-through”).
541
542
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Why did the directors do this? The answer is shocking by
contemporary standards but perfectly straightforward. As Van
Gorkom later explained, at the September 20 meeting, “The directors did not decide that $55 was a fair price at which to sell
the company,” much less that it was the best price reasonably
available.544 Rather, “all the directors decided was that the offer
was too good to be allowed to expire without giving the stockholders a shot at it,”545 and this “limited decision” by the board
“did not constitute approval by the directors of $55 as the sale
price.”546 As recounted above, Van Gorkom sincerely believed he
and the other directors had a duty to do what was best for the
stockholders. Nevertheless, he clearly did not believe that a
board should approve a sale of the company only if it believes
that the price offered is the best one reasonably available.547 Put
anachronistically, Van Gorkom did not believe in Revlon duties.
Quite the contrary, he believed that, sometimes, a board had a
duty to approve a sale of the company even if it was not satisfied
that the price offered was the highest price reasonably available.
The problem with Van Gorkom’s view, however, is that, although
approving the merger agreement did in effect give the stockholders an option to sell the company to Pritzker at $55 per share, this
option was not obtained for free. It came at a cost. Part of that
cost came in the form of diminished opportunities to sell the
company at a higher price arising from the difficulties that the
existence of the first deal, including Pritzker’s stock option, created
Van Gorkom, supra note 145, at 19.
Id. The majority opinion alludes to this argument in Van Gorkom,
(stating, “[c]ertainly in the merger context, a director may not abdicate [his or
her duty under Section 251 to make an informed judgment about the advisability of the merger] by leaving to the [stock]holders alone the decision to
approve or disapprove the agreement.”). Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
546 Id.
547 See Roundtable, supra note 23, at 39 (Donald J. Gogol, stating, “[u]nless a
deal is wildly mispriced or the company represents a unique strategic asset,
it is unlikely that an interloper is going to come in very quickly against a
board-recommended deal,” and Robert Friedman, stating, “[t]hat is an important point the board should have known. When you sign a merger agreement, with or without a ‘fiduciary out,’ that has a chilling effect on other
bidders coming in. A board has a greater responsibility to make sure that it
gets the best price and not rely on what happens after the merger agreement
has been executed.”).
544
545
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for other bidders. Another part came in the form of losing the
opportunity to remain independent—a real cost if it turned out
that the intrinsic value of the company exceeded the deal
price.548 The question, therefore, was not whether the put obtained in the merger agreement with Pritzker was valuable (it
was obviously very valuable); the question was whether it was
worth the cost. Since they seem not to have realized that accepting Pritzker’s offer came with costs, or at least how great these
costs might be, Van Gorkom and his fellow Trans Union directors seem never to have considered that question.549 This brings
us naturally to the next question, which is the effect of the
Pritzker stock option as a deal protection device.
(2) The Pritzker Stock Option as a Deal Protection
Device550
The original merger agreement that the Trans Union
board approved at the September 20 meeting included a stock
option in favor of Pritzker, exercisable when his financing condition was fulfilled or waived, that entitled him to purchase one
million shares of Trans Union common stock for $38 per share.
This was $0.75 above the shares’ closing market price of $37.25
on the day before the transaction was announced.551 The Supreme Court does not discuss the stock option in detail, but it
does suggest that it may have deterred other bids.552 As noted
above, although there was similar speculation among some Trans
Union insiders,553 in fact none of the potential buyers approached
548

2011).

See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch.

McChesney, supra note 340, considers this issue at length, albeit ignoring the third option discussed supra in the text of considering the Pritzker
option more closely before deciding whether to accept it.
550 On the deal protection issues raised by Van Gorkom, see generally R.
Franklin Balotti & A. Gilchrist Sparks, Deal Protection Measures and the
Merger Recommendation, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 467 (2002).
551 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 867 (Del. 1985); OWEN, supra note
3, at 52.
552 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876. On the deterrent effect, or lack thereof,
of such options, see Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury
Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions? 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682, 705
n.61 (1990).
553 OWEN, supra note 3, at 117–19.
549
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by Trans Union during the subsequent go-shop period mentioned
the Pritzker stock-option as an impediment to the formulation of
an offer.554
How would the option be treated under current law? Under
such cases as QVC, the stock option would be a deal protection
device reviewed under Unocal, and nowadays it is generally
settled law that such devices will be found to be reasonable if
their value is a sufficiently small fraction of the value of the transaction.555 Pritzker’s option allowed him to profit on the spread
between any superior bid and the strike price of $38 per share
on one million shares. As explained above, KKR eventually offered to purchase Trans Union for $60 per share.556 At that price,
Pritzker’s option was worth about $22 million, which would have
been about 3.2 percent of the value of $690 million of his offer for
Trans Union and 2.9 percent of the value of the $750 million of
KKR’s offer.557 Under current market conditions, a 3 percent termination fee is well within the customary range for a deal of this
size,558 and Delaware courts routinely uphold 3 percent termination
Id. at 121.
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43–45 (Del.
1993); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958–59 (Del. 1985).
556 See supra text accompanying note 233.
557 According to Owen, at all relevant times, Trans Union had 12,512,956
outstanding shares. OWEN, supra note 3, at 2. Hence, Pritzker’s $55 per share
offer valued the company at about $688 million, and KKR’s $60 per share
offer valued the company, without giving effect to Pritzker’s option, at about
$751 million. If Pritzker exercised his option, the number of outstanding
shares would increase by one million and the value of the company would
increase by $38 million, the purchase price Pritzker would have to pay to
exercise the option. Hence, if Pritzker exercised the option and KKR acquired
the company at $60 per share, KKR would have to pay in total about $811
million ($60 per share times 13,512,956 shares), but on completion of the
transaction would recover the $38 million exercise price of the option, thus
reducing the effective cost to KKR to $773 million—an increase of $22 million
due to the Pritzker option. Conversely, Pritzker’s profit on the option would
be $60 – $38 = $22 per share on one million shares or $22 million. This amount
is about 3.2 percent of the $690 million Pritzker was paying for the company
and about 2.9 percent of the $751 million KKR would have had to pay to buy
the company at $60 per share in the absence of Pritzker’s option. Owen’s
computations about the value of the option are similar. Id. at 120.
558 See Harrison & Kreps, supra note 441, at 323, 325–26; Kling et al., supra
note 149, at 782.
554
555
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fees under Unocal.559 At these levels, the option would, at least in
isolation from other aspects of the transaction, be found reasonable, and the board’s decision to approve it was not in violation
of its fiduciary duties under Unocal.560
(3) The No-Shop Market Test and the Go-Shop
Market Test
As explained above, at the September 20 meeting at
which the Trans Union directors originally approved the merger
agreement, they required561 that the draft agreement be amended
to allow Trans Union what would now be thought of as a standard no-shop provision and fiduciary out—that is, to allow Trans
Union to entertain unsolicited superior offers from other bidders
pending the closing of the merger, to share with such bidders
confidential information about the company,562 and to terminate
See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 87 (Del. Ch. 2010) (3
percent termination fee did not violate Unocal); In re MONY Group, Inc.
S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004) (3.3 percent termination fee); In re
Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005 (3.75 percent);
In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007) (4.3 percent); In re
Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig. 14 A.3d 573, 614 (Del Ch. 2010) (3.9 percent and
referring to a 3 percent termination fee as “standard”); In re Pennaco Energy,
Inc., S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 707 (stating that a 3 percent termination
fee was “modest and reasonable”); McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d
492, 505–06 n.61 (Del. Ch. 2000) (3.5 percent termination fee was within the
reasonable range).
560 The analysis in the text treats Pritzker’s stock option as if it were a
cash termination fee. Of course, it was not, and its value would have varied
with the price of an overtopping offer. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 38–41 (discussing how the value of Viacom’s stock option varied with the price of competing
bids for Paramount). Its deterrent effect thus increased with the amount of
the overtop. Furthermore, Pritzker’s option may have made a pooling accounting
treatment impossible for other purchasers.
561 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 869 (Del. 1985). Although the
Delaware Supreme Court was somewhat skeptical, Owen accepts that the
board did indeed condition its approval of the merger in these ways. OWEN,
supra note 3, at 294–95.
562 Making information about the company available to all bidders on
equal terms is, absent special circumstances, required by Revlon. See Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)
(stating that, in general, bidders must be given equal access to financial data
about the company because “directors cannot fulfill their enhanced ... duties
by playing favorites with the contending factions,” and “[m]arket forces must
559
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the merger agreement before closing in order to accept a superior
bid.563 Of course, these provisions made the merger agreement
more favorable to Trans Union, and they are nowadays standard
deal protection devices so common that they are no longer challenged under Unocal.564
The relevance of the Trans Union board’s conditioning its
approval on the inclusion of the no-shop and fiduciary out is
unclear under the Delaware Supreme Court’s duty of care analysis. That is, whether the merger agreement as executed actually
included the changes the Trans Union board wanted, or if it did,
to what extent these changes benefited the Trans Union stockholders, seems quite irrelevant to the question of whether the
Trans Union directors had all the material information about
the transaction reasonably available when they approved the
merger agreement. When we shift to a Revlon analysis, however,
the relevance of these changes is obvious. Under Barkan, one
way for a board to acquire sufficient knowledge of market conditions to allow it to reasonably conclude that it is getting the best
price reasonably available is to canvas the market.565 Although a
passive market check performed after a deal is signed may in
general be the least effective kind of market check, it certainly
has some value under Revlon. This is particularly true for a
company like Trans Union, which was a Fortune 500 company566
widely followed by securities analysts: the announcement of Trans
Union’s agreement with Pritzker made national news,567 and
Delaware courts have recognized in Revlon cases that mergersand-acquisitions professionals are hardly shy and retiring types,
but can generally be counted upon to make unsolicited offers for
be allowed to operate freely to bring the target’s [stock]holders the best price
available for their equity.”).
563 See supra Section I.A.
564 See McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 498–99 (Del. Ch. 2000);
Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 105 (Del. Ch. 1999).
565 Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989).
566 OWEN, supra note 3, at 3.
567 E.g., John C. Boland, Winners & Losers: Silver and Gold Issues Led
Market in September; Sunshine Spurts 75 percent, BARRON’S NAT. BUS. & FIN.
WKLY., Oct. 6, 1980, at 33, 48; Pritzker Concern Plans Acquisition of Trans Union,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1980, at 2; The Latest Pritzker Bid is the Most Ambitious,
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1980, at 38, 40; Joseph Winski, Marmon Buying Trans
Union for $688 Million in Cash, CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 23, 1980, at C1, C5.
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companies who have announced transactions, if such professionals perceive a reasonable opportunity for profit.568 And, in fact,
Van Gorkom and the Trans Union directors generally were
counting on the publicity surrounding the announcement of the
transaction with Pritzker to generate other offers for the company, if there were credible buyers who were interested in paying
more than $55 per share for Trans Union.569 Indeed, Pritzker
himself was worried from the beginning that Marmon would end
up as a stalking horse,570 and this is why he demanded compensation in the form of the stock option should his bid for Trans
Union be overtopped.571
This brings us to the question of whether the merger
agreement as executed actually contained a no-shop with a fiduciary out. The question is vexed for several reasons. First, as noted
above, the language in the merger agreement supposedly embodying the fiduciary out was at best cryptic, providing only that,
although the Trans Union board would (1) call a stockholder meeting to consider the merger, (2) recommend that the stockholders
adopt the merger agreement, and (3) use its best efforts to obtain
the requisite vote, nevertheless the acquirer “acknowledge[d]
that the Trans Union directors may have a competing fiduciary
obligation to the stockholders under certain circumstances.”572
As noted above, this language would seem to allow the Trans
Union board to decline to do the things specified if the board
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185
(Del. 1986).
569 OWEN, supra note 3, at 73–74. Owen quotes Van Gorkom as saying, “I
knew that the minute this announcement was made that the Pritzker family
was willing to pay $55 a share in cash for all of our stock, that every M&A
man ... in every investment banking firm throughout the country would immediately go to his book and start looking at Trans Union.” Id. The people
who work in mergers-and-acquisitions, Van Gorkom thought, are “the least
bashful people in the investment business” and would not refrain from making unsolicited offers for Trans Union. Id. at 73.
570 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866 (Del. 1985).
571 Pritzker later testified that he “assumed that all investment banking
firms would have their pencils out Monday morning, and start to approach
their customers to see whether they could interest them in making an offer.”
OWEN, supra note 3, at 74.
572 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 879; see also id. at 895 (McNeilly, J. dissenting); OWEN, supra note 3, at 76.
568
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determined that its fiduciary duties so required, not to terminate
the merger agreement in order to accept a superior proposal.573
Nevertheless, it is unclear how important this right to
terminate the agreement really was. If a superior proposal for
the company emerged, then any stockholder meeting considering
the Pritzker proposal would likely defeat it (regardless of whether
the Trans Union directors were recommending the transaction
or not),574 and at that point the merger agreement with Pritzker
would presumably have to be terminated in accordance with its
terms, which would leave Trans Union free to accept the superior
proposal. More importantly, whatever the exact restrictions or
lack thereof on Trans Union in the original merger agreement,
that agreement was amended on October 10, less than three
weeks after the original agreement was executed.575 There was
thus not enough time to determine the effectiveness of a passive
market check conducted under the no-shop. For all practical
purposes, it was under the agreement as amended that Trans
Union performed whatever market check it did.
Under the amended agreement, from October 10 until
February 10, Trans Union was permitted to solicit other offers
for the company.576 It had, in other words, a four-month go-shop
period.577 To this end, Trans Union engaged Salomon Brothers
to market the company,578 and Salomon approached about 150
See supra text accompanying note 157.
For example, in the Time-Warner transaction, the Time board was certain that the Time stockholders would vote down the merger with Warner
even though the Time board was recommending the merger because Paramount
had launched a tender offer for the Time shares at a very attractive price
conditioned on the Time stockholders rejecting the merger with Warner. See
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147ï48 (Del. 1990).
575 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 870.
576 Id. at 883.
577 Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals:
Evidence and Implications, 63 BUS. LAW. 729, 735ï36 (2008). On go-shops
generally, see id. at 730, and Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During Extended
Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops: The Development, Effectiveness,
and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transactions,
73 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 530–31 (2008).
578 See Van Gorkom, supra note 145, at 18 (describing Salomon Brothers’
efforts in the go-shop and noting that the firm would have been entitled to a
$2.6 million success fee if it secured an offer of $56 per share and a larger fee
if the offer were higher).
573
574
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potential purchasers. Borg Warner, Bendix, GECC, and Genstar
(in addition to KKR, of course) all conducted due diligence.579 Of
course, the Delaware Supreme Court made much of the fact
that, to exercise the fiduciary out and terminate the agreement,
Trans Union was required, prior to February 10, either to consummate a merger (or similar transaction) with another bidder
or enter into a definitive agreement related to such a transaction
that was superior to the Pritzker offer and subject only to stockholder approval (i.e., contained no financing condition and no
condition related to regulatory or antitrust approvals).580 As
noted above, contemporary fiduciary outs virtually always involve significantly shorter periods but are based on the target
company receiving a superior offer, not on its entering into a
superior definitive agreement,581 which makes comparisons to
the go-shop in the Pritzker–Trans Union agreement difficult.
Perhaps in the Pritzker–Trans Union transaction, the exceptionally long four-month go-shop period may have made executing a definitive agreement reasonably possible. However this may
be, since the Trans Union board neither conducted any pre-signing
market check nor considered any financial analysis concerning
the value of the company pre-signing, the post-signing market
check under the go-shop would form virtually the entire factual
basis for the board’s ultimate conclusion that the $55 per share
price offered by the Pritzkers was the best price reasonably available. Since the requirements of the go-shop would be far off
market terms today in ways that undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of the go-shop, it is possible to imagine the Court of
Chancery holding that the provisions in the revised merger agreement requiring Trans Union to obtain a definitive agreement
(indeed, one not conditioned even on obtaining regulatory approvals)
before exercising the fiduciary out, were unenforceable as an
OWEN, supra note 3, at 188 (mentioning Borg Warner and Bendix); id.
at 190 (mentioning Genstar).
580 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 883–84.
581 Hence, some go-shops allow the company to formalize a list of parties
who expressed interest in acquiring the company during the go-shop period and
to continue to negotiate with them after the expiration of the go-shop period
and until the requisite stockholder approvals have been attained. Subramanian,
supra note 577, at 735; see also In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58,
72 (Del. Ch. 2007).
579
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unreasonable deal protection device under Unocal.582 Even if the
conditions on the go-shop were consistent with Unocal, however,
it remains a separate question whether the market test conducted
under the go-shop was sufficient to allow the board to fulfill its
Revlon duties by reasonably concluding that the $55 per share
price from Pritzker was the best price reasonably available.583
Perhaps the best way to answer this question is to observe that in the more than thirty years since Revlon, other than
to require additional disclosure to the stockholders prior to a
meeting to consider the merger, the Delaware courts have never
enjoined a transaction because the board had violated its Revlon
duties,584 except when there had emerged another bidder who
582 There is no direct precedent, but consider ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp.,
747 A.2d 95, 106 (Del. Ch. 1999) (holding that a fiduciary out conditioned on
the board receiving a legal opinion that its fiduciary duties required it to negotiate with a potential topping bidder was unenforceable) and Omnicare, Inc.
v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003) (holding that the board of
directors “was required to contract for an effective fiduciary out clause to
exercise its continuing fiduciary responsibilities” to the stockholders).
583 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 459 n.39, assert, without further analysis, that “the broad market check conducted by the board in Van
Gorkom would have satisfied its Revlon duties” as construed in Barkan. It is
certainly correct that the market check was thorough in the sense that it
lasted for a long time and the company or its financial advisors approached
all or virtually all potential buyers of the company. Whether given the other
considerations mentioned in the text, such as the requirement for a definitive
agreement not conditioned on financing or regulatory approvals and the
sharply increasing interest rate environment, the market check was truly
effective, however, is less clear. Allen, Jacobs, and Strine never allude to any
of these other considerations.
584 There is perhaps one limited exception to this. In C&J Energy Services,
Inc. v. City of Miami General Employee’s, the Court of Chancery enjoined the
transaction, but the Supreme Court quickly reversed and allowed the transaction to proceed. 107 A.3d 1049, 1071 (Del. 2014) (reversing the Order Granting
Preliminary Injunction, No. 9980-VCN, 2014 WL 6696435, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 25, 2014)). There are also cases in which, when no other bidders had
emerged for the company, the Court of Chancery found it was likely that a
plaintiff stockholder would prevail on the merits of its claim that the directors had breached their Revlon duties, but nevertheless, declined to issue an
injunction on other grounds—generally, the grounds that, assuming the
stockholders had full disclosure, the balance of the equities favored allowing
them to decide for themselves whether to take the deal on offer. See, e.g., In
re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 452 (Del. Ch. 2012); In re
Netsmart Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 210 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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appeared to be willing to offer a superior price for the company
and whose transaction was being stymied by an agreement the
board had approved.585 In Van Gorkom, however, there emerged
several other potential buyers,586 but only KKR reached the
point of presenting a written offer to Trans Union.587 This naturally takes us to the question of whether the Trans Union board
breached its Revlon duties in its dealing with KKR, and it is to
that question that I now turn.
(4) Trans Union’s Dealings with KKR
As recounted above, members of the Trans Union management team, dissatisfied with the Pritzker transaction, had
approached KKR to organize a competing proposal.588 On December 2, more than two months before the end of the go-shop
period, KKR and the management team delivered to Van
Gorkom for transmission to the Trans Union board a written
offer to acquire the company at $60 per share, an offer that valued
the company at about $751 million or about $90 million more
than the price in the Pritzker transaction, but otherwise on the
same terms offered by Pritzker.589 KKR’s offer also contained a
financing condition related to both debt and equity financing, 590
but Kravis represented to Van Gorkom that he was confident
There have been a few cases in which, even in the absence of a competing bidder, on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Delaware courts
have held that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their Revlon claims.
Yet, the courts, nevertheless, declined to issue a preliminary injunction,
either because, assuming the stockholders have had full disclosure, they are
not threatened by irreparable harm by being allowed to decide for themselves
whether to complete the merger, or because the balance of the equities did
not favor issuing an injunction. See, e.g., In re El Paso, 41 A.3d at 452; In re
Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 210.
586 As noted above, Borg Warner, Bendix, Genstar, and GECC were also
bidders. See OWEN, supra note 3, at 188 (mentioning Borg Warner and Bendix);
id. at 190 (mentioning Genstar). The Delaware Supreme Court discusses
Trans Union’s dealings with these potential purchasers only briefly, but Owen
has a longer account. See id. at 188, 190–91.
587 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985).
588 Id.
589 Id.
590 Id.
585
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the financing commitments could be obtained in two to three
weeks—and thus long before the February 10 deadline.591 Also as
recounted above, Van Gorkom reacted in a highly negative manner to the offer, arguing that it was excessively contingent,592 a position for which he may have had considerable justification,593
even if the main reason for his negative reaction was his belief
that, as the Trans Union board had determined, he ought to
have been included in the internal discussions of the management buy-out group formulating an offer, not just in negotiating
against the management group seeking to buy the company.
The duty of care is not well-suited to evaluate Van
Gorkom’s response to the KKR offer. The issues involved simply
do not reduce to questions of whether Van Gorkom (or the board)
was fully informed before taking action. Under Revlon, however,
we come directly to the point: in dealing with KKR, did Van
Gorkom (and the other Trans Union directors) take reasonable
steps to get the best price for the stockholders reasonably available? Even in 1980, KKR was very well-known and had successfully concluded some very large transactions,594 though none as
large as the $751 million transaction Kravis proposed to Trans
Union.595 Generally speaking, therefore, KKR was a credible and
reputable bidder. Hence, especially as Trans Union was in the
midst of the go-shop period, Van Gorkom should have welcomed
the KKR offer and, rather than belittle it because of the financing contingency it involved, worked with KKR and the management participants to help them secure their financing, just as he
Id.
Id. at 884–85.
593 Id. explaining how KKR’s financing condition involved more contingency
than the facially similar condition in the Pritzker offer.
594 Owen writes:
Very much in the spotlight at the time of the announcement
of Trans Union’s merger agreements with the Pritzkers, KKR
seemingly was putting together a new deal every day. In the
single week preceding that announcement, it had announced
proposals to acquire three different companies for a total consideration of over $800 million.
OWEN, supra note 3, at 9. Moreover, at the time, KKR had completed larger
acquisitions than the Pritzkers had. Id. at 139.
595 Id.
591
592
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had done with Pritzker.596 Thus, even to the extent that Van
Gorkom’s concerns about KKR’s financing were justified, whether
by the substantial rise in interest rates since the time Pritzker
had secured his financing or otherwise, Revlon would require
Van Gorkom to take reasonable steps to help KKR arrange the
necessary financing. No matter how contingent the offer may
have been, Revlon would not permit a board to dismiss the KKR
offer out of hand as Van Gorkom did, when he insulted Kravis
by saying to his face that he would not dignify KKR’s letter with
the term offer.597
Moreover, if the primary reason that Van Gorkom reacted
so negatively to the KKR offer was not the financing contingency
it contained but the fact that, contrary to the board’s instructions and Van Gorkom’s orders, the management participants
had met with KKR without his knowledge and formulated the
offer without his participation, then Van Gorkom and the Trans
Union board had clearly breached their Revlon duties. As this
condition was imposed only on buyers including management
participants, it amounted to “discriminatory treatment of a bidder, without any rational benefit to the stockholders,” which is a
breach of the board’s fiduciary duties under Revlon.598 For, as
Romans clearly realized,599 since Van Gorkom was to be the chief
negotiator for the company on the sell-side, he would have an obvious and substantial conflict of interest acting on the buy-side.600
Just like any other potential buyer, KKR, the Reichmanns, and
the management participants would be grossly disadvantaged in
subsequent negotiations if someone from the sell-side were privy
to their internal discussions. In short, Trans Union would know
the buyer’s reserve price and could capture the entire joint surplus of the transaction, thus making it worthless to the buyer.
To be sure, in one sense, such an arrangement may have been to
Id. at 59–60 (describing how Van Gorkom helped Pritzker arrange financing).
597 Id. at 138.
598 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 (Del. 1988).
599 OWEN, supra note 3, at 151.
600 Id.; see also Macey, supra note 57, at 611–12 (explaining that, because
neither Van Gorkom nor most of the other directors of the company were
going to participate in an LBO, “the usual conflict between management and
stockholders inherent in leveraged buyouts did not really exist in the case of
Trans Union”).
596
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Trans Union’s advantage, but it is so disadvantageous to the potential buyer as to ensure that no potential buyer would proceed
on such terms—as indeed KKR and the management group did
not, for they eventually cut Van Gorkom out of their discussions.
In fact, it is difficult to imagine a condition that a selling board
could impose on a buyer better calculated to ensure that the
buyer would not make an offer for the company than the one the
Trans Union board imposed on KKR and the management group.
Perhaps because of their unfamiliarity with the LBO concept, neither Van Gorkom nor the other directors understood
what a chilling effect this requirement would have on any potential buyout offer involving management. Even so, the directors’
subjective intentions are not dispositive. Revlon requires not
only that the directors act in subjective good faith to get the best
price reasonably available for the stockholders but also that they
take steps to do so that are objectively reasonable,601 and requiring that Van Gorkom be privy to the buyout group’s internal discussions is not only unreasonable but, at least by contemporary
standards, manifestly absurd. A timely suit by KKR or a stockholder seeking an injunction against the board’s instructions
that Van Gorkom participate in the internal discussions of the
buyout group would surely have succeeded under Revlon.
Furthermore, as described above, because he believed
that the board’s instructions and his orders about the process of
formulating the KKR offer had been violated, Van Gorkom immediately began questioning his senior executives to determine
which of them were participating in the KKR offer. His manner
of doing so surely made it clear that he thought anyone participating in that offer had behaved improperly. 602 Indeed, after the
offer was withdrawn, Romans and Bosner, the leaders of the
buyout group, worried that they may no longer have jobs at
Trans Union.603 Regardless of his intentions, the natural and
601 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180
(Del. 1986).
602 OWEN, supra note 3, at 151 (stating that Van Gorkom thought “the
handling of the whole situation [with KKR] had been improper” because “the
instructions that had been issued on the coordination of inquiries from various suitors had not been followed.”).
603 Id. at 149 (stating that, after KKR withdrew its offer, Romans and
Bosner “were concerned about their fate”).
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foreseeable effect of Van Gorkom’s actions was to chill management participation in an LBO; by interrogating his senior executives
in the manner he did, therefore, Van Gorkom likely breached his
Revlon duties. In any event, Van Gorkom’s questioning of his
senior executives in this way surely was not reasonably calculated to facilitate a superior offer from KKR.
It is possible, however, that things were even worse than
this. According to Owen, “it was widely believed that anything
Van Gorkom learned about the buyout effort would immediately
be channeled to Pritzker.”604 If this is correct, then the board’s
requirement that Van Gorkom be involved in the buyout group’s
discussions meant not only that KKR would be severely disadvantaged in any negotiations with Trans Union but also that
KKR would be severely disadvantaged in any competitive bidding with Pritzker. To the extent that Van Gorkom was providing information about the KKR bid to Pritzker, Van Gorkom was
breaching his Revlon duties in an egregious fashion. Indeed, the
only reported parallel in the history of Delaware law would be
the notorious incident in Mills Acquisition in which, in the final
round of an auction for the target, the chief executive officer of
the company, who was participating with KKR as a bidder in the
auction, illicitly learned the details of a competing bidder’s bid
and shared them with KKR.605
Similarly, there is the matter of Van Gorkom’s conversation
with Kruizenga.606 In the Supreme Court’s account, after receiving the KKR offer letter, Van Gorkom had a private conversation
with Kruizenga, the most key employee of the company, and
immediately thereafter Kruizenga declined to participate in the
Id. at 143.
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1267–68 (Del.
1988). The situations would be similar but not identical. Evans’s conduct in
Mills was self-interested and so a breach of his duty of loyalty and morally
blameworthy. Id. If Van Gorkom shared any information about the KKR bid
with Pritzker (and other than the suspicions of some Trans Union insiders,
there is no evidence he did this), he was not personally profiting by so doing.
Id. The overall impression one gets of Van Gorkom is of a good man, accustomed to command, who wished to remain in charge of everything in the
midst of a corporate transaction occurring in a new world that his admittedly
long and very successful career left him ill-prepared to manage. Id.
606 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 885 (Del. 1985); O WEN, supra note
3, at 145–46.
604
605
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buyout group.607 The court does not expressly say so, but it seems to
believe that Van Gorkom was responsible for Kruizenga’s decision.608 As noted above, Owen’s account seems to disprove this
version of events, for Kruizenga had told Romans the day before,
in no uncertain terms, that he was not participating in the KKR
transaction.609 In the unlikely event that the Supreme Court’s
suspicions were correct, however, this would be another egregious breach by Van Gorkom of his Revlon duties.610
So, even on the version of the facts most favorable to the
Trans Union directors, the board surely breached its Revlon duties
in its dealings with KKR. Rather than working with Kravis to
line up financing, as Van Gorkom had done with Pritzker, he
practically rejected the offer because of the financing contingency.
Rather than treating KKR on a par with Pritzker, the board and
Van Gorkom hamstrung the buyout group by requiring that Van
Gorkom be involved in all its internal discussions. Rather than
taking reasonable steps to allow his executives to participate in
the KKR transaction if they wished to do so, Van Gorkom interrogated them as if they had done something wrong and created the
impression that participating in the offer could endanger their
futures with the company. Moreover, if Van Gorkom was passing
information about the KKR offer to the Pritzkers, or if he scuttled the KKR offer by dissuading Kruizenga from participating,
the breaches of Revlon are even worse.
But—and this is a key point in understanding the significance of Van Gorkom, and the same point we saw above—none
of these obvious and gross breaches of Revlon duties can even
remotely be recast as a breach of the duty of care. The Trans Union
board did many things wrong,611 but for the most part they were
substantive mistakes in the sales process that made it difficult
for the stockholders to realize the best price reasonably available for their shares. For the most part, the delicts of the Trans
Union directors were breaches of their Revlon duties, not their
duty of care.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 885.
Id.
609 OWEN, supra note 3, at 145–46.
610 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 885.
611 See id. at 890–92; Herzel & Katz, supra note 448, at 1188.
607
608
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d. The Case on the Edge of Forever
Imagine some eminent Delaware jurist—say Chief Justice
Strine—travels back in time from 2017 to 1985, and, knowing all
he does about the subsequent history of Delaware law, sits on
the Delaware Supreme Court as it considers Van Gorkom and
changes the past by sharing his knowledge of future law with
the rest of the court. What would the Supreme Court likely have
held? On the basis of the discussion above, it seems clear that
the court would have held that the Trans Union board’s Revlon
duties were triggered when Van Gorkom initiated a sale of the
company by approaching Pritzker, and that Van Gorkom and
the other Trans Union directors repeatedly breached those duties. That is, on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court
would have held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Revlon claims.
The court would have held that the directors breached
their Revlon duties in approving the original merger agreement
because the sales process that Van Gorkom initiated and managed, virtually entirely on his own, involved no board control,
participation, or monitoring. The court would also have held
that, in approving the merger agreement on September 20, the
board again breached its Revlon duties because it lacked a reasonable basis for believing that $55 per share was the best price
reasonably available for the company: the board had undertaken
no financial analysis of the value of the company, no market
check, and no negotiating over price. The court would have held
that the directors breached their Revlon duties again, by, requiring that Van Gorkom, as their representative, be included in all
internal discussions of any management buyout group, for his
involvement in this way would obviously torpedo any possible
offer from a management group. The court would have held that,
when KKR did make an offer, the directors breached their
Revlon duties when Van Gorkom did not receive the offer in a
manner reasonably calculated to improve it, but rather, turned
on his subordinates to discourage them from participating in
KKR offer. If the court was considering the case at a point in
time when KKR had made and not withdrawn a superior offer to
acquire the company, the court would almost certainly have
issued an injunction that ensured a fair bidding contest between
Pritzker and KKR, and possibly GECC as well.
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Crafting the injunction remedy, however, may have been
difficult, and in any event, the terms of the injunction would
have depended significantly on just when in the process it would
have been issued. Assuming KKR had sued immediately after
its first bid collapsed, the court would presumably have issued
an injunction enjoining the Trans Union board and Van Gorkom
from interfering with KKR and its dealings with any managers
who wanted to participate in the LBO. It may also have enjoined
the more offensive aspects of the go-shop and fiduciary out, such
as the requirement that Trans Union enter into a definitive
merger agreement before the board had a right to terminate the
Pritzker agreement.612 In reality, of course, Van Gorkom ordered
a cooling off period for KKR and his managers. In mid-January,
KKR and the managers were still interested in paying $60 per
share for Trans Union, but their offer failed only because they
no longer had time to arrange financing before the Trans Union
stockholder meeting to consider the Pritzker offer.613 Had the
Delaware courts intervened in late 1980 with an appropriate injunction, it seems likely that KKR and the buyout group could
have made a fully financed offer to acquire Trans Union at $60
per share. If, on the other hand, the suit was being considered
only in January of 1981, when KKR had dropped out definitively
and the stockholders meeting was fast approaching, the court
would likely have found that, although the plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on the merits in proving that the Trans Union directors had breached their Revlon duties, nevertheless the court
would decline to issue an injunction and would allow the Trans
Union stockholders to decide, after receiving full disclosure,
whether to accept Pritzker’s premium offer.614
On the other hand, the court would not likely have enjoined or voided
Pritzker’s stock option. Given its reasonable value in relation to the value of
the transaction (i.e., only about 3.5 percent), it was probably not deterring
materially higher bids, and neither KKR nor any other bidders were complaining about it. Moreover, Pritzker’s lack of involvement in the worst aspects of the directors’ breaches (e.g., the various ways Van Gorkom interfered
with KKR’s bid) also militated against enjoining it. See In re Dollar Thrifty
S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 575, 591–93, 618 (Del. 2010).
613 See supra Section I.A.
614 See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 452 (Del. Ch.
2012); In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 210 (Del. Ch.
2007).
612
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It is important to appreciate the significance of the fact
that KKR and the Reichmanns were still interested in bidding $60
per share for Trans Union as late as January of 1981, for their
willingness to do so shows that the $55 per share price Pritzker
offered was almost certainly not the best price reasonably available in September of 1980. Defenders of the Trans Union directors—and critics of the Delaware Supreme Court—have long
argued that,615 for more than four months, the entire financial and
615 Mones, supra note 31, at 561. McChesney, who agrees about the fundamentally misguided nature of Van Gorkom, also thinks that, as far as could
be known on September 20, 1980, it was “unlikely that an even better offer
than Pritzker’s $18 premium would emerge” after that date. McChesney,
supra note 340, at 639. His reasons are that (a) the 50 percent premium was
quite high for the period, (b) Pritzker insisted in the original draft of the
merger agreement that Trans Union not seek higher offers, and (c) the financial community had known for a long time about Trans Union’s ITC problem,
and no one had proposed to take over the company to monetize the ITCs. As
indicated in the text, the fact that KKR could afford to pay $60 per share
when interest rates were 800 basis points higher than they were on September 20 refutes the idea that the premium in the Pritzker deal made a topping
bid improbable. McChesney, unlike virtually everyone else writing about Van
Gorkom, knows how much interest rates increased from September 1980 to
February 1981, see McChesney, supra note 340, at 645 n.56, and he correctly
concludes that the dramatic increase in rates would have made financing
subsequent offers topping Pritzker’s offer difficult. Id. This seems to me,
however, to overlook the key implication of rising rates, which is that if KKR
could afford to pay $60 when the prime rate was 20.5 percent and the effective federal funds rate at 19.08 percent, surely it could have paid much more
than $60 per share when, in September, the prime rate was merely 12.5
percent and the effective federal funds rate 10.87 percent. As to McChesney’s
second point, Pritzker, who was clearly the savviest dealmaker involved in
the transaction, initially insisted on the no-shop precisely because he was
concerned that a higher bid would emerge. This suggests such an offer was
likely, not unlikely. As to the third point, it is true that the financial community knew about Trans Union’s ITC problem, but that is hardly the same
thing as knowing that Trans Union is for sale. See generally In re Lear Corporation S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 118–19 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing
importance of the market’s knowledge that a large public company widely
followed by analysts has entered into a merger agreement). More generally,
McChesney argues that the price Pritzker was offering was so high that the
Trans Union stockholders were very likely better offer with the board accepting the offer and locking it in than they would have been in rejecting the offer
and hoping to get a better offer from another buyer. This argument assumes,
however, that the board could neither have considered Pritzker’s offer more
carefully in the time provided nor obtained from Pritzker more time to consider it—i.e., that Pritzker would have withdrawn his offer at its expiration
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corporate world knew that Trans Union was for sale, but apart
from the abortive offer from KKR, not a single bidder emerged to
top the $55 per share offer from Pritzker.616 Normally, such facts
would strongly suggest that $55 per share was indeed the best
price available for the company,617 but the autumn of 1980 and
the winter of 1980–1981 were anything but normal. Although the
Delaware Supreme Court never alludes to it, as noted above, interest rates increased astonishingly during this period, with the
prime rate rising from 12.5 percent on September 20 (the date of
the Pritzker agreement) to 18.5 percent on December 2 (the date
of the KKR offer) to 20.5 percent in January of 1981 (when
Kravis was trying to resurrect that offer).618 Over approximately
the same period, the effective federal funds rate increased from
10.87 percent in September of 1980 to 18.90 percent in December
of 1980 to 19.08 percent in January of 1981.619
The increase in interest rates had several important effects. First and most important, it raised the borrowing costs of
any acquirer who needed to finance the merger, which of course
reduced the amount the borrower could pay for the company. 620
and never have renewed it. The text argues that the first of these assumptions is definitely false. The second also seems dubious to me.
616 See, e.g., Mones, supra note 31, at 561 (“The majority may ... have been
off the mark in its outright rejection of the board’s market test of the merger
proposal.”).
617 Macey, supra note 57. He also thinks that $55 per share was likely not
the best price Trans Union could have obtained from Pritzker in September of
1980, but he points to reasons different from, though compatible with, those
given in the text. See Macey, supra note 57, at 617–19. He argues convincingly
that, if the board had known about the negotiating history underlying the $55
per share price and KKR’s interest in the company, it likely could have negotiated a better price from Pritzker. Id. at 618. Only because Van Gorkom had
kept from the board some of the material facts is the board’s “seemingly bizarre failure even to suggest a higher price to Pritzker … comprehensible.” Id.
618 OWEN, supra note 3, at 128.
619 Effective Federal Funds Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS (Oct. 2,
2017), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/serios/FEDFUNDS [http://perma.cc/53LK-TYB7].
620 See supra note 253 and accompanying text. The extraordinary increase
in interest rates resulted from the dramatic tightening of monetary policy by
the Federal Reserve to reduce the very high inflation rates of the final years
of the Carter Administration. Under more normal circumstances, increases in
interest rates due to increases in the expected inflation rate would likely
result in increases in the cash-flow projections of the company and so any
increase in the borrower’s financing costs would be, to some extent at least,
thereby offset. It is very difficult to venture any speculations about effects of
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Indeed, in November of 1980, “Van Gorkom doubted that a leveraged buyout could be arranged” because “[r]ising interest rates
would torpedo any deal that involved such extensive borrowings.”621 Second, the increase in interest rates limited the kinds
of financing an acquirer might arrange and which financing
sources may be available. For instance, Romans concluded that
rising interest rates “had priced subordinated debt and preferred stock out of consideration,” which would significantly
limit the buyout group’s ability to obtain financing from the institutional investors who would naturally be interested in such
instruments.622 Third, because Trans Union’s leasing business
was heavily dependent on short-term borrowing, rising interest
rates reduced Trans Union’s free cash flow,623 which made the
company less valuable to a potential acquirer. Therefore, the
dramatic increases in interest rates guaranteed that, based on a
discounted cash flow analysis, Trans Union was much more valuable on September 20, the day the Pritzker agreement was
signed, than it was on December 2, the day KKR made its offer
for the company. Similarly, the company was much more valuable on December 2 than it was in mid-January of 1981 when
Kravis tried to resurrect the KKR offer, but ran out of time to
arrange financing. If KKR could have paid $60 per share for
Trans Union in January of 1981, when the prime rate hit 20.5
percent (and the effective federal funds rate stood at 19.08 percent), surely someone could have paid a good deal more than $60
per share (let alone Pritzker’s $55 per share) for the company in
September of 1980. There is simply no way that $55 per share
was the best price reasonably achievable for Trans Union on
September 20, 1980.624
inflation expectations on the future cash flows of Trans Union in the unprecedented monetary environment of late 1980.
621 Owen, Leveraged Buyout, supra note 197, at 18.
622 Id. at 22.
623 Between 1979 Q4 and 1980 Q4, Trans Union’s interest expense increased 46 percent from $90 million to $131 million. Id. at 200.
624 The importance of the sharp increase in interest rates was obvious at
the time. One Trans Union insider, who as not generally friendly to Van
Gorkom, later commented that selling the company in September of 1980 was
“a brilliant move financially” on Van Gorkom’s part because he “sold the
company for way, way more than it would be worth today.” Id. at 195. Van
Gorkom himself said, “[p]erhaps it was sheer luck, ... but the fact is that $55
was the proper number, and subsequent events have demonstrated that the
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There is additional contemporaneous confirmation for this
view. Within days of the merger, Oppenheimer & Co. issued a report recommending the purchase of Trans Union shares on the
theory that a $65 per share price could easily be justified.625 Significantly, the market agreed, and Trans Union shares sometimes
traded above the $55 deal price after the Pritzker transaction
was announced.626
II. SMITH V. VAN GORKOM AS THE KOBAYASHI MARU OF
DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
The final section of the previous Part imagined a timetraveling jurist guiding the Delaware Supreme Court in deciding
a motion for a preliminary injunction in Smith v. Van Gorkom.
That was not, however, the procedural posture of the actual case.
For, by the time the Supreme Court decided the case, the merger
had been closed for more than four years, and the plaintiffs were
not seeking an injunction but either rescission of the merger or,
much more plausibly, monetary damages in the amount of the
difference between the fair value of their shares and the $55 per
share price in the Pritzker transaction.627 This procedural fact is
the most critical aspect of Smith v. Van Gorkom.
company was sold at almost precisely the peak of its value.” Id. Here, Van
Gorkom is right thatɆbecause interest rates rose sharply after the date of the
September 20 agreementɆSeptember 20 was more-or-less the date at which
Trans Union could have commanded the highest price. That $55 per share
was that price, however, does not follow. As the argument in the text shows,
that number was likely very much higher.
625 Owen, Trans Union, supra note 117, at 30 (noting Oppenheimer & Co.’s
report that “recommended the purchase of Trans Union common stock, indicating that it would not be difficult to arrive at a price of $65 per share—less
than five times Trans Union’s pre-tax cash flow of $13.40 per share”).
626 Van Gorkom, supra note 145, at 19.
627 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863 (Del. 1985) where the
court says that plaintiffs were “originally seeking rescission” of the merger,
but that “[a]lternative relief in the form of damages is sought against the
defendant members of the Board of Directors of Trans Union.” In the court’s
very brief discussion of damages, it never mentions rescission, presumably for
the obvious reason that, so long after the consummation of the merger, such a
remedy would be entirely impracticable and extremely costly. Id. at 890–93.
Rather, without further explanation, the court remands the case to the Chancery Court to determine the fair value of Trans Union as of September 20,
1980, in accordance with Weinberger and, then, assesses damages as the
difference between this fair value and the $55 per share price paid by Pritzker in
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In this Part, I explain why this was true. In particular, in
Section II.A, I shall argue that, given that the Delaware Supreme Court had to operate within the common law method, if it
imposed on directors selling their company any stricter duties
than those imposed by the traditional business judgment rule
(that is, the rule as it existed before Aronson v. Lewis invented
the duty of care), the result would have been disaster, just as it
was in Van Gorkom. In other words, if the court got the holding
about breach right (i.e., it held that Van Gorkom and the other
Trans Union directors breached their duties to the stockholders),
then it would necessarily get the holding about remedies wrong,
because it would have to impose on the directors such enormous
liabilities that Delaware’s whole system of corporate law would
be threatened with collapse. In other words, within the common
law system in which the Delaware Supreme Court operated,
there was simply no right way to decide Smith v. Van Gorkom.
The case is a Kobayashi Maru.628
In Section II.B, however, I shall argue that Van Gorkom
was nevertheless a critically important advance in Delaware law.
For, the case had shown that any attempt to use the common law
system to control directors considering business combinations would
produce disastrous consequences, and this prompted the Delaware bar and the Delaware General Assembly to seek a solution
outside the confines of the common law system. In other words,
just as the young James Kirk was able to defeat the Kobayashi
Maru by reprogramming the computer simulation to devise a
solution not possible under the pre-existing program, so too did
the Delaware General Assembly devise a solution not possible
under the common law by enacting Section 102(b)(7): to wit, a
kind of fiduciary duty enforceable by injunction before the harm
from breaching the duty has occurred but not enforceable by
damages after the harm has eventuated. The possibility of such
duties allowed the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon and later
cases to craft a set of fiduciary duties for directors significantly more
stringent than those announced in Van Gorkom without threatening to undermine the foundations of Delaware corporate law.
the transaction. Id. at 893 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
712–15 (Del. 1983)). Presumably, the plaintiffs included the recession for rescission merely for jurisdictional reasons in the Court of Chancery.
628 For a discussion the Kobayashi Maru, see supra note 69.
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The ultimate result was an ingenious system of fiduciary
duty pre-clearance analogous to the system of antitrust preclearance under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement
Act of 1976.629 Under the system that resulted from Van Gorkom,
Section 102(b)(7), and Revlon, after a merger agreement is signed,
but before the merger closes, plaintiff stockholders can challenge
the proposed transaction by alleging that the directors have
breached their fiduciary duties in approving the merger, and the
Delaware courts will review the directors’ action under Revlon
and similar doctrines, ordering appropriate equitable relief if the
courts find a violation. If the courts do not find a violation, however, the transaction will proceed to closing. If the stockholders
approve the transaction, then, assuming the corporation has a
Section 102(b)(7) provision in its certificate of incorporation, any
Revlon claims against the directors will become dismissible630
except for those sounding in the duty of loyalty.631 Since they are
generally unable to recover post-closing, plaintiff-stockholders
have the strongest incentives to bring suit pre-closing. The possibility of such a pre-clearance system, therefore, turns on the elimination of personal liability for breaches of a particular kind of
fiduciary duty, and that was not a result possible in the common
law system. It was possible only by legislative action, and the
cause and basis of that action was Smith v. Van Gorkom. The elimination of personal liability in damages that underlies the whole
Delaware system of pre-clearing mergers could, with some justice,
have been called Van Gorkom immunity.
A. Van Gorkom as Necessarily a Mistake
Having said much about what made Van Gorkom a bad decision, I should be clear about what did not make it a bad decision. In
this section, I summarize (1) what Van Gorkom got right, (2) what
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 189
(2012).
630 See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093 (2001).
631 Id. at 1093. Indeed, under recent developments in Delaware law, assuming that the stockholder vote approving the merger was a fully informed,
uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders, all claims against the directors in connection with the merger will be extinguished except for claims of
waste, and these will, of course, virtually always be dismissible. See Singh v.
Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016); Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, Inc., 125 A.3d 304, 312–14 (Del. 2015).
629
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Van Gorkom got wrong, and (3) why Van Gorkom had to get wrong
what it got wrong.
1. What Van Gorkom Got Right
It is important to appreciate that Van Gorkom did not get
everything wrong. In fact, it got much right. To begin with, there
was nothing wrong with the impetus behind Van Gorkom: the
idea that the Delaware Supreme Court should impose more rigorous fiduciary duties on directors when they were engaged in
selling the company. The court would do exactly that in Revlon
just ten months after deciding Van Gorkom,632 and almost everyone nowadays thinks that Revlon has been a major success. Nor
did the Van Gorkom court err in imposing on directors new fiduciary duties that were too stringent. The Van Gorkom duty of
care may well be poorly theorized and ultimately incompatible
with the theory underlying the business judgment rule, but it
requires only that before making a business decision the directors be informed of all material facts reasonably available, and
this is a duty much less stringent than the duties the Supreme
Court would impose on directors in Revlon.633 Indeed, a board’s
Revlon duties include the Van Gorkom duty of care and then go
far beyond it by requiring not only procedural due care but also
substantive reasonableness to the extent that they require a
board that has initiated a sale process to take substantively reasonable steps to get the best price for the stockholders reasonably
available.634 Nor was Van Gorkom wrong in its essential holding
that the Trans Union directors had breached their fiduciary
duties, for that result would follow—and even follow more easily
and clearly—under Revlon than it did under the reasoning in
Van Gorkom itself. Viewed charitably, the worst thing about
Van Gorkom was that it was an under-theorized635 and poorly
explained early stab at Revlon.

632 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173
(Del. 1986).
633 Compare Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del 1985), with Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
634 See supra text accompanying notes 35ï40.
635 See Quillen, supra note 28, at 469 (suggesting that “it is the opinion
rather than the decision which has created the depth of the criticism”).
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2. What Van Gorkom Got Wrong
The only thing that was fatally wrong about Van Gorkom
was the remedy the Supreme Court imposed when it held the
Trans Union directors personally liable in damages that could
easily have run to $100 million or more.636 That is, the Supreme
Court ordered the Chancery Court on remand to determine, in
accordance with Weinberger v. UOP,637 the fair value of Trans
Union as of the date of the board’s approval of the merger
agreement and to award damages based on the difference between this fair value and price obtained in the Pritzker transaction. Based on KKR’s bid of $60 per share, the damages would
have aggregated about $60 million.638 If the Chancery Court had
found that the fair value of the company was $65, the high end
of range Romans had computed in his leveraged buy-out study,
the damages would have been about $120 million. If, as often
happens, a discounted cash flow analysis produced a higher value
for the company than a leverage buy-out study, say $70, the damages would have been about $180 million. Even at the lowest
figure of $60 million, that would come to $6 million per director.
By comparison, selling his 75,000 Trans Union shares in the
merger at $55 per share, Van Gorkom netted only $4.125 million
before taxes. In other words, assuming full contribution by all
the directors, each director’s individual share of the damages
would likely have greatly exceeded the director’s net worth.639
But this was not merely a catastrophe for the individual
directors involved. It also threatened to collapse the entire system of Delaware corporate law. The reason for this may not be
immediately obvious. After all, directors had always been liable
for certain harms to the corporation and the stockholders arising
636 As noted above, this point is generally conceded by all observers. See
e.g., Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 330, at 430 (defending the decision but
conceding that “the court’s imposition of personal liability on the board is
original”); Sharfman, supra note 57, at 287 (stating that “[t]he enduring
legacy of Van Gorkom is the understanding that corporate directors should
not be held financially liable for decisions that lack due care”).
637 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713–14 (Del. 1983).
638 As noted above, Trans Union had outstanding at the time of the merger
12,512,956 shares. OWEN, supra note 3, at 2. If damages were assessed at $5
per share, the aggregate liability for the directors would have been $62.6 million.
639 Before the Chancery Court held a trial to determine the fair value of Trans
Union, the case settled for $23.5 million. See also OWEN, supra note 3, at 261.
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from some of their decisions. Under the traditional business
judgment rule, however, these decisions were only those involving fraud, bad faith, or some other kind of conduct from which the
director was deriving a personal benefit not shared by the stockholders generally. As an old Delaware case put it, “an honest
mistake of business judgment should not be reviewable by the
Court.”640 Granted that Van Gorkom expanded the class of decisions for which directors could be liable to include uninformed
ones, why does this make such an important difference?
A common answer, but an inadequate one, is that directors can easily avoid transactions that are fraudulent or from
which they derive improper personal benefits, but it is much
more difficult for them to avoid being (or being later found to be)
uninformed. The better answer appeals to the difference in the
relevant judicial error rates. That is, the false-positive rate in
cases alleging directors have acted disloyally, engaged in selfdealing, or otherwise received an improper personal benefit from
a transaction is very low.641 For duty of care claims, however,
the false-positive rate would likely be much higher: courts will
often find that a director breached a duty of care of the kind
articulated in Van Gorkom when in fact the director has not
done so.642 There are two related reasons for this. The first is
Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 267 (1927).
Of course, in determining the expected value of serving as directors, potential directors also care about the false-negative rate because this makes
defecting and profiting by breaching their duties more valuable. To the extent
that the director is honest, however, and refuses to profit illicitly, the falsenegative rate is irrelevant, and for this reason it is treated as such in the argument
in the text. As Chief Justice Strine would say, absent evidence to the contrary, Delaware presumes directors are honest. Goodwin v. Live Entm’t, Inc.,
No. Civ.A. 15765, 1999 WL 64265, at *24 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999) (quoting
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989)).
On the false-negative problem more generally, see Elson & Thompson, supra
note 9, at 587–88 (arguing that courts, like all outsiders, cannot reliably
distinguish between genuine exercises of due care and mere play-acting by
directors attempting to demonstrate to courts that have exercised such care).
642 Thus, the fatuity of such defenses of Van Gorkom as “if a director of a
Delaware corporation performs his duties as a director conscientiously and
loyally, he has absolutely nothing to fear from the ruling of the court in Trans
Union.” Prickett, supra note 357, at 462. The conclusion follows only if one
also assumes that the Delaware courts will find that a director breached his
duty of care if and only if the director actually breached his duty of care—that is,
the judicial error is zero. It is no accident here that Prickett is a plaintiff’s
640
641
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hindsight bias, the human tendency to exaggerate the probability that the actual outcome of an uncertain process is the one
that would result.643 In duty of care cases, plaintiffs would sue
only when the directors’ decision proved to be harmful to the
corporation, and hindsight bias would tend to make reviewing
courts think that the negative outcome was more probable and
predictable (and thus more likely to have involved a want of
care) than was really the case.644
But hindsight bias affects all cases in which judges or juries review the decisions of others, not just cases involving the
decisions of corporate directors, and so if hindsight bias does not
result in unacceptably high false-positive rates in other kinds of
negligence cases, neither should it do so in business judgment
cases either. This brings us to the second and much more important
reason.645 To wit, unlike most decisions of ordinary people in daily
lawyer. Because plaintiffs rather than defendants decide to initiate a lawsuit,
repeat players on the plaintiffs’ side, such as plaintiffs’ counsel, have a strong
personal incentive to favor rules that involve high false-positive error rates.
Under such rules, suits against even perfectly innocent defendants have
positive settlement value. Indeed, plaintiffs (and their counsel) with weak
cases have strong incentives to favor a rule with a high error rate even when
the false-positive and false-negative rates are the same.
643 Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business
Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 588 (1994).
644 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d. Cir. 1982) (stating that “the
circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily reconstructed
in a courtroom years later,” and “a reasoned decision at the time made may
seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect
knowledge”); see also Gentler Critique, supra note 409, at 493 (discussing
hindsight bias as a justification for the business judgment rule); Allen, Jacobs
& Strine, supra note 31, at 454–55 (discussing importance of hindsight bias
in duty of care cases).
645 Rock & Wachter, supra note 373, at 664–71, give a different, though related, explanation of why business decisions are economically different and
thus ought be reviewed under a different judicial standard. For them, the key
point is that the decisions have characteristics that make them efficiently
handled intra-firm as opposed to on the market—e.g., the decisions are part
of a relationship that is open-ended in time and scope, transactionally intensive, and often involving assets, physical and otherwise, that are illiquid and
difficult to value. Id. at 666. From the point of view of the analysis given in
the text, however, Rock and Wachter concur on the key point: with business
decisions, “judges cannot reliably distinguish between negligent and nonnegligent behavior.” Id. at 667. Similarly, Fischel explains that directors
should not be liable for negligent business decisions because, for among other
reasons, “the cost of contracting” in such situations is high, which “makes it
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life and unlike the decisions of most other professionals in the
exercise of their trades, the decisions of businesspeople regularly
result in losses even when they were in no way negligent. That
is, an automobile accident or a bridge collapse almost always
involves a negligent mistake on the part of some individual or
other,646 but a business decision that loses money does not. For
example, an investment that has a 90 percent probability of resulting in a complete loss may well have positive net present
value because the expected payoff, which occurs with only 10
percent probability, is so great as to give the transaction positive
net present value. In such a case, the business decision to make
the investment may well be eminently sound. Hence, business
decisions are importantly unlike most other decisions in that,
much more than other kinds of decisions, they often result in
losses even when they were entirely reasonable.647 This fact,
extremely difficult to distinguish adequate or reasonable performance from a
breach of fiduciary duty.” Fischel, supra note 338, at 1439. In other words,
“[l]iability rules will be most useful in assuring contractual performance
when the duty owed can be specified and monitored at low cost,” which is not
the case with directors making informed decisions. Id. at 1440. Rather, “it
will frequently be impossible to determine … whether a bad outcome had
anything to do with the amount invested in information as opposed to market
conditions that could not have been anticipated, bad luck, or any number of
other possible factors.” Id. at 1442. For a very different account, see Sharfman,
who maintains that it is efficient not to impose liability on directors for
breaches of the duty of care based on a combination of arguments related to
Bainbridge’s conclusions about director primacy and Blair and Stout’s conclusions about mediating hierarchies. See Sharfman, supra note 57, at 290.
646 Allen, Jacobs, and Strine argue that “[i]n cases involving comparatively
simple decisions such as automobile accidents, there is often little difference
between decisions that are bad and good decisions that turn out badly.” Allen,
Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 454, “[i]n such cases, typically only one
decision is reasonable in a given set of circumstances, so decisions that turn
out badly almost invariably turn out to have been bad decisions.” The authors
seem to conflate several ideas here: (a) complex, as opposed to simple, decisions, (b) decisions such that, if they produce a bad outcome, they were likely
negligent, and (c) decisions such that, in their circumstances, they were the
only reasonable alternatives. These are clearly different concepts, and the
classes of such decisions do not coincide in reality. The concept that matters
is the one identified in the text: decisions such that, if they result in bad
outcomes, they were almost certainly negligent—e.g., car accidents do not
usually occur unless at least one driver has been negligent.
647 Again, Allen, Jacobs, and Strine are very close but get distracted by
other real, but not essential, properties of business decisions. They write,
“Unlike automobile accident cases, it may be hard for judges to differentiate
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combined with hindsight bias, explains why a court reviewing
decisions of corporate directors for want of due care will likely
produce a significant false-positive error rate.648
Now, the possibility of being found personally liable, whether
for a breach of the duty of loyalty or the duty of care, creates an
expected cost for individuals serving as directors.649 Given the immense size of the potential liabilities, however, the false-positive
rate need not be very high to create unacceptable expected costs.650
For example, suppose a company with market capitalization of
$5 billion pays its outside directors $250,000 per year in total
compensation.651 In exchange for this benefit, an individual
bad business decisions from good business decisions that turn out badly.
Business decisions are virtually always made with less than perfect information and thus decisions makers are required to assess and assume some
degree of risk.” Id at 454. But the distinguishing characteristic of business
decisions is not that they are made with imperfect information (indeed, all
human decisions are made with imperfect information) nor yet that they involve
risk or the possibility of negative outcomes (which is also true of all human
decisions). The distinguishing characteristic of such decisions, as indicated in
the text, is that they may be perfectly reasonable (e.g., have net present value)
even though they may very likely result in negative outcomes (e.g., entail losses).
648 Compare Herzel and Katz’s point that markets can evaluate directors’
business acumen better than courts can because markets can judge directors
on the basis of the large number of decisions they make over a significant
period of time but courts can consider only the one decision challenged in a
lawsuit. Herzel & Katz, supra note 448, at 1189. Because business decisions
have the properties described in the text, one business decision working out
badly shows very little about the business judgment of the directors. When
we consider the aggregate result of a large number of decisions, however, that
changes. Whether the aggregate result is positive or negative will correlate
well with whether the directors are astute businesspersons or not.
649 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 455 (stating, “the risk of liability, at least in the case of non-management directors, could be highly disproportionate to the incentives for serving as a director. Liability for an imprudent
decision could be in the millions, but outside directors rarely receive annual
fees commensurate with liability risk of that magnitude”).
650 Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984); Gagliardi v. Trifoods
Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating, “[g]iven the scale of
operations of modern public corporations … only a very small probability of
director liability based on ‘negligence,’ ‘waste,’ etc., could induce a board to
avoid authorizing risky investment projects”).
651 See the 2016 Director Compensation Report for a report of median annual compensation for non-employee directors at public companies as $260,000 for
large-cap companies, $200,000 for mid-cap companies, and $144,625 for
small-cap companies. 2016 Director Compensation Report, FW COOK (2016),
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agrees to provide services as a director, which involves a certain
cost to him (at least in the form of forgone leisure) that reduces
the value to him of serving to some indeterminate amount below
$250,000. As a director, this person will also bear certain risks.
In particular, whenever he is called upon to make a business decision as a director, no matter how careful he is to be informed,
under Van Gorkom he will run a risk that a court will later find
(erroneously) that he made the business decision on less than an
informed basis. Thus, there is a cost to the director of making
this business decision equal to the potential liability multiplied
by the probability that a court will (erroneously) find he made
the decision without being fully informed. Now suppose that the
company receives a takeover proposal valuing the company at $6
billion (i.e., a 20 percent premium to market), and the director
exercises due care and votes to approve the transaction. If there
is just a one in a hundred chance that a court will subsequently
(erroneously) find that the director breached his duty of care and
that the company was really worth $7 billion (i.e., a 40 percent
premium to market), then the potential liability for the director
will be 1/100 of $1 billion or $10 million, which is 40 times the
director’s annual compensation for being a director. If the board
has ten members and the director can count on the other nine
directors to contribute fully to the judgment, the expected cost of
the director’s personal liability would still be $1 million or four
times his annual compensation as a director.
A takeover proposal is an extraordinarily large transaction and so involves extraordinarily large possible liability for
the director, but potential liability would attach to every business judgment the director makes as a director of the corporation.652 The aggregate value of those decisions in a given year
may plausibly be valued at the total revenues of the company.
Assuming the $5 billion company from our example above has a
10 percent profit margin653 and a P/E multiple of 20, its revenues
https://www.fwcook.com/content/documents/publications/11-30-16_FWC_2016
_Director_Comp_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MGG-QPU8]. The report defines
large-cap companies as companies with a market capitalization greater than
$5 billion. The example thus involves a director very well compensated by
current market standards. Id.
652 Herzel & Katz, supra note 448, at 1190–91.
653 For reference, according to the “U.S. Weekly Kickstart” report issued by
Goldman Sachs in late July, 2017, the average profit margin of the S&P 500 was
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would be about $2.5 billion. Thus, on the same assumptions used
above, the expected cost of liability to the director, even absent
having to decide about a takeover proposal, would be 1/100 of
$2.5 billion or $25 million, which is 100 times the director’s annual compensation as a director. Again, assuming full contribution from the other nine members of a ten-member board, the
expected cost of the director’s personal liability would still be
$2.5 million or ten times his annual compensation as a director.
Clearly, under these conditions, it would be very difficult to find
enough qualified individuals to serve as corporate directors of
public companies. Such a system would make serving as a director highly irrational from a financial point of view, with the result that many qualified individuals will decline to serve.654
That result threatens the very survival of the system as a whole.
3. Why Van Gorkom Had to Get Wrong What It Got Wrong
If what Van Gorkom got wrong was that it made serving
as a director economically irrational by imposing on directors
potentially enormous liabilities for honest but uninformed business decisions, how could the Delaware Supreme Court have
recast the opinion to avoid this result? The simple answer is
that there is no way it could have done so, at least not if it was
going to create new fiduciary duties to discipline directors considering business combination transactions.
For example, let us abstract from the actual opinion in
Van Gorkom and assume merely that, on any theory whatever
not involving bad faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty, the
court had held that the directors breached their fiduciary duties
10 percent. Mark Kolakowski, Why Techs, Banks Will Lead in 2nd Half: Goldman,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 25, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/news
/why-techs-banks-will-lead-2nd-half-goldman/ [https://perma.cc/K84U-RKXA].
654 See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 449 (stating, “[h]ighly
qualified directors may also avoid service if they face liability risks that are
disproportionate to the benefits of service”); id. at 452 (stating, “the risk of
liability under the applicable standard of conduct for assuming a given corporate role may dwarf the incentives for assuming that role”); see also Fischel,
supra note 338, at 1454 (arguing that managers “will be less willing to serve”
because not serving is “the best protection against getting sued”); McChesney,
supra note 340, at 648 (stating that, as a result of Van Gorkom, “it … became
more difficult for corporations to attract directors to their boards, and existing directors resigned from boards”).
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to the stockholders. For this breach, there must be remedy, for it
is axiomatic in the common law that wherever there is a right,
there is a remedy.655 Ubi ius, ibi remedium,656 or sometimes Lex
dabit remedium.657 Thus, Blackstone says that “it is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also
a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded,”658 and “all possible injuries whatsoever, that did not
fall within the exclusive cognizance of either the ecclesiastical,
military, or maritime tribunals, are for that very reason within the
cognizance of the common law courts of justice.”659 He continues,
“[f]or it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England,
that every right when withheld must have a remedy, and every
injury it’s proper redress.”660 This principle was universally adopted
in the United States along with the rest of the common law, and
it appears in American cases at least as far back as Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison.661 There he writes,
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
afford that protection.”662 For Chief Justice Marshall, the principle lies at the foundation of the new republic. He writes, “[t]he
government of the United States has been emphatically termed
a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for
the violation of a vested legal right.”663
Naturally, this universal principle became part of the
common law in Delaware, as it did everywhere else in the United
655 “The modern jurist assumes the other, the more ideal of the two correlated terms, to be the more evident, and acts upon the converse maxim: Where
there is a Right there is a Remedy; or, Given the Right, the Remedy follows.”
GAIUS, INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW 445 (Edward Poste, trans., Oxford at the
Clarendon Press 1904).
656 Ubi jus, ibi remedium, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
657 AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (Oxford University Press 2009).
658 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23.
(1794).
659 Id. at 108–09.
660 Id. at 109.
661 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803).
662 Id. at 163.
663 Id.
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States. Indeed, in 1844, in Short v. Piper, the Superior Court of
Delaware proclaimed as an axiom accepted by all “the principle of
law … that wherever there is a right there ought to be a remedy.”664
In 1985, therefore, in the Delaware Supreme Court, which is a common law court and a court of equity, this principle was too fundamental to be questioned. Not surprisingly, therefore, the court
in Van Gorkom never even considered the possibility that, having shown that the Trans Union directors had breached their
fiduciary duties to the stockholders, the stockholders might have no
remedy. It was obvious beyond question that the stockholders
had a remedy. But what remedy? Delaware courts have on occasion entertained the possibility of rescinding a merger, but they
have virtually always665 declined to do so on what might be
thought of as the doctrine of not unscrambling the eggs.666 The
obvious impracticality of such a remedy, coupled with what would
undoubtedly be a strong preference of the plaintiffs for cash, left
just one option: monetary damages.667 As Manning put it, “[h]aving
decided that the directors’ behavior was substandard, the [S]upreme
[C]ourt reached for its only remedial tool—damages.”668
But at that point, the essential problem of Van Gorkom
was created: the relatively high false-positive error rate in nonloyalty cases, coupled with the tremendous sums at stake in
corporate transactions, especially business combinations, causes
the expected costs of serving as a director to rise sharply and
quickly exceed the benefits of such service, and we are back to
the untenable result of Van Gorkom. Within the common law
system in which the Delaware Supreme Court operated, the only
Short v. Piper, 4 Harr. 181, 182 (Del. Super. Ct. 1844).
As far as I know, when the case involved public companies, they always
declined to do so.
666 The phrase entered the Delaware lexicon in the opinion of the Court of
Chancery in Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 603 (Del. Ch. 1974),
aff’d, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974), apparently borrowed from Metro-GoldwynMayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
but the metaphor goes back at least as far as President Lincoln, who once
quipped, “Broken eggs cannot be mended.” 2 MICHAEL BURLINGAME, ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: A LIFE 587 (2008) (quoting Abraham Lincoln).
667 Quillen writes, “[a]lthough there was a continuing prayer for rescission,
after the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, the real question was whether
the Trans Union directors were liable personally for money.” Quillen, supra
note 28, at 490.
668 Manning, supra note 23, at 4.
664
665
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way to avoid this result would be to find, as the Court of Chancery below found,669 that the Trans Union directors did not
breach their fiduciary duties. Any result in the Supreme Court
that did the right thing by holding that the Trans Union directors
had breached their duties would necessarily do the catastrophically wrong thing and hold those directors liable in damages, thus
undermining the economic viability of the entire Delaware system
of corporate law. For the justices of the Delaware Supreme Court,
Smith v. Van Gorkom was a problem in which every available
solution was wrong. It was a Kobayashi Maru.
B. Van Gorkom as a Necessary Mistake670
Now, since Van Gorkom was a Kobayashi Maru, any solution
the court adopted was necessarily going to be mistaken, and in
this sense, Van Gorkom was thus necessarily mistaken. Most
Kobayashi Marus, however, are not necessary mistakes; that is,
a person can avoid adopting a mistaken answer to the Kobayashi Maru by declining to address the problem, by simply refusing to play the game. In one sense, of course, that option was
unavailable to the Delaware Supreme Court since its jurisdiction over appeals of final orders from the Court of Chancery is
mandatory.671 Hence, once the plaintiffs in Van Gorkom lost on
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985).
In a very perceptive article, Lawrence Hamermesh follows Macey and
Miller’s suggestion that Van Gorkom be viewed as a takeover case and argues
that, apart from the misguided duty of care analysis, the case in fact includes
several holdings that advanced corporate law in the right direction. See generally Gentler Critique, supra note 409, at 595. He argues that, among other
things, the case (a) rejected the board passivity thesis of Easterbrook &
Fischel, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids,
Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders’ Welfare, 36 BUS. LAW. 1733 (1981), and
held that the board must take a position on the advisability of the merger
under DGCL 251(b), id. at 596–97, (b) established the director’s duty of candor, requiring that the board disclose to the stockholders all the material
information in its possession when seeking a stockholder vote, even when
directors are not interested in the matter placed before the stockholders, id.
at 598, and (c) made clear the importance of fiduciary-outs in merger agreements by holding that target boards were not generally free to accept a superior
offer on general fiduciary grounds. Id. at 601.
671 DEL. CODE ANN. CONST., ART. 4, § 11(4) (2015). Of course, even if the
Delaware Supreme Court avoided deciding the case, the Court of Chancery
certainly could not have done so.
669
670
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the merits below and filed a notice of appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court was legally required to hear the case. In a more
important sense, however, the disastrous holding in Van Gorkom
was necessary in order for Delaware to develop the well-functioning
system of takeover law it has today. In that sense, Van Gorkom
was a necessary mistake—necessary for the salutary development
of Delaware law. The purpose of this Section II.B is to explain
and support that claim.672
1. The Need for Van Gorkom Immunity
As explained above, if the Delaware Supreme Court created any special set of fiduciary duties, including Revlon duties,
governing the conduct of directors approving the sale of their
company, then those duties would have to support appropriate
remedies, including monetary damages for breaches not enjoined
pre-closing673—or at least this is implied by the common law
axiom that wherever there is a right, there is a remedy.674 But
we now know that he remedy of monetary damages, which was
the only possible remedy post-closing, was untenable. The solution to this problem—a solution that allowed the creation of meaningful fiduciary duties governing the board’s consideration of
business combination transactions, but that did not render service as a director financially irrational for qualified individuals—
was possible, but not within the common law system that the
Delaware Supreme Court inhabited. The solution lay in surrendering what seemed like the most obviously correct principle in
the system—the principle that for every right there is a remedy. As
often happens, genius is manifested in the denial of what everyone
knows to be indisputably, irrefutably, necessarily true.
In particular, the solution lay in abolishing the remedy of
monetary damages for violations of the duty of care. While stockholders always could bring actions pre-closing seeking to enjoin
Cf. Sharfman, supra note 57, at 289–90 (arguing that “the enduring
legacy of Van Gorkom is the understanding that corporate directors should
not be held financially liable for corporate board decisions that lack due care”
and attributing this legacy not to the decision itself but the chain of events it
set off, principally the enactment of Section 102(b)(7)).
673 See supra text accompanying notes 54ï56.
674 See supra note 655 and accompanying text.
672
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a transaction and in fact often did so (indeed, Smith in Smith v.
Van Gorkom did so),675 nevertheless abolishing the post-closing
remedy of damages greatly incentivizes stockholders dissatisfied
with a sale approved by their board to sue pre-closing when equitable relief is not only available but the preferred remedy.
Creating such powerful incentives for stockholders to sue and
present their best arguments pre-closing thus required something like Section 102(b)(7).676
And without Van Gorkom there would be no Section
102(b)(7). That is, perhaps a very wise legislator, devising a preclearance system in which a regulator reviews the actions of
See Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1981 WL 15145, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3,
1981).
676 As noted above, since 2015, if the stockholder vote approving the merger
was a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders, then
all claims against the directors in connection with the merger are extinguished
except for claims of waste, which will virtually always be immediately dismissible. Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 n.3 (Del. 2016); Corwin
v. KKR Fin. Holdings, Inc., 125 A.3d 304, 309 (Del. 2015). The defendant
directors in Van Gorkom argued that the stockholder vote approving the
merger with Pritzker extinguished the stockholder’s claims. Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888 (Del. 1985). The Delaware Supreme Court accepted
this argument. Id. It is now well understand that Gantler v. Stephens, 965
A.2d 695 (Del. 2009), did not overrule Van Gorkom on this point but merely
clarified that the term ratification does not properly apply to stockholder
votes required by the DGCL to approve a corporate action, such as the vote
required by Section 251 to approve a merger. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 309–11.
But the Supreme Court in Van Gorkom also held that the proxy statement
used in connection with the stockholder meeting to consider the Pritzker
transaction did not disclose all of the material facts in possession of the
board, and thus, the stockholder vote was not fully informed and hence ineffective in extinguishing the fiduciary claims against the directors. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d at 890–92. Even after Corwin, in the absence of a Section 102(b)(7)
provision in the corporate charter, a plaintiff-stockholder may argue postclosing that the stockholder vote was not fully informed, and if the plaintiff
succeeds on this score, the directors would be liable in monetary damages for
any breaches of their duty of care, including under Revlon. In the presence of
a Section 102(b)(7) provision, the plaintiff-stockholder has to argue that any
material misstatement or omission in the disclosure resulted from a breach of
the board’s duty of loyalty—a claim that, in a third-party transaction in
which the directors were not otherwise interested—is very unlikely to succeed. See Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 4485447, at *20 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 25, 2016). The upshot is that, even after Corwin, Section 102(b)(7)
remains very important in insulating directors from post-closing actions for
damages in merger cases.
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directors in approving a sale of the company, would realize that
an effective overall system required the elimination of personal
liability of directors in the relevant cases. Delaware corporate
law, however, is not a regulatory scheme designed by some jurisprudential mastermind, but a common law system that proceeds one case at a time, with judges reasoning by analogy from
one case to the next.677 There was no mechanism whereby the
Delaware courts could implement a pre-clearance system in one
fell swoop; on the contrary, the system has to evolve step-by-step
in the common law fashion. The development of the law proceeded
apace, but in Van Gorkom the courts reached a Kobayashi Maru:
whatever they did next, the result would be disaster. The situation is analogous to that of people playing a very complicated
board game who suddenly discover that a position has arisen on
the board in which the complex rules of the game require contradictory things—for instance, one rule requires that a certain
piece be moved to a given location on the board, but another rule
prohibits such moves in the unusual position on the board. In
such cases, there is no way forward within in the system. The
rules of the system have to be changed, and this can be done only
from outside the system. When the Delaware Supreme Court decided Van Gorkom, it threw Delaware law into just such a situation, and only action by the legislature could create a way forward.
But this shows the unique, positive contribution of Smith
v. Van Gorkom to the development of Delaware corporate law.
The system contained a latent contradiction: no system of corporate law could simultaneously (a) impose special fiduciary duties
on directors (thus creating correlative rights in the stockholders)
in approving a sale of the company beyond duties of good faith
and loyalty, (b) provide a remedy for every violation of a right,
and (c) make the position of directors economically sustainable.
Prior to Van Gorkom, no one saw the contradiction latent in the
conjunction of these three premises. Unless the contradiction became apparent, the legislative action needed to create a right that
would sometimes be without a remedy would never have occurred. That contradiction became apparent only with the Delaware
Supreme Court’s decision in Van Gorkom. In short, if there were
See, e.g., Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U.
CHI. L. REV. 501 (1948).
677
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no Van Gorkom, there would be no Section 102(b)(7), and if
there were no Section 102(b)(7), there could be no special duties
for directors in selling their company—that is, there could have
been no Revlon duties. Hence, no Van Gorkom, no Revlon.678
2. The Solution in Section 102(b)(7) Exculpation Provisions
Probably no one involved in enacting Section 102(b)(7) in
Delaware in 1985 and 1986 was thinking in terms of creating a
system of pre-clearance, whereby the Delaware courts would
review the actions of directors who had approved a sale of their
corporation to determine whether they had complied with their
fiduciary duties, enjoining the merger and ordering corrective
equitable relief if the courts determined that directors had
breached those duties. Part of that system, of course, was in
place and had been in place for a very long time. It was already
common for stockholders to sue directors, seeking to enjoin a corporate action for which the directors were seeking approval at an
upcoming stockholders meeting. This is precisely what happened
in Van Gorkom and any number of other cases.679 In one very
important sense, Delaware already had a pre-clearance system.
Rather than developing a pre-clearance system of merger
review, in the aftermath of Van Gorkom, the immediate problem
for Delaware lawyers was the collapsing D&O insurance market680 and the well-grounded fear that directors felt concerning
By analogous reasoning in the takeover and deal-protection contexts,
there could also have been no Unocal. Consider, for instance, the potential
liability of directors who prevented a hostile takeover by adopting a poison
pill and were later found by the court to have breached their duty of care in
so doing. Presumably, they would be liable in damages for entire amount of
the premium in the lost offer. In this regard, also see the discussion of Macey
& Miller, supra note 23.
679 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721ï22 (Del. 1971).
680 See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 198 (stating that the “perception that
the decision had significantly increased director liability exposure drove
dramatic changes in the director and officer … liability insurance market”);
Veasey et al., supra note 60, at 400–01 (discussing how some D&O carriers
withdrew from the market or raised premiums and deductibles as a result of
Van Gorkom); Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 31, at 458 n.36 (stating that
“after Van Gorkom, the D & O insurance industry sharply increased their
premiums and in some cases, threatened to stop writing D & O insurance
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potentially ruinous liability imposed for purely honest mistakes
in judgment (or what courts would later deem to be mistakes in
judgment) about the amount and quality of information they
considered before making a business decision. Something had to
be done to make serving as a director not economically irrational.
By late 1985, the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware
Bar Association was considering various possible amendments
to the Delaware General Corporation Law to address the problems created by Van Gorkom.681 Based on analogies to the law of
trusts, some Delaware practitioners had argued that a provision
in the corporation’s charter could limit682 or eliminate personal
liability for the directors for breaches of their duty of care,683 but
others doubted whether such a provision would be legal under
the DGCL.684 Ultimately, on June 18, 1986, the Delaware General
Assembly enacted685 what is now Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL,
which provides that a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation may include a provision limiting or eliminating the
personal liability of directors for monetary damages for breaches
policies.”). Nevertheless, it remains a matter of dispute whether, or to what
extent, the crisis in the D&O insurance markets in 1985 and 1986 resulted
from Van Gorkom and perhaps other cases holding directors liable in damages or
from other factors. See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 346, at 4-99ï100;
Hartman & Rogers, supra note 346, at 525 (arguing that many predictions of
dire consequences flowing from Van Gorkom were exaggerated). Probably,
there were many forces at work, some antedating Van Gorkom. It would seem
clear, however, that Van Gorkom exacerbated whatever problems already existed in the market.
681 See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 346, at 4-99 n.565.
682 Section 102(b)(7) provisions can limit, as opposed to eliminate, such liability by capping the liability at a stated dollar amount. See id. at 4-99–100.
The fact that the market has clearly rejected this option (Section 102(b)(7)
provisions virtually universally eliminate such liability completely) strongly
suggests that a system that would fine directors a relatively small amount for
careless decisions rather than impose on them liability for the entire harm
caused, see, e.g., Renee M. Jones and Michelle Anne Welsh, Toward a Public
Enforcement Model for Directors’ Duty of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L.
343 (2012), is inefficient.
683 See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (amended
2010).
684 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 346, at 4-100.
685 65 Del. Laws Ch. 289, §§ 1, 2, 102(b)(7) (1986); see also Bainbridge, supra
note 60, at 221–22 (discussing the enactment of Section 102(b)(7)).
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of their fiduciary duties, other than for breaches of their loyalty,
for acts or omissions not in good faith or involving intentional
misconduct or knowing violation of law, for willful or negligent
conduct in paying dividends or repurchasing stock out of other
than lawfully available funds, or for any transaction from which
the director derives an improper personal benefit.686 Section
102(b)(7) thus allows corporations to eliminate the directors’
personal liability in monetary damages for breaches of the Van
Gorkom duty of care.687 It creates the possibility of what may
fancifully be called Van Gorkom immunity.
Soon after the enactment of Section 102(b)(7), most public
companies incorporated in Delaware proposed to their stockholders an amendment to the corporation’s charter adding a provision of the kind authorized by the section, and these proposals
virtually always passed.688 Nowadays, virtually every public company incorporated in Delaware has such a provision in its charter.689 Moreover, most other states copied Section 102(b)(7),690
and so public companies in the United States, even those not
incorporated in Delaware, almost always have a substantially
similar provision in their articles of incorporation.691
From practically any jurisprudential point of view, Section 102(b)(7) is an extremely unusual statute. This is certainly
true from the point of view of economic analysis. For, whether it
be under Van Gorkom’s duty of care or Revlon’s Revlon duties,
directors of a Delaware corporation owe certain duties to their
stockholders, which means that the stockholders hold correlative
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
See Balotti & Gentile, supra note 351, at 5, 7, 8ï11; Lee, supra note
351, at 241, 259.
688 Lee, supra note 351, at 272.
689 Hamermesh, supra note 23, at 477, 490 (reporting that of 100 Fortune
500 companies sampled, each of 98 stock corporations in the sample incorporated
in a jurisdiction allowing exculpatory charter provisions had such provisions,
including all Delaware corporations in the sample); see also Bainbridge, supra
note 60, at 198 (describing Section 102(b)(7) provisions as “now nearly universal”). See generally Veasey et al., supra note 60, at 401–04 (1987) (discussing Section 102(b)(7) exculpation).
690 See DeMott, supra note 350, at 297; Hamermesh, supra note 23, at 477,
479 (stating that statutes like Section 102(b)(7) have been “almost universally
enacted since Van Gorkom” ).
691 DeMott, supra note 350, at 301 n.33; Hamermesh, supra note 23, at 490.
686
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rights against the directors. It is a truism in the economic analysis of law that a right may be enforced by a property rule, under
which a violation of the right supports an injunction enjoining
the violation, or by a liability rule, under which a violation of the
right supports an action for monetary damages,692 with the
choice of rule turning on which involves the lower transaction
costs in the particular situation.693 In corporate law, the situation is complicated because the allocation of rights between directors and stockholders is so complex, but from the economic
point of view, the pre–Section 102(b)(7) system seems fairly typical. When the directors take action threatening an inefficient
transfer of rights (for instance, by agreeing to sell the corporation too cheaply), the stockholders’ rights are protected from the
anticipated breach by a property rule supporting an injunction,
the reason being that, prior to an actual breach, this is by far
the cheapest remedy. When an inefficient transfer of rights has
actually occurred, however, the pre–Section 102(b)(7) system
provided a remedy implementing a liability rule—that is, monetary damages. The reason was that, at that point, enforcing a
property rule would amount to rescission—returning the rights
to the parties who valued them most highly—but of course the
transaction costs of unscrambling the eggs are extremely high,
higher even than the expensive and error-prone battle of evaluation experts involved in awarding monetary damages. Expensive
as it may be, a liability rule in such cases is cheaper.
But then Van Gorkom revealed that implementing the
post-closing remedy based on the liability rule ran into the problem that directors, who would have to pay monetary damages
under the liability rule, either literally did not have enough money
to do so—the damages exceeded their net worth and would send
them into bankruptcy—or would decline to participate in a system
in which their expected costs greatly exceeded their expected benefits. In other words, Van Gorkom highlighted an assumption of the
economic analysis that people almost always forget immediately
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–
10 (1972).
693 See, e.g., DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER, WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO
DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 57–61 (Princeton U. Press ed., 2000).
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after making: that the transfers analyzed produce no wealth
effects for the people involved—in practice, that they are all very
small in relation to the person’s total wealth. The damages to
which directors could be subject under a liability rule enforcing
post-closing the stockholders’ rights would most certainly produce a wealth effect for the directors. Indeed, the costs to the
directors were generally so high that they would likely drop out
of the system entirely. In these unusual facts, the costs of using
a liability rule become the cost of losing the participation of qualified individuals as directors—i.e., ultimately the costs of losing the
benefits of the entire system separating ownership and control
in public companies.
It is not hard to see how those costs greatly exceed the
benefits arising from correcting post-closing inefficient transfers
of the stockholders’ rights in those (hopefully few) cases that
were not enjoined pre-closing. In other words, although the
stockholders’ rights post-closing could be protected by a property
rule requiring rescission of the transaction (which everyone
agrees was too costly a remedy), or by a liability rule holding the
directors liable in damages (which Van Gorkom revealed to be
an even more costly remedy), there was a third alternative: not
protect the stockholders’ rights in such cases and suffer a third
set of costs, to wit, the costs of allowing some inefficient corporate transactions that occur because of the reduced incentives
directors would have to be diligent in approving business combination transactions if they know that, post-closing, they will not
be held liable in damages for mere errors in judgment.694 The costs
of this third way are certainly real, but they can be reduced by
raising the percentage of claims that are reviewed pre-closing,
an outcome that Section 102(b)(7) gives stockholders and their
See Elson and Thompson, who argue that “the Van Gorkom context
does not fit within the set of circumstances in which judicial gap filling is the
optimal constraint” and thus “private ordering by contract or norms by which
directors obtain equity ownership in their companies can be more effective
than fiduciary duty in addressing the issues that concerned the court in Van
Gorkom.” Elson & Thompson, supra note 9, at 582. Contra John C. Coffee,
Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between
Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 798 (1984) (arguing that
the duty of care is more useful as expressing an aspiration norm than a legally
enforceable one).
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counsel a strong incentive to pursue.695 But all solutions to all
problems are costly, and the economically rational solution is not
the costless one (there is no such solution) but the lowest cost
solution available. In cases like Van Gorkom, we have the very
unusual situation in which the cheapest way to enforce a right is
not to enforce it at all, for all available means of enforcement
produce even higher costs than the costs of not enforcing the
right. Section 102(b)(7) allows exactly that outcome.696
3. The Van Gorkom–Revlon Pre-Clearance System
The result of all this was the current Delaware system of
pre-clearance of merger transactions. When the board announces
that it has agreed to a merger, almost inevitably a stockholder
(or, perhaps most accurately, an attorney specializing in such suits)
sues, alleging that directors breached their duties in connection
with the merger. The Court of Chancery will consider the case
on a motion for a preliminary injunction, which requires the
court to determine whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated
Elson and Thompson argue convincingly that these costs can be reduced in other ways as well, including especially through improving directors’
incentives by compensating them with equity in the company rather than
cash. “In this setting, it makes more sense to use a pre-decision incentive
structure that relies on the personal economic interest of the directors whose
conduct we are trying to police instead of after-the-fact judicial sanctions,”
and “such an incentive structure can be created by linking directors’ personal
wealth to their companies’ success or failure … by making them substantial
[stock]holders.” Elson & Thompson, supra note 9, at 587. See generally R.
Franklin Balotti, Charles M. Elon & J. Travis Laster, Equity Ownership and
the Duty of Care: Convergence, Revolution, or Evolution?, 55 BUS. LAW. 661 (2000).
696 Schwartz and Wiles defended Van Gorkom on the grounds that it
would “insure the continued confidence of investors and the electorate in the
essential fairness of the stock market and of economic society generally” even
though the decision may be at odds with “pure economic efficiency and a
minimization of transaction costs.” Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 330, at 445.
In its assumption that inspiring confidence on the one hand, and reducing
transaction costs and promoting efficiency (they are often the same thing) on
the other, cut in opposite directions, this reasoning is fairly confused. Why
would the adoption of a rule that reduces the return on stocks inspire people
to invest in the stock market? But to the extent that there was any such loss
of confidence because of Section 102(b)(7), this is a genuine cost. Id.; see also
Drury, supra note 57, at 141ï43.
695
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that they have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits,
that they will face an irreparable injury if the injunction does
not issue, and that the balance of the equities favors issuing the
injunction.697 If the plaintiffs show a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits—if, that is, they have shown that the directors likely breached their fiduciary duties in approving the
merger—then it almost always follows that the plaintiffs have
also shown that they face an irreparable injury—the consummation of the merger at too low a price. In such cases, if other bidders have emerged and made superior offers for the company,
the Delaware courts have always issued an appropriate injunction. When no other bidders have emerged, the courts have
found that, provided that appropriate supplemental disclosure is
made to the stockholders, the merger may be considered at a
meeting of the stockholders, the theory being that fully informed
and uncoerced stockholders are best placed to decide whether
the transaction is value-maximizing even despite the fiduciary
breaches by the directors.698
Of course, if the plaintiffs do not show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits (or if they do, but, as explained
above, the Court of Chancery still declines to issue an injunction), then the plaintiffs can appeal as of right to the Delaware
Supreme Court. Assuming the result of this appeal is the same,
the merger will be submitted to the stockholders. Only if the stockholders vote to approve the merger, of course, will the merger
actually close.699 Historically, in this situation, most plaintiffs
abandon their suits, because unless they are alleging bad faith
breaches or breaches of the directors’ duty of loyalty, after closing, when the only available remedy is monetary damages, their
suits become subject to dismissal because of the inevitable Section 102(b)(7) provision in the corporation’s charter.700 After the
See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
178, 179 (Del. 1986).
698 See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch.
2012); In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192ï95,
209ï10 (Del. Ch. 2007).
699 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2017).
700 See, e.g., In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d
1173, 1179–82 (Del. 2015); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093ï96 (Del.
2001); see also Hamermesh, supra note 23, at 490 (stating that exculpatory
697

216 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:065
Delaware Supreme Court decided Corwin in 2015, of course, the
plaintiffs’ position became even more difficult.701
The system thus created is similar to the pre-clearance
system under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976.702 Under that system, parties in the United States seeking to effect a business combination meeting certain modest
threshold requirements regarding the purchase price paid and
the revenues and assets of the parties involved703 are required to
give notice to the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC),704 providing the relevant agency with
certain information regarding the transaction and the products
and services that the parties sell and the markets in which they
operate.705 Under the statute, the filing by the parties starts a
thirty-day clock.706 If the transaction raises no antitrust concerns,
the relevant agency will grant “early termination” within this
thirty-day period, and the parties are then free to complete the
provisions like those authorized by Section 102(b)(7) “have rendered damage
claims for breach of the duty of care essentially non-existent”).
701 See supra note 676 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of Corwin).
702 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(2006). See generally, AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2000);
STEPHEN M. AXINN ET AL., ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENT ACT (2008); PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PRACTICE
MANUAL (Anthony W. Swisher & Neil W. Imus, eds., 4th ed. 2007).
703 The rules are fairly complicated, and the dollar thresholds are indexed
to the United States Gross Domestic Product and, thus, are adjusted every
year. In 2017, if the value of the transaction exceeds $323 million a filing is
required. If the value of transaction falls below $80.8 million, a filing is not
required. If the value of the transaction is between these two, a filing may or
may not be required depending on the revenues and assets of the persons
involved. See FTC Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the
Clayton Act, 82 FED. REG. 8524 (Jan. 26, 2017).
704 The agency that has jurisdiction depends on the industries in which the
parties operate as per an inter-agency agreement between the DOJ and the
FTC. See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATIONS
3ï5, 8ï11 (Mar. 5, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy
/2007/07/17/10170.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2X9-4Q85].
705 AXINN ET AL., supra note 702, 295ï312 (explaining what information
must be included in HSR filing).
706 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (2006).

2017]

SMITH V. VAN GORKOM

217

merger.707 If the agency is concerned that the merger may violate the antitrust laws, it will typically issue a “second request”
for additional information regarding the issues about which it has
concerns.708 This stops the thirty-day clock and usually triggers
an extended regulatory approval process, often involving negotiations between the government and the parties concerning divestitures and other conditions on the operations of the combined
company after the merger.709 If the results of this process satisfy
the agency, the agency will terminate the review, and the parties
will be free to close the merger in accordance with their agreement
with the government. If the agency and the parties do not reach
an agreement, then the parties will usually abandon the merger.710
If they do not, the agency generally sues to enjoin the merger,
and a federal court will decide whether to issue an injunction.
Under the HSR Act, providing the required notice to the
government is mandatory (except for certain very small transactions), whereas in Delaware review of the transaction depends
on a plaintiff bringing a suit, but with 84 percent of all publiccompany mergers being challenged in 2015, this is not much of a
difference.711 In the HSR system, there is often a negotiation between the government and the parties, and in the Delaware system there is often a settlement process between the plaintiffs and
the board, usually concerning additional disclosure the board will
make to the stockholders before the stockholder meeting.712 In
707 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE 2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS INITIATIVE 3,

(Dec. 12, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/12
/15/220241.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ9B-FG8M].
708 Id. at 3–6.
709 Id. at 6–8.
710 Justin Sayers & Nathan Bomey, Aetna, Humana abandon $37 billion
merger, JOURNAL SENTINEL (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.jsonline.com/story
/money/business/2017/02/14/aetna-humana-abandon-37-billion-merger/97889
790/ [https://perma.cc/3GAK-J4DZ].
711 Cornerstone Research, Shareholder Litigation Involving Acquisitions of
Public Companies 1 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports
/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/497K
-7F7H]
712 See In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.2d 884 (Del. 2015); Peter J.
Walsh Jr. & Aaron R. Sims, Trulia and the Demise of “Disclosure Only” Settlements in Delaware, BUS. L. TODAY (2016), https://www.americanbar.org
/publications/blt/2016/02/delaware_insider.html [https://perma.cc/Z2CY-QARP].
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both systems, if there is a serious legal problem with the merger,
the transaction will be likely be enjoined (or abandoned), and in
both systems if an injunction does not issue, the matter is usually
at an end. Although the government can challenge a merger on antitrust grounds after the merger has closed, such cases are rare.713
It is notable in this regard that the HSR pre-clearance system is regarded as a great advance in antitrust enforcement and
has been widely copied around the world, including by the European Union and the Japanese and Chinese antitrust authorities.
As suggested in this Article, its key procedural features have been
reproduced in Delaware as well—albeit for quite different purposes.
CONCLUSION
Genius is of various kinds. In some cases, it involves doing much better than everyone else, something that other people
are already doing. In other cases, it involves doing something no one
else ever thought of doing, thus opening up whole new realms of
human achievement. Shakespeare, Mozart, and Gauss had genius
of the first kind, while Dante, Beethoven, and Frege had genius
of the second kind. It is surely hyperbolic to compare any accomplishment in corporate law with the achievements of Dante,
Beethoven, or Frege, but there is still a certain limited analogy.
The advances in corporate law achieved by Unocal and Revlon involved the first kind of genius: they developed existing materials
in excellent ways to substantially improve on past results. The
advance in corporate law jointly achieved by Van Gorkom and
Section 102(b)(7), however, is of the second kind.714 It required
seeing that what everyone implicitly assumed was true—that
every right has a remedy—need not be true, and that changing
See Brent Kendall, U.S. Seeks to Undo Parker-Hannifin’s Clarcor Deal
on Antitrust Grounds, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2017). See generally J. Thomas
Rosch, Remarks before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting:
Consummated Merger Challenges—The Past is Never Dead, F.T.C. (May 29,
2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/con
summated-merger-challenges-past-never-dead/120329springmeetingspeech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LP4D-JGC3].
714 Martin Lipton’s invention of the poison pill, which the Delaware Supreme Court declared legal in Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1352, 1355–57 (Del. 1985), the fourth great case in the miracle year of 1985,
also involves genius of this second kind.
713
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this assumption could produce a significantly better system. I do
not pretend that the justices in the majority in Van Gorkom
understood all this and intended to create the system of takeover regulation Delaware now has. They surely did not. But that
does not change the fact that Van Gorkom, albeit in a unique
way, was a great and necessary step forward in the development
of Delaware corporate law.

